SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
Disciplinary Review Board
Docket No. 16-330
District Docket No. VA-2012-0036E

IN THE MATTER OF

ALI A. ALI

AN ATTORNEY AT LAW

Decision

Argued: January 19, 2017

Decided: May 11, 2017

Deborah B. Fineman appeared on behalf of the District VA Ethics Committee.

Respondent waived appearance for oral argument.

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.

This matter originally was before us on September 15, 2016, on a recommendation for an admonition, filed by the District VA Ethics Committee (DEC). At that time, we determined to treat it as a recommendation for greater discipline and to bring the matter on for oral argument.

The three-count complaint charged respondent with violations of RPC 1.3 (lack of diligence), RPC 1.4(c) (failure to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit

the client to make informed decisions about the representation), RPC 3.2 (failure to expedite litigation), RPC 3.4(c) (knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), RPC 3.5(b) (making improper ex parte communications), and RPC 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).[1] For the reasons expressed below, we determine that a reprimand and conditions on respondent's practice are warranted.

Respondent was admitted to the New Jersey bar in 2009. He has no history of discipline. At the relevant time, respondent maintained a law office in Elizabeth, New Jersey. During the course of the representation, he moved his office to his home in Bridgewater, for approximately one year, and then opened an office in Princeton, New Jersey.

In May 2013, respondent entered into an agreement in lieu of discipline (ALD). Because he failed to comply with its requirements, the DEC filed an ethics complaint against him.

On June 17, 2015, prior to the ethics hearing, the DEC issued a case management order, which provided that, if respondent sought to challenge the admissibility of the ALD

---

[1] Although the complaint alleged that respondent maintained a solo law practice under the name "Law Champs LLC," it did not charge him with a violation of RPC 7.5(a), which requires that a firm name include the full or last names of one or more of the lawyers in the firm or office.

and/or the admissions contained therein, he was required to file a brief on or before July 10, 2015, failing which he would be deemed to have waived any objection to its admission into evidence and any admissions contained therein. Respondent neither filed a brief nor objected to the admission of the ALD at the DEC hearing, but stated that he was there to put on a case and "to win friends and influence people."

The ethics investigation was prompted by an October 4, 2012 referral from the Honorable Daniel D'Alessandro, J.S.C.. The judge's letter explained that respondent had represented plaintiff Fernando Bernaola[2] in a matrimonial matter. According to the judge, on June 7, 2011, his staff requested a notice of appearance from respondent. On July 11, 2011, he was ordered to file a substitution of attorney by July 18, 2011, because he had not complied with the court's first request. Thereafter, a September 13, 2011 conference was cancelled because respondent did not appear.

After the Bernaola matter was scheduled for a November 1, 2011 hearing, respondent sent an adjournment request to the court, because (1) his staff had misplaced the file; (2) he was extremely busy preparing for another case; and (3) he had lost

---

2 The name is spelled Bernacola in the complaint.

power the day before due to a storm. The court was unable to reach him to reply to his request.

The defendant's attorney and the Matrimonial Early Settlement Panel coordinator also were unsuccessful in their attempts to contact respondent.

Later, at a January 18, 2012 hearing date, respondent left his client in court, without informing the judge or the judge's staff. When Bernaola's case was called, Bernaola stated that respondent had instructed him to relay to the judge that he had to leave. Thereafter, when the judge ordered respondent to appear before him, respondent informed the judge that he had left to pick up his child. The judge did not sanction respondent but explained to him that he should not have left his client, and instructed respondent about his responsibility to provide the court and his adversary with reliable contact information.

On March 27, 2012, after the matter was rescheduled for April 2, 2012, respondent sent an ex parte letter to the judge, requesting an adjournment due to a scheduling conflict, and stating that "if the Judge wanted more details he 'would be happy to discuss this matter over the phone and disclose the conflict in confidence.'" By letter dated March 29, 2012, the judge denied the adjournment request, informing respondent that he could not have ex parte communications with counsel.

Thereafter, respondent told the judge's law clerk that he was "not going to make that" April 2, 2012 hearing because he had another case pending. Because respondent failed to appear at the hearing, the judge adjourned it and issued an order on May 7, 2012, which, in part, required respondent to appear in court on May 14, 2012. Bernaola then retained new counsel.

