SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
Disciplinary Review Board
Docket No. DRB 10-445
District Docket No. XIV-2009-563E

IN THE MATTER OF

PETER H. JACOBY

AN ATTORNEY AT LAW

Decision

Argued: February 17, 2011

Decided: April 28, 2011

Lee A. Gronikowski appeared on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics.

Alan L. Zegas appeared on behalf of respondent.

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.

This matter came before us on a motion for final discipline filed by the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE), pursuant to R. 1:20-13, following respondent's guilty plea to "unlawful wounding," a felony, in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-51, in

the Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria, Virginia. The OAE recommends that respondent receive "at least" a three- to six-month suspension. Respondent urges the imposition of a three-month suspension. For the reasons stated below, we determine to impose a one-year suspension.

Respondent was admitted to the New Jersey bar in 1987. He is retired from AT&T, where he served as corporate counsel, from 1982 until April 2008.

In October 2006, respondent received a censure for "commit[ting] a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects," a violation of RPC 8.4(b). In re Jacoby, 188 N.J. 384 (2006) (Jacoby I). Respondent was charged with having violated this ethics rule, following his guilty plea to simple assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)), in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County. The criminal action arose out of a domestic violence incident, in which respondent twice grabbed his wife by the throat with both hands, began to choke her, and then threw her against a wall, dislocating her shoulder. In the Matter of Peter H. Jacoby, DRB 06-068 (June 6, 2006) (slip op. at 2).

In Jacoby I, we determined that a three-month suspension was the appropriate measure of discipline for respondent's misconduct. Id. at 17. The Court disagreed and, instead, censured respondent.

In this matter, on March 29, 2008, Officer Tony V. Moore, Jr., of the Alexandria Police Department, was dispatched to the home of respondent and his wife, Laurann, upon the report of a domestic violence incident. When Officer Moore arrived, he was unable to talk to Laurann, due to her injuries. She was taken to the hospital by ambulance. Respondent was arrested, charged with malicious wounding, a felony, in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-51, and incarcerated in the Alexandria Detention Center on April 1, 2008. Ultimately, he pleaded guilty to unlawful wounding.

Under Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-51, unlawful wounding is a lesser-included offense within malicious wounding. The statute defines both as follows:

> If any person maliciously shoot, stab, cut, or wound any person or by any means cause him bodily injury, with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill, he shall, except where it is otherwise provided, be guilty of a Class 3 felony. If such act be done unlawfully but not maliciously, with

> the intent aforesaid, the offender shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.
>
> [Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-51 (2010).]

In Virginia, a Class 6 felony calls for

> a term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than five years, or in the discretion of the jury or the court trying the case without a jury, confinement in jail for not more than 12 months and a fine of not more than $ 2,500, either or both.
>
> [Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-10(f).]

Both respondent and Laurann reported on what transpired during the March 29, 2008 incident. Respondent's version was given to Moore at the scene, as reflected in the incident report, and Laurann's version was set forth in a hand-written statement.

According to Laurann's written statement, on March 29, 2008, between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m., she had a telephone conversation with her stepsister about a fall that her 96-year-old stepfather had taken. She was upset. After the telephone call ended, she went upstairs to talk to respondent, who was in the couple's bedroom. She claimed that respondent, who was sitting on the floor, going through papers, "was not very comforting," did not want to be interrupted, and became agitated.

Laurann then left the bedroom, went downstairs to the kitchen, and removed an ice cube tray from the freezer. She returned to the bedroom, with the ice cube tray in hand, and dumped the ice cubes onto respondent's head. She claimed that this was her way of telling respondent "to cool down."

Respondent mentioned nothing to Moore of Laurann's first trip to the bedroom, when she tried to talk to him about the situation with her stepfather. His version began with her appearance in the room with the ice tray.

The parties agreed that, after Laurann dumped the ice cubes onto respondent's head, she left the room with the tray and went downstairs. Respondent claimed that, after she left, he picked the ice cubes up off the floor and went downstairs. Laurann was waiting at the bottom of the stairs with the ice cube tray. According to respondent, she hit him across the left side of his face with it, dropped it onto the floor, and then left the room. After he put the ice cubes into the garbage disposal and the tray back into the freezer, he returned to the bedroom.

