

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
Disciplinary Review Board
Docket No. DRB 06-327
District Docket Nos. XIV-03-513E,
XIV-04-456E, and XIV-05-265E
and
Docket No. DRB 06-328
District Docket Nos. XI-04-002E
and XI-04-023E

IN THE MATTERS OF
PATRICIA ADELLE
AN ATTORNEY AT LAW

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Decision

Argued: February 15, 2007

Decided: April 5, 2007

Janice Richter appeared on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics.

Respondent waived appearance for oral argument.

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associates Justices of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.

These matters were before us on two recommendations for discipline filed by the District XI Ethics Committee ("DEC"). The two complaints charged respondent with misconduct in five client matters and with recordkeeping violations. Specifically, in DRB 06-327, respondent was charged with violating RPC 1.1(a)

(gross neglect), RPC 1.16(d) (failure to turn over a client's file) RPC 1.15(a) and (b) (failure to safeguard client funds and failure to turn over funds to third parties), and RPC 1.15(d) and R. 1:21-6 (recordkeeping violations). In DRB 06-328, respondent was charged with violating RPC 1.3 (lack of diligence) and RPC 1.4(a) (failure to communicate with a client), R. 1:20A-3(b)(4) (failure to comply with a fee arbitration determination, mistakenly cited as R. 1:20-3A(b)(4)), and R. 1:20-3(g)(3) (failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities), more properly, a violation of RPC 8.1(b)).

The DEC recommended concurrent two-year suspensions. We determine to impose a six-month suspension.

Respondent was admitted the New Jersey bar in 1993. She has been disciplined on three occasions. In February 2002, she received a reprimand, in a default matter, for lack of diligence, failure to communicate with a client, and failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities. In re Adelle, 170 N.J. 601 (2002).

In October 2002, respondent received a three-month suspension, in a second default matter. There, she had sent to the defendant in a suit a copy of a fabricated notice of motion, which contained inaccurate statements and which was never filed

with the court. Her purpose was to compel the defendant to execute a certification of parentage. In addition, she failed to cooperate with disciplinary authorities. In re Adelle, 174 N.J. 348 (2002).

In October 2004, respondent received a second three-month suspension for improperly representing clients in the purchase of real estate, failing to communicate with them, failing to turn over money allegedly due them as a refund, and failing to cooperate with disciplinary authorities. In re Adelle, 181 N.J. 352 (2004).

Respondent has not petitioned for reinstatement.

DOCKET NO. 06-327¹

The Wilkes Matter (District Docket No. XIV-03-513E)

In March 2002, Edward Wilkes retained respondent in connection with a guardianship matter. In June 2002, respondent filed a complaint for the appointment of a guardian. On or about October 8, 2002, Wilkes gave respondent a check for \$3,246.03, representing her \$1,636.03 legal fee and the \$1,610 cost of a guardianship bond. On October 9, 2002, respondent

¹ In these matters, respondent admitted the facts set forth in the complaint, but denied that the acts constituted unethical conduct.

deposited Wilkes' check in her attorney business account. On October 3, 2002, the Court ordered respondent's three-month suspension, effective November 1, 2002. She did not purchase the guardianship bond.

In November 2002, the balance in respondent's business account, where she had deposited the \$1,610 for the bond, fell below that amount and stayed below \$1,610 until the account was closed, in June 2003.²

Wilkes' daughter paid for the guardianship bond, for which the New Jersey Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection ("CPF") reimbursed her. When respondent learned of Wilkes' grievance, she sent to the Office of Attorney Ethics ("OAE") a check for \$1,610, payable to Edward Wilkes. The OAE then forwarded that sum to the CPF.

The complaint charged respondent with violating RPC 1.15(a) and (b) based on her failure to keep the \$1,610 intact. There are no allegations of knowing misappropriation.

² The complaint noted that respondent's business account receipts journal listed the \$1,610 as a fee from another client, rather than funds for the bond. Although the complaint states further that respondent's check ledger is unclear, the ledger appears to reflect \$1610 for the "Wilkes Bond" and also shows the \$1,636 fee.

