SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
Disciplinary Review Board
Docket No. DRB 07-416
District Docket No. XIV-07-665E

IN THE MATTER OF

DORA RAQUEL GARCIA

AN ATTORNEY AT LAW

Decision

Argued: March 20, 2008

Decided: May 7, 2008

Richard J. Engelhardt appeared on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics.

Respondent waived appearance for oral argument.

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.

This matter came before us on a motion for reciprocal discipline filed by the Office of Attorney Ethics ("OAE"), following respondent's fifteen-month suspension in Pennsylvania. We agree with the OAE that respondent should receive the

equivalent discipline here. In addition, she may not seek reinstatement in New Jersey before she is reinstated in Pennsylvania.

Respondent was admitted to the New Jersey and Pennsylvania bars in 1992. Although she has no disciplinary history in either jurisdiction, she has been ineligible to practice law in New Jersey since September 26, 2005, for failure to pay the annual assessment to the New Jersey Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection.

We now turn to the facts of this matter. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania suspended respondent for fifteen months, effective November 24, 2007, based on a Joint Petition in Support of Discipline by Consent ("joint petition"), filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and respondent on August 17, 2007. Respondent practiced law with her husband, Allen Feingold, who was suspended in Pennsylvania for three years on April 2, 2006, and for an additional two years on August 22, 2006. Respondent admitted that she aided and abetted her husband in the practice of law after he was suspended, practiced under a false and misleading firm name, lacked candor to a tribunal, filed several frivolous lawsuits, and made numerous false and reckless allegations about judges' qualifications.

Rule 217 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement prohibits formerly admitted attorneys, including suspended attorneys, from engaging in various activities related to the practice of law. Respondent admitted in the petition that she (1) failed to disassociate herself from the practice of law with Feingold and permitted him to perform law-related activities for her law firm, after he had been suspended; (2) allowed Feingold to communicate directly with clients by telephone and in writing; (3) permitted Feingold to appear in court on behalf of her clients; and (4) allowed Feingold "to negotiate or transact substantive matters relating to the ongoing representations of the law firm, for or on behalf of a client with third parties, and to have contact with third parties regarding such negotiation or transaction."

On June 30, 2006, after the date of Feingold's suspension, respondent filed with the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania an annual attorney form indicating that she practiced with the law firm of Feingold Feingold & Garcia ("FF&G"). From June 30, 2006 through May 2007, respondent also practiced law under that name and used letterhead with the name of the law firm of "Feingold Feingold & Garcia, P.C." At that

time, however, respondent was the only partner eligible to practice law in that law firm, as seen below.

As a result of Feingold's suspension, respondent was prohibited from implying or suggesting to the public and to the courts that she practiced law with Feingold. Respondent admitted that she violated RPC 7.1 (false and misleading communication) and RPC 7.5(a) (misleading firm name or letterhead) by indicating, through the use of the law firm name, that Feingold was licensed to practice law.

On August 7, 2006, in a case captioned "Berger v. Feingold," a judge found that respondent's use of the law firm name "Feingold Feingold & Garcia, P.C." violated RPC 7.1 and RPC 7.5."

On May 9, 2006, five weeks after Feingold had been suspended, respondent represented to a workers' compensation judge that Feingold operated under the law firm name of "A.L. Feingold and Associates," while she operated under the law firm name of FF&G. Further, she told the judge that the two law firms were separate entities. In August 2006, respondent asserted to the judge that she was the "Garcia" and one of the "Feingolds" in the law firm of FF&G, and that Feingold's niece was the other "Feingold" in the firm.

Similarly, on June 19, 2006, respondent represented to a judge, in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, that she and Feingold always had separate law firms and were sole practitioners who helped each other by covering matters for one another.

At a disciplinary proceeding, however, respondent testified that Feingold's niece had worked for her on occasion, that the niece had not been a partner or a principal of FF&G, and that respondent was the only principal of the firm.

Respondent admitted that she had violated RPC 3.3 (candor toward a tribunal) by knowingly making false statements to a tribunal.

Respondent also committed other ethics infractions. Before Feingold's suspension, in September 2004, he had filed a workers' compensation petition on behalf of Everett Harding, against his employer, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA"). On September 19, 2005, Workers' Compensation Judge Susan Kelley dismissed Harding's claim for failure to timely present medical evidence.