According to Laurann's statement, she returned the ice cube tray to the freezer. She made no mention of respondent's going downstairs. Rather, she claimed that, while she was downstairs,

respondent called for her to come back to the bedroom. She complied. She asserted that, when she entered the room, they began to argue about her stepfather's condition and about the ice cube incident.

Laurann further asserted that, as she attempted to pick up a small plastic trash can to empty downstairs, respondent again became agitated. In response, she emptied the contents onto the floor and threw the trash can at him.

For his part, respondent claimed that, after the ice cube incident, Laurann returned to the bedroom, yelling and screaming at him. She began to punch and kick him about his face and chest. Laurann then left the room, but returned about a minute later and began to assault him again. He attempted to defend himself by putting his arms up in front of his face. According to respondent, this second assault ended with Laurann's throwing the trash can at him and leaving the room.

Next, respondent claimed, Laurann re-entered the room while he was picking up the trash and putting it back into the trash can. Again, she started yelling at him and then left the bedroom. Respondent got up to close the door. As he was doing so, Laurann tried to force her way back into the room. At this

point, respondent, who was now crying, began to scream at her to leave him alone. Laurann forced her way through the door and into the room, where she began to yell at him again, including calling him a baby, because he was crying, and telling him that he was not a "real man." She left the room again.

After some time, according to respondent, Laurann came back into the bedroom and "bumped him in the chest region." According to the incident report,

> Mr. Jacoby reports that he then slapped Ms. Jacoby a [sic] unknown amount of times with his left hand across the face causing her nose to bleed. Mr. Jacoby reports that on the last slap across the face Ms. Jacoby bent over in pain. Mr. Jacoby reports that when Ms. Jacoby got on the ground that he straddled her and held her down against her will. Mr. Jacoby reports that his wife was screaming for him to let her go but he refused to do so. Mr. Jacoby reports that his wife was trying to struggle free and started to hit him with her free hand.
>
> Mr. Jacoby reports that he struck her back multiple times in defense of her hitting him while he was holding her down on the ground against her will. Mr. Jacoby reports that he continued to hold his wife down while he tried calling his doctor. Mr. Jacoby reports that he let Ms. Jacoby go on the advice of his doctor after he told him what had happened. Mr. Jacoby reports that his

> wife then ran out the door in an unknown direction.
>
> [OAEaEx.A1.][1]

Laurann's version of what transpired after she had dumped the contents of the plastic trash can on respondent differed, except for the description of his attack on her. There, too, however, Laurann provided details that were not included in respondent's version of the story.

Laurann did not write, in her statement, that she had exited and re-entered the bedroom on the multiple occasions identified by respondent. Instead, she stated that, after she dumped the contents of the trash can onto respondent, she left the room and he closed the door. She continued:

> I then said we need to talk about this – I opened the door witch [sic] he was close to and it bumped him. I entered and before I could say a thing (I do remember asking him why was he so upset) then he started hitting me open hand on face right to left and my head right to left. He then put me in a head hold – one arm around the front (he was in back of me) the other arm grabbing the

[1] "OAEa" refers to the appendix attached to the OAE's brief. "Ex.A1" refers to the Alexandria Police Incident Report, dated March 29, 2008.

> back of my hair and pulled me down – he was yelling saying see what you made me do now I'm in trouble I'm going to get dis-bared [sic] and my career and life is over – and your [sic] going down with me – he then twisted my neck to left – heard a snap & crackle sound on right. I was begging him to stop he was hurting me – he then pulled me up and pushed me down toward back of bedroom near rear window – straddled me at pelvis area and put both knees on right and left arms elbow area – and started hitting closed fist right to left. I could feel blood coming from my nose.
>
> [OAEaEx.A2.][2]

In a separate incident report, filed by Officer Shawn P. Adcock, who spoke to Laurann at the scene of the crime, the officer noted that, according to Laurann, while respondent was twisting her neck, he stated: "I'll twist it until I kill you" and "I'll kill you."

The bottom of the page of the statement is cut off, but it continues on the following page, as follows:

> He was sweating and shaking – he got his cell phone – stayed on top of me. I was trying to get away. Could not. He then called psycol in D.C. he see's [sic] 1x a week. Mon. AM. Weber? George town – not available [sic] – he had cell phone in right

[2] "Ex.A2" refers to Laurann's undated written statement.