Bernaola's new attorney informed the court that, on April 27, 2012, he had sent respondent a substitution of attorney, but had not heard from him. His efforts to fax the substitution were unavailing. He could not reach respondent by phone as his mailbox was full.

Finally, on May 5, 2012, respondent signed the substitution of attorney, which the court accepted so that Bernaola would not be prejudiced, notwithstanding respondent's failure to comply with the Court Rules regarding withdrawal from a case. The judge also directed respondent to appear in court on May 14, 2012. Respondent failed to do so.

According to the judge, respondent's conduct, including his failure to provide reliable contact information, to appear at court sessions, and leaving his client on his own in court, delayed the proceedings.

Through the ALD, respondent stipulated that, in the course of representing Bernaola in a divorce action, he (1) failed to

attend various court sessions and court-ordered appearances; (2) left his client in court when the case was about to be called, without notifying the court or court personnel; and (3) failed to provide the court or opposing counsel with accurate or available means to contact him.

The ethics complaint asserted that, as a result of respondent's conduct, the parties' divorce action was repeatedly delayed and, ultimately, the plaintiff retained new counsel.

According to the ALD, respondent's conduct violated RPC 1.3, RPC 3.2, RPC 3.4(c), and RPC 8.4(d); and by leaving his client alone in court, as the case was about to be called, respondent also violated RPC 1.4(c).

The ALD provided further that respondent engaged in an improper ex parte communication when he wrote to the court, without copying his adversary, and attempted further impermissible ex parte communications with the court, thereby violating RPC 3.5(b). As to such communications, respondent asserted that he was not familiar with the Rule and did not know what he had done that was considered prejudicial to the administration of justice, which seemed to him to be a broad "catchall."

In order to successfully comply with the ALD, respondent was to satisfy the following conditions: (1) within thirty days

of the Office of Attorney Ethics' (OAE) acceptance of the terms of the ALD, he was to submit a letter of apology to Judge D'Alessandro; and (2) within six months of the OAE's acceptance of the agreement, he was to (a) attend, in-person, the New Jersey Bar Association's (NJBA) Diversionary Continuing Legal Education (CLE) Program; (b) attend, via audio CD, the CLE program "Ethics for the Small Firm and Solo Practitioner;" (c) update his website, letterhead, and other materials to reflect his current contact information; and (d) complete an additional fifteen CLE credit hours during his two-year reporting cycle.

The ALD further required respondent to file a number of reports at various intervals to provide evidence of his progress toward completing the requirements of the ALD.

The agreement also provided that, "[i]f accepted, this Agreement is valid, and a copy is admissible, but only in this and any subsequent disciplinary proceeding as evidence of respondent's unethical conduct."

Respondent's answer to the ethics complaint provided the following excuses for his behavior:

> I do not remember the exact dates I missed but due to a transition in the office there was a communication issue between the

> "mentor"[3] and myself. This was a very busy time in my career with family obligations and case load. This forced me to choose between zealously representing my client vs family obligation to my son (8 years old) and wife (12 years now). . . . Another issue at that time was time and not having enough money to hire additional help.
>
> [A¶7(i)].[4]

As to abandoning his client in court, respondent stated that, because the judge was on the bench and his staff was doing paperwork, he did "[not want] to be rude I did not want to approach the staff so I made the decision to tell my client I have to pick up my son from childcare." At the DEC hearing, he explained that the case was not going to be settled. He, thus, chose to leave to pick up his son and told the client to let the judge know that he had childcare issues and to schedule the matter for trial. He later added that he was concerned that if he approached the bench, the judge would become upset. He stated that he was not aware that he could have access to the judge's chambers to alert his staff.

As to the court's and counsel's inability to contact him, respondent blamed his mentors, asserting that they had assured him that he could use their office and that his phone calls

---

[3] Presumably, the mentor or mentors were attorneys with whom respondent shared office space.

[4] A refers to respondent's answer to the ethics complaint.

would be answered there. He claimed further that he had also provided the judge with his cell phone number. In addition, respondent stated that his failure to respond to the court's directives was "an issue of [his] messages not being taken by [his] 'mentor's office'."