The Wisner Matter (District Docket No. XIV-04-456E)

Respondent represented Robert and Julie Wisner in a real estate transaction. In July 2001, respondent obtained a commitment for title insurance from NIA/Lawyers Title Agency, now known as Valley National Title Services ("VNTS"). VNTS submitted an invoice for \$1,200 to respondent, which she failed to pay. VNTS was unsuccessful in its attempts to contact respondent.³

Following her receipt of the grievance, respondent located the check to the title insurance company in her file. Through inadvertence, the check had not been forwarded to VNTS. Respondent had maintained sufficient funds in her account to cover the obligation. In July 2004, she sent the funds to VNTS.

The complaint charged respondent with violating RPC 1.1(a).

The Esser Matter (District Docket No. XIV-05-265E)

On an unknown date, respondent represented Peter Esser (incorrectly spelled as "Hesser" in the complaint), in an unspecified matter. Esser contacted respondent to obtain his file, although the details of his attempts are not known.

³ The record does not reveal the nature of VNTS' attempts to communicate with respondent.

According to the complaint, the OAE wrote to and called respondent, in an effort to retrieve Esser's file, to no avail.

The complaint charged respondent with violating RPC 1.16(d).

Recordkeeping Violations

In March 2003, the OAE conducted a demand audit of respondent's trust and business account records. Numerous deficiencies were found, including the following:

(a) trust disbursements ledger was not maintained;

(b) trust receipts ledger was not maintained;

(c) client trust ledger sheets were not fully descriptive;

(d) inactive trust ledger balances remained in respondent's trust account for an extended period of time;

(e) A separate ledger sheet was not maintained detailing attorney funds held for bank charges;

(f) client ledger accounts were not reconciled to the bank account statement.

Respondent had been the subject of an OAE audit in 1999, at which time similar deficiencies had been detected.

The complaint charged respondent with violating RPC 1.15(d) and R. 1:21-6.

In mitigation, respondent testified that she closed her law practice in 2002, and does not know if she intends to have her license reinstated. She stated further that, during "this time," she relocated her residence and her law practice to her home, her family was facing financial problems, her mother was ill, and "everything really snowballed" for her.

As to the Wilkes matter, the DEC concluded that respondent's deposit of Wilkes' payment for the guardianship bond in her business account, non-payment of the bond, and use of the funds for another purpose violated RPC 1.15(a).⁴

In the Wisner matter, the DEC was unable to find clear and convincing evidence that respondent's failure to pay the title insurance company constituted gross neglect. The DEC noted that respondent made out the check, but failed to send it; as soon as she became aware of the problem, she corrected it. The DEC found significant that no proofs were presented as to VTNS' attempts to communicate with respondent and what reply, if any, was received. The DEC found no RPC violations in this matter.

⁴ In its summary, the DEC mentioned a violation of RPC 1.15(b). Presumably, this finding relates to the Wilkes matter, as charged in the complaint. The violation was respondent's failure to promptly return the funds to Wilkes, when she found out about her suspension.

As to the Esser matter, the DEC found that respondent's failure to turn over Esser's file, after repeated requests, violated RPC 1.16(d).

Finally, the DEC concluded that respondent's numerous recordkeeping deficiencies violated R. 1:21-6 and RPC 1.15(d).

The DEC was not persuaded by the mitigating factors advanced by respondent, finding that her "three prior suspensions reinforce the need for continued restrictions on the Respondent's practicing law."⁵ The DEC recommended that respondent receive a two-year suspension (concurrent with any suspension imposed in the matters under DRB 06-328), be directed to complete the NJSBA diversionary course, and resume practice only under the supervision of a proctor.

⁵ As noted above, respondent had two prior suspensions and a reprimand.