> hand and holding my throat in left hand – he told me to be quiet – I was beggning [sic] to feel blood going down by throat and ask [sic] him to get a towel – he then did get up went to bathroom and I ran out of bedroom downstairs was approx. 1 foot from front door and he ran after me got me by the back of my hair and pulled me back upstairs – while going upstairs I was on my feet and with my left hand was pounding on left wall to call attention to neighbor next door . . . . He did not respond – Peter got me back in bedroom got me down again – straddled me again same position the [sic] called Dr. Eisenberg in N.J. prior psycaritsit [sic] Peter had cell – on speaker holding my neck – on cell to Dr. Eisenberg – I was screaming to Dr. Eisenberg to call "911" and Peter was chocking [sic] and then after trying to have Dr. Eisenberg call – 911 Peter told me to be quiet and put his hand over my mouth – I'd guess within a minute – Peter suddenly got up (like he snapped out of it). I then ran out the front door with towel – bleeding face.
>
> [OAEaEx.A2.]

After Laurann ran to a neighbor's house, the police were called.

Adcock wrote, in the incident report that, according to Laurann, while respondent was on the phone with Dr. Eisenberg, he stated: "My life's over so I might as well make her's [sic] over."

While Moore interviewed respondent, he noticed blood on his left hand, and asked him about that. He wrote in the report:

> Mr. Jacoby stated it was his wife [sic] blood from when he slapped her. Mr. Jacoby reports that he also had change [sic] clothes due to the blood that was on his original clothing. Their [sic] was also a blood stained spot on the carpet. I looked over Mr. Jacoby and noticed no swelling, bruising, or fresh scratch marks on Mr. Jacoby. Mr. Jacoby stated that his wife was kicking and punching all afternoon but did not have one mark on him to prove this claim.
>
> [OAEaEx.A1.]

Respondent made no further statements with respect to what happened on the night of March 29, 2008.

At the hospital, Laurann met with a police department representative. She told the representative that she had consumed a half bottle of wine on the date of the incident. Nevertheless, the representative noted that Laurann appeared coherent.

Further, the police department representative called Dr. Eisenberg, who confirmed that respondent had called him during the altercation and that he did hear a woman "ask for 9-1-1." Eisenberg did not call 9-1-1 because "he was concentrating on Mr. Jacoby" whom he believed to be "in distress." Eisenberg would not say anything further, citing doctor/patient privilege.

On July 9, 2008, respondent pleaded guilty to unlawful wounding, a felony, in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-51. On August 21, 2008, he was sentenced to three years in jail, with all but twelve months suspended, conditioned on eighteen months of supervised probation, upon his release. He also was ordered to make restitution in the amount of $2283.

At sentencing, respondent stated that he "was the only person who could avoid having what was already a very explosive situation degenerate further." He stated that he was "ashamed" of his conduct and that he was prepared to accept its consequences.

As he did in the 2006 disciplinary matter, respondent presented a number of mitigating factors, most of which he relied upon in Jacoby I. There, respondent's attorney pointed out that the assault on Laurann was an aberration; that respondent took immediate responsibility for the assault, including caring for Laurann afterward; that, immediately following the incident, he sought professional help for his mental illness (intermittent explosive disorder), including voluntarily entering an anger-management program; that he was extremely remorseful for his behavior; that he had been the single parent of three children after his first wife had died,

more than twenty years before; that he had changed course in his career by becoming in-house counsel to AT&T so that he could devote sufficient time to the emotional needs of his children; that he continued to care for two of his adult children, one of whom was dependent on him, due to his own issues; that he and his wife had been in marriage counseling and that they moved to Washington, D.C., together so that he could continue his employment with AT&T; and that his reputation, character and good conduct were stellar.

In the matter now before us, respondent offered the following mitigating factors: (1) his intermittent explosive disorder, (2) his commitment and willingness to seek treatment for this disorder, (3) the termination of his relationship and all contact with Laurann, "which ensures his conduct will not recur," (4) his repeated expression of remorse, (5) his strong reputation and good conduct in his professional life, (6) the fact that his conduct was not related to the practice of law, and (7) his self-imposed three-year suspension as the result of his refraining from practicing law since April 2008. Respondent also repeated his history of losing his first wife when his children were young and his continuing financial and emotional support to them, even though they are adults.