In his answer, respondent also denied knowingly disobeying the court. He asserted that he had to make a choice and he chose family, adding that his time was limited because he did not have the financial resources to hire additional help.

Regarding Judge D'Alessandro's referral of the matter to the OAE, respondent complained that "it is unclear why an offer of mentorship and help was not made rather than a letter to the [OAE]."

Respondent explained that he failed to comply with the ALD because he was embarrassed; he, thus, took the "Ostrich Approach," and hid his head in the sand. He is now

> ready to be a leader and face these issues head on and willing to do more than what was originally stated in the ALD. For example, I would love to participate in the Benchmark Civics program offered through the [NJBA]. I want to bring law and leadership to the Pakistani community. The leadership may save the lives of many innocent individuals including you and your family. This is just one example where I see I can help the bar and my fellow brothers and sisters.
>
> [A¶17.]

At the DEC hearing, respondent thanked the panel for the opportunity to be present and "you know, just win friends and influence people. One day I'll be on top of that panel." He later reiterated that if the ethics matter "goes nowhere, in about ten years, I will be on a panel similar to this." Respondent asserted that, regardless of the panel's ultimate decision, he had already changed his business practice. He was a "different attorney" from the one he was before. He was thought of "more of a business-minded attorney," and his clients were "much happier." He has changed his business practices, "which teaches me to think more like a business professional and have a successful family life . . . I've rehabbed myself."

Respondent regretted not following through with the conditions, presumably of the ALD. He claimed that he had written a letter of apology to the judge, but never submitted it because he wanted to deliver it in person. He remarked

> I took an ostrich instruction [sic], and honestly, I'll be honest with you, 90,000 lawyers in New Jersey, I didn't feel that if I violated the agreement in lieu of I [sic] would -- would come back to haunt me. That's the honest answer.
>
> [T38-7 to T38-11.][5]

---

[5] T refers to the August 10, 2015 DEC hearing transcript.

Respondent did not believe that he had violated the RPCs. He believed that he had protected the public – his client – by returning the entire retainer. As to the RPC 3.2 violation, respondent believed that he was courteous and considerate to all parties. On March 30, 2012, respondent notified the court that he would not attend an April 2, 2012 hearing. Even though he was informed that the matter would proceed, he did not appear. He maintained that he would have been discourteous if he had told the judge "F you, I'm not coming," rather than telling the court that he would not appear because he had a busy schedule.

Respondent blamed his mentor for his troubles. He found the mentor on Craig's List "as many attorneys do who look to establish their own office." According to respondent, the mentor:

> was saying, I'm looking to mentor young attorneys . . . but it didn't work out like that, right, so he stopped taking my calls. He thought I was going to come in, an attorney from the Pakistani community, the target market would be the Pakistani community would bring in a lot of clients to him, and just didn't work out that way . . . So he lost all interest in me and said, Hey, I'm just going to advise my office not to take his phone calls . . . .
>
> [T23-10 to T23-23.]

Respondent asserted that he did not knowingly disobey the obligations under the rules of a tribunal because "maybe I

didn't get the phone calls from my mentor attorney's office who cut me off."

According to respondent, he "stopped dealing in the legal business, I have my paralegals who do that and I only take issues that are of the most important that needs [sic] to come to my desk. That makes me a better person, a better husband, a better father."

Respondent made a recommendation to the panel:

> I will be happy to complete some -- everything that's in the [ALD].
>
> Here's what I propose to the committee. I'm from the Muslim community. I'm a leader and I stand out. In the age of terrorism, I think I could be more beneficial to young professionals to engage in athletic competition or just teaching their mind to be on the right track, rather than engaging in any activity that's going to injure the public.
>
> . . . .
>
> If the committee feels I'm an asset, I think I have the ear of my community that may one day save yours and my life if I even get one mentor to agree to the way of thinking and just engage in working and reading.
>
> [T25-19 to T26-13.]

As to the changes to his law practice, respondent remarked that new attorneys do not have funds for hiring staff. Thus, he starting reading books, one of which changed his life, Four Hour Work Week, which deals with outsourcing work. According to

respondent, none of his paralegals are even in the State of New Jersey. "They're spread out through the United States and I'm even exploring paralegals in India who can do legal work for me for pennies on the dollar." Respondent named several websites that could be used to post ads to hire paralegals for project-based jobs to avoid paying someone a salary or benefits to sit in the office. He stated that the concept "works great" for him.