Feingold re-filed the Harding claim. After Feingold was suspended, respondent assumed the representation of Harding. On October 5, 2006, respondent filed a separate lawsuit on behalf

of Harding and Feingold against SEPTA, its lawyers, its expert medical witness, and others. According to the joint petition, the lawsuit alleged that:

> a. Workers' Compensation Judge Susan E. Kelley had "impersonated an individual who cared and had taken an oath to truly and properly handle Workmen's [sic] Compensation Claims";
>
> b. Judge Kelley had conspired with the defendants to do "everything in their power" to deny the plaintiffs, Mr. Harding and Allen L. Feingold, a fair and proper hearing; and
>
> c. Allen L. Feingold had been "denied the payment of his counsel fee" due to the defendants' wanton actions, which were "intolerable in a civilized society."
>
> [OAEaEx.C9-10].[1]

On January 2, 2007, Judge Allan Tereshko of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissed this lawsuit with prejudice.

In the workers' compensation matter, respondent sent a letter to Stephanie Coleman (SEPTA's attorney), with a copy to Judge Kelley, in which she accused Judge Kelley of extreme bias

[1] "OAEaEx.C9-10" refers to Exhibit C to the OAE's December 19, 2007 brief in support of its motion for final discipline.

and alleged that respondent's separate lawsuit against Coleman had created a conflict of interest requiring Coleman to withdraw from the workers' compensation case.

Respondent admitted that the Harding lawsuit was based on routine discovery disputes; that she intended to create an alleged conflict of interest that would require the disqualification of SEPTA counsel; that she knew that Pennsylvania courts had determined that prior similar actions by Feingold had violated the RPCs; and that, by filing the Harding lawsuit, she had violated RPC 3.1 (frivolous claims) and RPC 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Respondent also admitted that her statements about Judge Kelley's qualifications and integrity had violated RPC 8.2(a) (a lawyer shall not make a statement known to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications of a judge).

On February 23, 2007, respondent filed with the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County a document accusing Judge Tereshko of extreme bias and impropriety. Respondent sent a copy of this document to Judge Tereshko.

On March 22, 2007, Judge Kelley granted Harding's petition, awarding workers' compensation benefits for the period from June

11, 2004 to January 26, 2006. According to the joint petition, the following events took place:

> 38. By letter dated March 30, 2007, with copy to Stephanie Coleman, Esquire, Respondent wrote to Judge Kelley and stated:
>
> a. that in the above described Order of March 22, 2007, Judge Kelley "actually showed how improper SEPTA's actions were, but then, as expected, You [sic] cut the umbilical cord and let the baby die"; and
>
> b. that she [i.e., Respondent] "can understand a judge when they cause some grief to a party or a lawyer, whether it is personal or business," but she had never "been able to understand when a judge takes their actions to extremes and intentionally injures a party and/or a lawyer, as it then becomes personal, to the extent that it is beyond the law, beyond their Oath, and shows that the judge has no heart or soul, or if they do, it is totally black."
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> [OAEaEx.C12].

Respondent admitted that her statements about Judges Kelley and Tereshko had violated RPC 8.2(a).

On March 2, 2006, Feingold filed a lawsuit in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on behalf of Sheku Mansaray and himself. Judge Tereshko dismissed the complaint with prejudice by orders dated December 21, 2006 and January 10, 2007. Notwithstanding this dismissal, respondent entered her appearance on behalf of plaintiffs on January 29, 2007.

By letter dated February 23, 2007, respondent filed a document in the Mansaray lawsuit, serving a copy on Judge Tereshko, accusing the judge of extreme bias and impropriety:

> a. "the actions of [Judge Tereshko] over the years, have been so prejudiced, lopsided and inappropriate in favor of the defense, as to preclude this plaintiff, the plaintiff's counsel, this law firm, or any of their clients from receiving a fair, full, proper or unbiased decision"; and
>
> b. Judge Tereshko "holds a grudge, dislikes those concerned, and abuses his position with those involved."
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> [OAEaEx.C13-14].

Respondent admitted that her statements about Judge Tereshko in the Mansaray matter had violated RPC 8.2(a).

In addition, on May 15, 2006, after Feingold's suspension, respondent assumed responsibility for a worker's compensation claim that he had filed on behalf of Deborah Jordan against her former employer, SEPTA. On October 10, 2006, respondent filed, on Jordan's behalf, a separate lawsuit in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County against SEPTA, its lawyers, and others, alleging:

> a. in defending the underlying workers' compensation claim, the Jordan Claim, the defendants had acted in "bad faith" to deny Ms. Jordan compensation for her losses;

b. the defendants conspired to deprive Ms. Jordan of a fair trial;

c. the defendants had made misrepresentations and engaged in fraudulent conduct; and

d. defendants' actions were malicious and warranted an award of punitive damages.