What is new is his claim, now, that Laurann is an alcoholic and that, at the time of the incident, her blood alcohol level was between .18 and .2.

Following a review of the full record, we determine to grant the OAE's motion for final discipline. Final discipline proceedings in New Jersey are governed by R. 1:20-13(c). Under that rule, a criminal conviction is conclusive evidence of guilt in a disciplinary proceeding. R. 1:20-13(c)(1); In re Magid, 139 N.J. 449, 451 (1995); In re Principato, 139 N.J. 456, 460 (1995). Specifically, the conviction establishes a violation of RPC 8.4(b). Pursuant to that rule, it is professional misconduct for an attorney to "commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer." Hence, the sole issue before us is the extent of discipline to be imposed on respondent for his violation of RPC 8.4(b). R. 1:20-13(c)(2); In re Magid, supra, 139 N.J. at 451-52; In re Principato, supra, 139 N.J. at 460.

In determining the appropriate measure of discipline, the interests of the public, the bar, and the respondent must be considered. "The primary purpose of discipline is not to punish the attorney but to preserve the confidence of the public in the bar." In re Principato, supra, 139 N.J. at 460 (citations

omitted). Rather, many factors are taken into consideration, including the "nature and severity of the crime, whether the crime is related to the practice of law, and any mitigating factors such as respondent's reputation, his prior trustworthy conduct, and general good conduct." In re Lunetta, 118 N.J. 443, 445-46 (1989). Yet, even if the misconduct is not related to the practice of law, we must keep in mind that an attorney "is bound even in the absence of the attorney-client relation to a more rigid standard of conduct than required of laymen." In re Gavel, 22 N.J. 248, 265 (1956). "To the public he is a lawyer whether he acts in a representative capacity or otherwise." Ibid.

In In re Margabia, 150 N.J. 198, 201 (1997), the Court held that, ordinarily, a three-month suspension is the appropriate measure of discipline for an attorney who engages in an act of domestic violence. Until Margrabia, attorneys who had been convicted of acts of domestic violence were reprimanded. See, e.g., In re Magid, 139 N.J. 449 (1995), and In re Principato, 139 N.J. 456 (1995). However, in Magid, the Court noted and discussed at some length society's and this State's Legislature's growing intolerance of domestic violence. In re Magid, supra, 139 N.J. at 453. In light of this change, the

Court believed that discipline greater than a reprimand was appropriate and warned that "the Court in the future [would] ordinarily suspend an attorney who is convicted of an act of domestic violence." Id. at 455. Nevertheless, the Court was constrained to reprimand the attorney in Magid because it had "not previously addressed the appropriate discipline to be imposed on an attorney who is convicted of an act of domestic violence." Ibid. In Magid's companion case, the Court repeated its warning. In re Principato, supra, 139 N.J. at 463.

The attorney in Margrabia was convicted of simple assault. Id. at 200. He received a thirty-day suspended sentence and two years' probation, was ordered to perform 200 hours' community service, and was required to pay $160 in costs and penalties. Ibid. He also was required to attend AA meetings and the People Against Abuse program. Ibid.

In Margrabia, we believed that the attorney should be reprimanded because he had "acknowledged that his conduct was wrong and improper; he ha[d] already fulfilled the conditions attached to his criminal conviction; and he did not display a pattern of abusive behavior." Id. at 201. The Court did not accept our recommendation.

In its decision, the Court found that Margrabia's misconduct had occurred seven months after the decisions in Magid and Principato and, that, therefore, he was on notice of the potential discipline. Id. at 202. Accordingly, the Court suspended him for three months. Id. at 203.

This is the second time that respondent appeared before us, as a result of an assault that he committed against his wife. In Jacoby I, we voted to impose a three-month suspension on respondent, who had pleaded guilty to simple assault upon Laurann. In the Matter of Peter H. Jacoby, supra, DRB 06-068, slip op. at 17. Our decision in Jacoby I was based upon a through review of the Magid, Principato, and Margrabia trilogy. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court imposed a censure. Jacoby I, supra, 188 N.J. at 384.