Respondent maintained that he tried to hire the best and smartest paralegals "who are ten times smarter than me who never got a chance to go to law school for whatever reason," and employs a paralegal who is licensed in another state but does not have a New Jersey license. According to respondent, she is 100 times smarter than him. He reviews her work and focuses "on going to conferences, building relationships and playing golf, because that brings in the business and I can have my paralegals do the work while I supervise them." His paralegals, however, do not dispense legal advice. This is like senior partner thinking because "they're out playing golf and building relationship[s], which ultimately brings in the business."

Respondent's paralegals draft complaints and paperwork. Clients do not want advice from a paralegal. When they want to speak to the "senior man . . . that puts me [on a] pedestal, so they're like, wow, I'm getting to talk to an attorney so I

better be quick and I better be important. It sets that precedence [sic] when you do that chain of hierarchy" that they be quick and not tell him their life stories. The paralegals can listen to them, "If I did that, I would be taking away from my family."

A panel member inquired whether respondent had contemplated that he might encounter a conflict of interest when outsourcing work. The panel member explained what problems could arise in that regard. Respondent replied "I understand now," but asserted that it had not been an issue. He conceded that he needed to come up with a system to check for conflicts.

As to respondent's multiple offices, he explained that he currently has an office in Princeton. His previous offices were reciprocity agreements with other attorneys so he could use them on his website. They were free to use his office and he was free to use theirs. His reason for choosing Princeton as his office location was "it's Disney, because it has an upscale reputation. So if you look at a timeshare, everyone wants to trade out for a Princeton office name."

Respondent conceded that he had problems getting messages because his voicemail sometimes was full due to his "involved" caseload. He complained that there was a miscommunication when calls were made to his "previous attorney slash mentor," who

would inform individuals that respondent no longer worked for him. However, respondent asserted that he had provided Judge D'Alessandro with his cell phone number "on the record."

Because respondent had emphasized that he was trying to operate his practice as a business, a panel member asked for a showing that he is an attorney, rather than a businessman. Respondent replied:

> I like to read. I read law books to -- it takes me away from issues when clients call. It just takes my time away from the clients telling me their life story. I leave that stuff out to my paralegals [sic]. I do a lot of reading on the law. I go to conferences. I network my attorney -- [sic] in fact, I'm in negotiations with Seton Hall to establish the first of its kind scholarship for C students. So I'm networking with other fellow lawyers because when I need a lifeline and it's all going to depend on my relationship with other lawyers.
>
> [T39-9 to T39-18.]

A panel member remarked that he did not believe that respondent recognized his responsibilities under the RPCs. Respondent inquired "[w]hat do you suggest that I do?" The panel member replied that he should read the rules, that attorneys are placed in a special position of trust, and that having a law license is a privilege. The panel member expressed his concern that respondent exhibited a cavalier attitude toward the court and his client.

When asked if he is currently reachable by phone, respondent replied that he now has a "1-800 number," which his secretary answers and then e-mails and texts messages to three people, "so someone's going to call them back."

As a resolution to the proceedings, respondent stated:

> I look at myself, where I can be the most effective at the bar association level. There's a lot of people in my community, I have some sort of influence at my mosque. I'm a leader in my community. . . . I'm not sure what sanction they would want to put on me, but if they want to put me in a mentorship position to younger Muslims, or I don't care, whatever population it is, but I think I would best serve in that capacity, but ultimately, the decision is with the panel.
>
> [T49-23 to T50-6.]

Respondent's closing comments were that he came to America as a "poor Pakistani kid;" that he "shouldn't even be here," presumably at the DEC hearing; that he has different ideas, not necessarily the traditional route to practicing law; that he wants to make an impact on his community, and the law is a great resource to do so; hopefully one day he can counsel a young attorney; and that he is "just lucky to be in America, which our way of life goes to my way, I just know, lucky to be alive and breathing."

The presenter, however, pointed out that, although "ignorance may be bliss," it is not a mitigating factor. The

aggravating factors are respondent's lack of remorse or contrition, and lack of remediation. Respondent does not hold himself accountable for what happened and, in the three years that passed since the entry of the ALD, he never sent a written apology to Judge D'Alessandro.