[OAEaEx.C15].

On January 18, 2007, Judge Gary S. Glazer dismissed the Jordan complaint, with prejudice, finding that respondent had filed a frivolous lawsuit solely to harass the defendants. The judge found that the lawsuit was harmful to the judicial system because it wasted resources and caused adverse public perception. Respondent admitted that, by filing the lawsuit, she had violated RPC 3.1 and RPC 8.4(d)). She further admitted that she knew that Pennsylvania courts previously had determined that similar actions by Feingold had violated the RPCs.

On February 2, 2007, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and recusal in the Jordan case, in which she

a. accused Judge Glazer of extreme bias against Ms. Jordan, Respondent, Respondent's law firm, and Allen L. Feingold and "his clients and our clients";

b. stated that Judge Glazer "has forgotten" that he took an oath of office; and

c. declared that Judge Glazer's actions as a judge, in the form of orders, decisions,

> opinions and explanations, "show a baselessness, vindictiveness, animosity and dislike toward this counsel ...."
>
> [OAEaEx.C16-17].

Respondent admitted that her statements about Judge Glazer's qualifications and integrity had violated RPC 8.2(a).

Also, on October 4, 2005, respondent filed a lawsuit, on behalf of Rosetta El, against SEPTA and others, alleging personal injuries arising from a motor vehicle accident. In November 2006, respondent filed a motion alleging that the presiding judge, the Honorable Jacqueline F. Allen, had an extreme bias toward plaintiff and respondent because Judge Allen was a friend of SEPTA's counsel. According to the joint petition:

> 58. On November 27, 2006, respondent appeared in front of Judge Allen in the El lawsuit on a discovery matter and, *inter alia*:
>
> a. told Judge Allen that, ". . . in this case, you have bent over backwards to give [Counsel for SEPTA] whatever she wants, because, you know, you were SEPTA counsel before and she's SEPTA counsel now"; and
>
> b. generally accused Judge Allen of making unfair and biased rulings in favor of SEPTA and against Respondent and Allen L. Feingold.
>
> 59. On or about February 2, 2007, Respondent filed a motion in the El lawsuit captioned, "Plaintiff's Motion for Discovery, Preclusion, Sanctions and Judgment," in which she:

a. repeated the allegations set forth in the Discovery Motion, including those accusing Judge Allen of extreme bias toward the defense and defendants; and

b. added that the "case is coming up for trial shortly, and to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining proper discovery, or to be able to properly defend the motion for summary judgment is a miscarriage of justice that is evidently being perpetrated upon the plaintiff because of Judge Allen's relationship with defense counsel [for SEPTA], or the Court's animosity toward the plaintiff, plaintiff's counsel, plaintiffs' [sic] counsel's law firm and/or any past members of that firm."

[OAEaEx.C17-19].

Respondent admitted that her statements about Judge Allen's qualifications and integrity had violated RPC 8.2(a).

Finally, on September 29, 1997, Feingold had filed a lawsuit on behalf of Louis Viola, Jr. After Feingold's suspension, respondent represented Viola. On February 14, 2007, Judge Gary DiVito dismissed the Viola complaint with prejudice. In a March 9, 2007 letter to Judge DiVito, respondent accused him of extreme bias. She asserted that he had "done everything to injure" respondent, her husband, and her clients; that he had a deep-seated prejudice against her and her clients; and that, if he were recused from the case, he would have to enlist another judge to do his "dirty work" to injure respondent and her clients.

In a March 12, 2007 motion for reconsideration and recusal, respondent argued that Judge DiVito "has failed and/or refused to be fair;" that he "was biased, short-sighted, spiteful, vindictive;" and that he had injured her, her firm, and her clients "in every way possible."

Respondent admitted that her statements about Judge DiVito's qualifications and integrity had violated RPC 8.2(a).

In the joint petition, disciplinary counsel and respondent agreed that she should be suspended for fifteen months, and that, for four years, she should comply with the following conditions: (1) she shall not facilitate or assist Feingold in the unauthorized practice of law; (2) if she becomes a sole practitioner or partner in a law firm, she will not permit Feingold to be employed by or connected with that law firm; and (3) she shall not allow Feingold to be present on the law firm's premises during business hours.