When the next domestic violence came before us, in 2008, In re Edley, 196 N.J. 443 (2008), we observed that, although the Supreme Court did not issue an opinion in Jacoby I, presumably the Court found that the facts of that case warranted an exception to the general rule that an attorney will "ordinarily" be suspended, when convicted of an act of domestic violence. In re Magid, supra, 139 N.J. at 455.

In Edley, the attorney punched and attempted to strangle his girlfriend of three years, after they had returned to her home, following a party. In the Matter of Henry D. Edley a/k/a H. Derek Edley, DRB 08-115 (July 31, 2008) (slip op. at 3). He then left two voice-mail messages on her cell phone, threatening to kill her children and her parents. Id. at 4. Ultimately, the attorney pleaded guilty to third degree criminal restraint. Id. at 2.

In determining the appropriate measure of discipline to impose on Edley for his assault, we contrasted his conduct with that of respondent in Jacoby I. We observed that, unlike the argument between Jacoby and Laurann, which involved some pushing, shoving, and throat-grabbing, the incident involving Edley was not just a blow up between him and his paramour. Id. at 12. In our view, the closed-fist punches to her face demonstrated a level of violence that extended well beyond a heat-of-the-moment lapse in judgment. Ibid. The two voice-mail messages threatening his girlfriend's children and her parents, made hours later, demonstrated a violent temperament, rather than an aberrant act. Ibid.

Moreover, in contrast to the responsibility and remorse exhibited by respondent in Jacoby I, the attorney in Edley had

expressly denied to the police that he had assaulted or even touched his girlfriend and had refused to acknowledge, at the plea, that he had caused any harm to her, let alone that he was sorry for his actions. Moreover, the attorney's assault involved an element of torment not present in Jacoby I. In short, the facts did not justify "an exception" to the ordinary form of discipline to be imposed in a domestic violence case.

Given the severity of Edley's attack and his extremely threatening voice-mail messages, we concluded that he should receive a three-month suspension. Ibid. The Supreme Court agreed. In re Edley, 196 N.J. 443 (2008).

Here, respondent seeks a three-month suspension, even though this is his second disciplinary proceeding arising out of a domestic violence incident. His argument is, in essence, (1) that his alcoholic wife started it and (2) that his conduct was mitigated by several factors, including his inability to control himself, due to a psychological disorder called intermittent explosive disorder.

In his brief, respondent argues that the facts of this case are distinguishable from the facts in the trilogy of domestic violence cases (Magid, Principato, and Margrabia), which led to the Supreme Court's ruling that, ordinarily, a three-month

suspension is the appropriate measure of discipline to be imposed on an attorney who commits even a single act of domestic violence. In re Magid, 139 N.J. 449, 455 (1995).

As to Magid, respondent points out that the attorney was a county prosecutor, who, by his actions, violated the public trust. As to Principato, he notes that the matrimonial attorney violated the trust of his client, a woman who had been referred to him by a battered woman's shelter. Finally, as to Margrabia, he observes that the newly-admitted attorney had no demonstrable good reputation to consider; he had struck his wife at least twelve times previously; and he also struck his three-year-old son in the incident resulting in the disciplinary action.

Despite respondent's reliance on the differences between the victims in those cases, as well as the differences in the nature of their relationships with the offending attorneys, the real distinctions – for the purpose of this case – lie in the severity of the crime, the punishment imposed for its commission, and the fact that this is not the first time that respondent has committed an act of domestic violence against his wife.

The attorneys in the trilogy were convicted of simple assault and the attorney in Edley, a case not mentioned by

respondent, was convicted of criminal restraint. None of the attorneys received jail time. Respondent, however, was convicted of a felony offense and served one year of a three-year prison sentence. Moreover, none of the attorneys in those cases had a prior criminal record for assault, whereas, prior to this incident, respondent had been convicted of simple assault on Laurann in New Jersey.

We believe that the conduct displayed by respondent warrants the imposition of a one-year suspension. We began our analysis of the appropriate discipline with the ordinary sanction to be imposed in a domestic violence case, a three-month suspension. In re Magid, supra, 139 N.J. at 455. In this case, three months is insufficient, however, because respondent has not learned from his previous mistake. Unquestionably, he is a dangerous, violent man. Not only is this the second time that he beat up his wife, but, during the attack, he threatened to kill her. Although we have before us only a cold record, the rage within respondent during this brutal attack is plainly evident. These factors would justify enhancement of the discipline from a three-month suspension to a six-month suspension.