Respondent did not file a post-hearing brief, despite having been afforded the opportunity to do so. In her post-hearing letter-brief, the presenter recommended that the panel impose no less than a reprimand, given respondent's lack of remorse and failure to accept responsibility for his actions. The presenter also highlighted respondent's inaction that was set forth in Judge D'Alessandro's referral to the OAE.

Finally, the presenter urged consideration of the following aggravating factors: respondent failed to accept responsibility for his wrongdoing; although he stated that he learned his lesson, respondent showed no remorse or contrition; respondent still had not written a letter of apology to the judge; and "by his own testimony," respondent had hoped that the ALD matter would "slip through the cracks and he would get away with not adhering to its terms."

The presenter argued that respondent failed to establish the existence of mitigating circumstances. His answer to the complaint "merely illuminated [his] total disregard of a

lawyer's duties and responsibilities while seeking to blame others or excuse each action without accountability."

The DEC found that respondent's conduct violated all of the rules charged in the complaint: RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(c), RPC 3.2, RPC 3.4(c), RPC 3.5(b), and RPC 8.4(d). The DEC reasoned that, because the underlying conduct was initially the subject of an ALD, and that such agreements are imposed only for minor unethical conduct, it was "highly persuasive, if not conclusive, that the underlying conduct was 'minor' and thus warrants no more than an admonition." The DEC did not find that respondent's failure to comply with the agreement warranted greater discipline, because the consequence of his non-compliance was his ineligibility for the benefits attendant to a diversion – the avoidance of a public record of his conduct.

* * *

Following a de novo review of the record we are satisfied that the DEC's conclusion that respondent was guilty of unethical conduct was fully supported by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree with the DEC's recommendation for discipline, however.

From the sparse record relating to respondent's underlying conduct, we find that he lacked diligence and failed to expedite litigation in the Bernaola matter by failing to attend various

court sessions, including court ordered appearances, and by leaving Bernaola in court when his case was about to be called, without advising the court or seeking leave to do so, violations of RPC 1.3 and RPC 3.2. He also disobeyed court orders by failing to appear when ordered to do so and by failing to file a substitution of attorney, violations of RPC 3.4(c) and RPC 8.4(d). Finally, respondent engaged in an *ex parte* communication with the judge, when he sought to obtain an adjournment without notifying his adversary, and by inviting the judge to contact him to discuss a conflict in confidence, a violation of RPC 3.5(b). The facts set forth in the record, however, do not establish that respondent violated RPC 1.4(c) (failure to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions about the representation). Respondent's failure to remain with his client until his case was called is a violation of RPC 8.4(d), rather than RPC 1.4(c).

Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice comes in a variety of forms and typically results in either a reprimand or a censure, depending on the existence of other violations, the attorney's ethics history, whether the matter proceeded as a default, the harm to others, and mitigating or aggravating factors.

Attorneys who have failed to obey court orders have been reprimanded, even when the conduct was accompanied by other violations. See, e.g., In re Cameron, 225 N.J. 370 (2016) (attorney engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by failing to return an unearned retainer after entry of a fee arbitration award requiring the attorney to return the entire retainer to the client, violations of RPC 1.16(d) and RPC 8.4(d), and charged an unreasonable fee; attorney had a prior admonition and a reprimand; mitigation included the attorney's cooperation, admission of wrongdoing, poor health, and his financial condition); In re Cerza, 220 N.J. 215 (2015) (attorney failed to comply with an order requiring him to produce subpoenaed documents in a bankruptcy matter, exhibited a lack of diligence, and failed to promptly turn over funds to a client or third person); In re Gellene, 203 N.J. 443 (2010) (attorney found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal for failing to appear on the return date of an appellate court's order to show cause and failing to notify the court that he would not appear; the attorney also was guilty of gross neglect, pattern of neglect, lack of diligence, and failure to communicate with clients; mitigating factors considered were the attorney's financial problems, his battle

with depression, and significant family problems; his ethics history included two private reprimands and an admonition); and In re Hartmann, 142 N.J. 587 (1995) (attorney intentionally and repeatedly ignored four court orders to pay opposing counsel a fee, resulting in a warrant for the attorney's arrest; the attorney also displayed discourteous and abusive conduct toward a judge with intent to intimidate her).