The joint petition contained the following mitigating factors: (1) respondent admitted her misconduct; (2) she is remorseful about and embarrassed by her misconduct; and (3) she has no disciplinary history. In addition, according to the joint petition, respondent stated that, at a disciplinary hearing, she would have proffered evidence of good character from members of

the Pennsylvania bar; she would have proffered evidence that she has written letters of apology to the relevant judges; and she would have proffered expert witness testimony that her conduct occurred while she was under stress caused by her husband's suspension.

The OAE asserted that respondent's conduct in connection with Feingold violated New Jersey RPC 5.5(a)(2) (assist in the unauthorized practice of law). The OAE agreed that respondent violated rules comparable to the New Jersey RPCs mentioned in the joint petition, i.e., RPC 3.1 (frivolous claims), RPC 3.3 (candor toward a tribunal), RPC 7.1 (false and misleading communication) RPC 7.5(a) (misleading firm name or letterhead), RPC 8.2(a) (a lawyer shall not make a statement known to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications of a judge), and RPC 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

The OAE recommended that respondent be suspended for fifteen months, retroactive to November 24, 2007, the effective date of the Pennsylvania suspension. Respondent represented to the OAE that she has not practiced law in New Jersey since September 2005, when she was placed on the ineligible list.

Following a review of the record, we determine to grant the OAE's motion for reciprocal discipline.

Pursuant to R. 1:20-14(a)(5), another jurisdiction's finding of misconduct shall establish conclusively the facts on which it rests for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this state. We, therefore, adopt the findings of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Reciprocal disciplinary proceedings in New Jersey are governed by R. 1:20-14(a)(4), which provides:

> The Board shall recommend the imposition of the identical action or discipline unless the respondent demonstrates, or the Board finds on the face of the record on which the discipline in another jurisdiction was predicated that it clearly appears that:
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> (A) the disciplinary or disability order of the foreign jurisdiction was not entered;
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> (B) the disciplinary or disability order of the foreign jurisdiction does not apply to the respondent;
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> (C) the disciplinary or disability order of the foreign jurisdiction does not remain in full force and effect as the result of appellate proceedings;
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> (D) the procedure followed in the foreign disciplinary matter was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or
>
> (E) the unethical conduct established warrants substantially different discipline.

A review of the record does not reveal any conditions that would fall within the ambit of subparagraphs (A) through (E). Respondent admitted that she assisted her husband, a suspended attorney, in the unauthorized practice of law; used misleading letterhead and the law firm name Feingold Feingold & Garcia, thus implying that her husband continued to practice law with the firm; lacked candor to a tribunal, when she told two judges that she and her husband operated different law firms, and when she told a third judge that the law firm of Feingold Feingold & Garcia included respondent and Feingold's niece; filed frivolous lawsuits; and knowingly made false allegations about judges.

Attorneys who assisted other lawyers in the unauthorized practice of law have received reprimands. See, e.g., In re Bevacqua, 174 N.J. 296 (2002) (attorney allowed a lawyer who was not admitted in New Jersey to conduct a deposition in New Jersey; Bevacqua also was guilty of gross neglect, pattern of neglect, lack of diligence, failure to communicate with clients, failure to explain matters to the extent reasonably necessary to permit clients to make informed decisions about the representation, failure to provide written retainer agreements, and failure to promptly return a client's file; mitigating factors included his relative inexperience at the time of the

misconduct and his lack of venality); In re Ezon, 172 N.J. 235 (2002) (attorney permitted his father, who had been disbarred in New Jersey, to present himself as an attorney in New Jersey for a common client and misled the court and other attorneys that he, too, represented the client; a mitigating factor was the father-son relationship between Ezon and the disbarred lawyer that he assisted); and In re Belmont, 158 N.J. 183 (1999) (attorney permitted his partner, a Pennsylvania attorney not admitted in New Jersey, to settle eight personal injury cases in New Jersey; he also improperly calculated his contingent fee on the recovery, improperly endorsed his clients' names on settlement checks in five cases, failed to deposit the settlement checks in a trust account in New Jersey, failed to maintain a bona fide office in New Jersey, and failed to turn over a file to a client).