But there is more. Respondent's crime, a felony, was so serious that he was sentenced to three years' imprisonment and required to serve one full year, followed by supervised probation. In contrast, none of the attorneys in Margrabia, Magid, Principato, and Edley served time in prison. Margrabia received a thirty-day suspended sentence and two years' probation for simple assault; Magid was given one year's probation for simple assault; Principato was fined for conviction of simple assault; and Edley was placed on one year's probation for third degree criminal restraint. In turn, respondent was sentenced to three years in jail and was required to serve one of those years. This factor justifies further enhancement of the discipline to a one-year suspension.

The multiple mitigating factors offered by respondent do not change our conclusion. Both in Jacoby I and here, respondent claimed to have taken responsibility for his crime; professed remorse; attributed his assault to intermittent explosive disorder; expressed a commitment and willingness to seek treatment for the disorder; asserted that he had a good reputation in his professional life; and pointed out that his misconduct was not related to the practice of law. Moreover, as he did then, respondent repeated his personal history of

becoming widowed with three young children, two of whom he continues to provide with financial and emotional support, now that they are adults. We do not find his claims to be compelling.

In Jacoby I, he was able to assert that his attack upon Laurann was an "aberration." This second attack cannot be categorized as such and, to his credit, respondent does not attempt to do so. Yet, precisely because this second incident is not an aberration, respondent's claims of remorse and willingness to seek treatment ring hollow. We have heard it before. Indeed, respondent was receiving psychological care at the time of this second attack on Laurann.

Moreover, we do not accept, in mitigation, respondent's claims that Laurann is an alcoholic and that she was legally drunk at the time he assaulted her. First, no such claim of alcoholism was made in Jacoby I. Second, while Laurann admitted to having consumed a half bottle of wine in the hours preceding the 2008 incident, there is nothing in the record documenting her blood alcohol level at the time of the assault.

Similarly, we do not accept respondent's so-called "self-imposed suspension" as a mitigating factor. If an attorney's misconduct warrants a suspension, a "self-imposed suspension"

will not either militate against the imposition of a suspension or mitigate the length of the suspension. In re Farr, 115 N.J. 231, 238 (1989). Moreover, we note that respondent's alleged self-imposed three-year suspension did not result from any choice on his part. Rather, he ceased practicing law when he was incarcerated and lost his job, in 2008. That he has not returned to the practice of law since his release from prison in February 2009 is of no consequence in determining the appropriate measure of discipline in this case.

Although the end of a marriage is not something to hail, we are encouraged that respondent has ceased all contact with Laurann, which, to use his words, "ensures that his conduct will not recur." Nevertheless, we are faced with the reality that he has engaged in this "conduct," not once, but twice.

In sum, given the fact that this is the second time that respondent has beaten up his wife, the brutality of the offense, including his threat to kill her, the lengthy prison sentence imposed on respondent for the attack, and the absence of compelling mitigating factors, we determine to impose a one-year suspension on respondent.

In addition, we require respondent to continue treatment for his intermittent explosive disorder, until discharged.

Moreover, prior to reinstatement, he must provide proof of fitness to practice law, as attested to by a mental health professional approved by the OAE.

Vice-Chair Frost filed a dissent, voting to impose a three-year suspension.

We further determine to require respondent to reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for administrative costs and actual expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in R. 1:20-17.

Disciplinary Review Board
Louis Pashman, Chair

By: Julianne K. DeCore
Julianne K. DeCore
Chief Counsel

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BOARD
VOTING RECORD

In the Matter of Peter H. Jacoby
Docket No. DRB 10-445

Argued: February 17, 2011

Decided: April 28, 2011

Disposition: One-year suspension

Members	Disbar	One-year Suspension	Three-year suspension	Dismiss	Disqualified	Did not participate
Pashman		X				
Frost			X			
Baugh		X				
Clark		X				
Doremus		X				
Stanton		X				
Wissinger		X				
Yamner		X				
Zmirich		X				
Total:		8	1			

Julianne K. DeCore
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Chief Counsel