A censure was imposed in In re D'Arienzo, 207 N.J. 31 (2010), where the attorney exercised poor judgment in the management of his calendar. He failed to appear for a scheduled criminal trial and, thereafter, at two orders to show cause stemming from his failure to appear at that trial. In the Matter of Marc D'Arienzo, DRB 10-406 (May 16, 2011) (slip op. at 3). We found that the attorney's failure to appear at trial inconvenienced the court, the prosecutor, and witnesses. By failing to notify the court, in advance, that he could not appear, he prevented the judge from scheduling other matters, a violation of RPC 8.4(d). The attorney's ethics history, a three-month suspension and two admonitions, played a role in elevating the discipline to a censure.

A censure was also imposed in In re LeBlanc, 188 N.J. 480 (2006). There, the attorney's misconduct in three client matters included conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice

for failure to appear at a fee arbitration hearing, failure to abide by a court order directing the attorney to produce information, gross neglect, pattern of neglect, lack of diligence, failure to communicate with the client, failure to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions about the representation, charging an unreasonable fee, failure to promptly remit funds to a third party, failure to expedite litigation, failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities, and failure to comply with the rule prohibiting non-refundable retainers in family law matters. We considered, in mitigation, the attorney's recognition and stipulation of his wrongdoing; that he had changed law firms and, thus, lost important staff; that he lacked the intent to disregard his obligation to cooperate with ethics authorities; and that he had no ethics history.

Here, respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by (1) leaving his client prior to the case being called, without first informing the court or court personnel, (2) failing to attend various court sessions and court-ordered appearances, and (3) being unreachable to the court, his adversary, and substitute counsel. Respondent also lacked diligence and failed to expedite litigation, leading his

client to retain new counsel, and engaged in _ex parte_ communications.

As the presenter noted, respondent showed no remorse or contrition for his conduct, but instead proffered flimsy excuses for his shortcomings and was sorry only that this matter did not "fall through the cracks," thus, making a mockery of the ethics process. Moreover, respondent's justification for his failure to comply with the ALD lacked sincerity. In addition to these aggravating factors, the more disturbing aspects of this case are that (1) respondent did not appear to understand the impact of his misconduct or that he in fact engaged in misconduct; (2) he did not understand the significance of the disciplinary process, as evidenced by the fact that he suggested that, as part of his discipline, he mentor others; (3) he did not seem to understand the function of a mentor, as it does not entail merely sharing office space with another attorney found on Craig's List; and (4) he outsources his work to paralegals outside of New Jersey and tries to minimize his contact with clients to maximize rainmaking and spending time with his family.

Based on precedent, because this is respondent's first disciplinary matter, involving only one client matter, and because respondent had been admitted for only three-to-four

years at the time of his misconduct and, therefore, was inexperienced, we determine to impose a reprimand.

However, we have some reservations regarding respondent's cognizance of his duties and obligations as an attorney. Thus, we further determine to impose the following conditions on respondent's practice: (1) that respondent practice under the supervision of an OAE-approved proctor, until the OAE deems it is no longer necessary; (2) that he complete a Continuing Legal Education (CLE) course in law office management; and (3) that he complete two additional ethics courses, in addition to those required for CLE credit. Respondent is to provide proof to the OAE of completion of the courses within one year from the date of the Court's Order.

We further determine to require respondent to reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for administrative costs and actual expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in R. 1:20-17.

Disciplinary Review Board
Bonnie C. Frost, Chair

By: 
Ellen A. Brodsky
Chief Counsel

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BOARD
VOTING RECORD

In the Matter of Ali A. Ali
Docket No. DRB 16-330

Argued: January 19, 2017

Decided: May 11, 2017

Disposition: Reprimand

Members	Reprimand	Recused	Did not participate
Frost	X		
Baugh	X		
Boyer	X		
Clark	X		
Gallipoli	X		
Hoberman	X		
Rivera	X		
Singer	X		
Zmirich	X		
Total:	9		


Ellen A. Brodsky
Chief Counsel