See also In re Cermack, 174 N.J. 560 (2002) (attorney consented to a six-month suspension after he entered into an agreement to permit a suspended lawyer to continue to represent his own clients while Cermack was named attorney of record and made court appearances; Cermack also displayed a lack of diligence, failed to keep clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters, failed to explain matters to the extent

reasonably necessary to permit clients to make informed decisions, failed to comply with recordkeeping requirements, failed to protect his clients' interests on termination of the representation, knowingly assisted another to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, and engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

For using misleading letterhead or practicing under a misleading law firm name, attorneys are usually admonished or reprimanded. See, e.g., In the Matter of Ellan A. Heit, DRB 04-138 (May 24, 2004) (admonition for attorney who used letterhead that did not reveal that she was "of counsel" to a New York lawyer, who was not admitted in New Jersey, resulting in a client believing that she had retained the New York lawyer, instead of Heit, to represent her in a matrimonial matter; Heit also improperly shared a fee with the New York lawyer); In the Matter of Jean D. Larosiliere, DRB 02-128 (March 20, 2003) (admonition imposed on attorney who used letterhead indicating that a law student was a licensed lawyer, allowed a California lawyer not admitted in New Jersey to sign letters with the designation "Esq." after his name, was guilty of gross neglect, and failed to communicate with a client); and In the Matter of David J. Witherspoon, DRB 02-050 (March 18, 2002) (admonition

for attorney who used letterhead with mail drop addresses, thus misleading clients into believing that he maintained an office in their locale; failed to maintain required records; closed a trust account before the last check issued had cleared, resulting in an overdraft; commingled personal and trust funds; and issued trust account checks for personal and other non-client expenses); and In re Felsen, 172 N.J. 33 (2002) (reprimand for attorney, a sole practitioner, who improperly practiced law under the trade name "Law Advisory Group" and placed a telephone book advertisement containing false and misleading statements about his qualifications and experience, as well as the qualifications and experience of other attorneys with whom he had no association).

For lack of candor toward a tribunal, the range of discipline is wide, depending on the seriousness of the misconduct. Here, respondent misrepresented to judges that she and her husband, a suspended attorney, practiced in separate law firms. She also was not truthful about the composition of her law firm. Respondent's conduct is similar to that of attorneys who received reprimands for lack of candor to a tribunal. See, e.g., In re Manns, 171 N.J. 145 (2002) (attorney stated in a certification filed with the court that he learned of the

dismissal of his client's case in November, when he had received notice of the dismissal four months previously; attorney was also guilty of a lack of diligence and failure to communicate); In re Mazeau, 122 N.J. 244 (1991) (attorney failed to disclose to a court his representation of a client in a prior lawsuit; that representation would have been a factor in the court's ruling on the attorney's motion to file a late notice of tort claim); and In re Marlowe, 121 N.J. 236 (1990) (attorney falsely represented to the court that all counsel consented to an adjournment of the matter).

For filing frivolous lawsuits, the discipline typically imposed is either an admonition or a reprimand. See, e.g., In the Matter of Samuel A. Malat, DRB 05-315 (March 17, 2006) (admonition imposed on attorney who was sanctioned in three cases for violating Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; in one of the cases, the attorney was sanctioned for filing the same type of claim for which he had previously received sanctions); In the Matter of Alan Wasserman, DRB 92-228 (October 5, 1994) (admonition for attorney who instituted a frivolous second lawsuit against an insurance carrier for legal fees, without notice to his client, after a prior lawsuit against the client to collect that legal fee had been

dismissed); and In re Silverman, 179 N.J. 364 (2004) (reprimand for attorney who filed a frivolous lawsuit for legal fees, after the client rejected a settlement offer that would have included payment of his legal fees by the opposing party; the attorney sued the client for three times the amount of the fee he would have received pursuant to the settlement offer and filed the lawsuit in a jurisdiction that, although convenient for him, had no connection to the matter).

When combined with other misconduct, however, the filing of frivolous claims has resulted in suspensions. See, e.g., In re Shearin, 166 N.J. 558 (2001) ("Shearin I") (one-year suspension imposed on attorney by way of reciprocal discipline where, in a property dispute between rival churches, a court had ruled in favor of one of them and enjoined the other church (the attorney's client) from interfering with the owner's use and enjoyment of the property; the attorney then violated the injunction by filing two lawsuits, which were found to be frivolous, seeking rulings on matters that had already been adjudicated; the attorney also misrepresented the identity of her client to the court, made inappropriate and offensive statements about the trial judge, failed to expedite litigation, submitted false evidence, and counseled or assisted her client

in conduct that she knew was illegal, criminal, or fraudulent) and In re Grenell, 127 N.J. 116 (1992) (two-year suspension imposed on attorney who, in one matter, filed frivolous criminal charges against his wife's former husband, shouted obscenities at the former husband and threatened to kill his adversary; in a second matter, the attorney was charged with contempt and was removed from a municipal courtroom after he became loud and uncontrolled; in three additional matters, the attorney disrupted court proceedings by screaming obscenities at his adversaries and engaging in loud and unruly behavior).

Finally, attorneys who knowingly make false allegations about judges or engage in disruptive behavior or similar conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice are usually suspended. See, e.g., In re Hall, 169 N.J. 347 (2001) ("Hall I") (attorney suspended for three months after she was found in contempt by a Superior Court judge for maligning the court, refusing to abide by the court's instructions, suggesting the existence of a conspiracy between the court and her adversaries, making baseless charges of racism against the court and accusing her adversaries of lying; the attorney also failed to reply to the ethics grievances and, after her temporary suspension, maintained a law office and failed to file the required affidavit

with the OAE); In re Maffongelli, 176 N.J. 514 (2003) (one-year suspension imposed on attorney who displayed a pattern of inability and refusal to follow the court rules, sending the same improper documents to the courts, even after receiving clear instructions not to do so; the attorney also failed or refused to appear at hearings where his presence was required; showed a woeful lack of familiarity with court rules and practices; refused to observe the dignity of court proceedings; refused to accept responsibility for his mistakes, blaming court staff for his problems; and wasted many hours of judges' and staff time); In re Shearin, 172 N.J. 560 (2002) ("Shearin II") (three-year suspension by way of reciprocal discipline for attorney who sought the same relief she had previously sought without success in prior lawsuits against a rival church in a property dispute, knowingly disobeyed a court order expressly enjoining her and her client from interfering with the rival church's use of the property, demonstrated a reckless disregard for the truth when she made disparaging statements about the mental health of a judge, and taxed the resources of two federal courts, many defendants, and many other members of the legal system who were forced to deal with frivolous matters; as mentioned above, Shearin had received a one-year suspension for similar

misconduct); and In re Hall, 170 N.J. 400 (2002) ("Hall II") (three-year suspension imposed after attorney made numerous misrepresentations to trial and appellate judges, made false and baseless accusations against judges and adversaries, served a fraudulent subpoena, failed to appear for court proceedings and then misrepresented that she had not received notice, and displayed egregious courtroom demeanor by repeatedly interrupting others and becoming unduly argumentative and abusive; her conduct occurred in four cases and spanned more than one year; as noted earlier, Hall had received a three-month suspension for similar misconduct).

But see In re Geller, 177 N.J. 505 (2003) (reprimand imposed on attorney who filed baseless motions accusing two judges of bias against him; failed to expedite litigation and to treat with courtesy judges (using profanity to characterize one judge's orders and, in a deposition, referring to two judges as "corrupt" and labeling one of them "short, ugly and insecure"), his adversary ("a thief"), the opposing party ("a moron," who "lies like a rug"), and an unrelated litigant (the attorney asked the judge if he had ordered "that character who was in the courtroom this morning to see a psychologist"); failed to comply with court orders (at times defiantly) and with the special

ethics master's direction not to contact a judge; used means intended to delay, embarrass, or burden third parties; made serious charges against two judges without any reasonable basis; made a discriminatory remark about a judge; and titled a certification filed with the court "Fraud in Freehold"; in mitigation, the attorney's conduct occurred in the course of his own child-custody case, the attorney had an unblemished twenty-two-year career, was held in high regard personally and professionally, was involved in legal and community activities, and taught business law).

Here, the totality of respondent's misconduct warrants substantial discipline. She consented to a fifteen-month suspension in Pennsylvania. The record presents no basis for imposing a different level of discipline in New Jersey. We, thus, determine that respondent should be suspended for fifteen months, effective November 24, 2007, the date of the Pennsylvania suspension. In addition, respondent must be reinstated in Pennsylvania before she may seek reinstatement in New Jersey.

Member Neuwirth did not participate.

We further determine to require respondent to reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for administrative costs and

actual expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in R. 1:20-17.

Disciplinary Review Board
William J. O'Shaughnessy, Chair

By: Julianne K. DeCore
Julianne K. DeCore
Chief Counsel

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BOARD
VOTING RECORD

In the Matter of Dora Raquel Garcia
Docket No. DRB 07-416

Argued: March 20, 2008

Decided: May 7, 2008

Disposition: Fifteen-month suspension

Members	Disbar	Fifteen-month Suspension	Reprimand	Dismiss	Disqualified	Did not participate
O'Shaughnessy		X				
Pashman		X				
Baugh		X				
Boylan		X				
Frost		X				
Lolla		X				
Neuwirth						X
Stanton		X				
Wissinger		X				
Total:		8				1

Julianne K. DeCore
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Chief Counsel