The Koch Matter (District Docket No. XI-04-002E)⁶

In June 2001, Francine Koch retained respondent to represent her in a matrimonial matter, paying her \$2,000. It was not until May 2002 that respondent filed a complaint on Koch's behalf. Respondent testified that she was busy and that the matter "fell between the cracks."

There was an issue as to the proper venue in which to file the Koch complaint. In June 2002, respondent advised Koch of the situation, but took no further action until November 2002, when she notified Koch that she had been suspended from the practice of law.

Koch filed a fee arbitration request. Respondent did not appear at the November 2003 proceeding. The fee arbitration panel concluded that the entire \$2,000 should be refunded to Koch. After respondent failed to pay the award, Koch filed a claim against respondent in Small Claims Court, Special Civil Part, in December 2003. Respondent and Koch entered a

⁶ The District XI Fee Arbitration Committee referred this matter to the OAE, following respondent's failure to comply with a fee arbitration determination.

stipulation of settlement for \$1,376. The stipulation of settlement states that respondent paid that amount.⁷

Respondent testified that she had been unaware of the fee arbitration proceeding and award. She did not recall receiving any documents from the fee arbitration committee. The arbitrator, however, represented that the notice of the proceeding, which was sent to respondent's last known office address, was not returned as undeliverable. The DEC noted that the summons and complaint in the small claims matter, which respondent received in December 2003, were sent to the same address as the correspondence in connection with the fee arbitration proceeding.

The complaint also alleged that respondent failed to reply to the DEC investigator's requests for information about the grievance. Respondent did not address this issue during the hearing.

The complaint charged respondent with violating RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), R. 1:20A-3(b)(4) (failure to comply with a fee arbitration determination), and failure to cooperate with the

⁷ During the ethics hearing, the DEC noted that the stipulation of settlement does not indicate that it was entered and approved by the court. It is, however, signed by the witness/mediator and states that respondent paid the money owed. Respondent testified that she paid the \$1,376. Koch did not testify at the DEC hearing.

DEC, charged as a violation of R. 1:20-3(g)(3), but more properly a violation of RPC 8.1(b).

The Kitchen Matter (District Docket No. XI-04-023E)

Curtis Kitchen alleged that, in January 2001, he retained respondent in connection with a Medicaid dispute. According to Kitchen, respondent failed to perform any work on his behalf. Respondent, in turn, testified that Kitchen had never retained her, but consulted with her about the Medicaid issues on two occasions, in January 2001, and then again in June 2001.

Kitchen further contended that he made numerous attempts to contact respondent to retrieve some of his documents, but was unsuccessful. Respondent did not recall any letters or phone calls from Kitchen and believed that she had nothing belonging to him.

The complaint alleged that respondent failed to reply to two DEC letters, dated December 2003 and May 2004, seeking information about the Kitchen grievance. Respondent admitted her failure to reply to those letters.⁸

The complaint charged respondent with violating RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 8.1(b) (mistakenly cited as R. 1:20-3(g)(3)).

⁸ In respondent's answer, she denied receipt of the December 2003 letter.

In Koch, the DEC found that, when respondent filed a complaint on her client's behalf, after the passage of eleven months, she did so in the wrong venue and then did nothing to remedy the situation. The DEC found violations of RPC 1.3 and RPC 1.4(a).

In addition, the DEC found that respondent violated R. 1:20A-3(b)(4) by failing to pay the fee arbitration award. The DEC found incredible respondent's claim that she did not know about the award. The DEC also found that respondent failed to cooperate with disciplinary authorities.

In Kitchen, the DEC was unable to conclude that respondent had been given any documents. The DEC stated, however, that "[w]hether she was actually retained or whether she merely had consultations is a distinction without merit. She admits that she gave Mr. Kitchen advice. At the very least, Respondent had an obligation to respond to Mr. Kitchen's inquiries, limited as their relationship may have been." In this section, the hearing panel report did not specifically refer to the charged RPCs - RPC 1.3 and RPC 1.4(a). The language suggests, however, that the DEC found violations of those rules.

As to the charge of failure to cooperate with the ethics investigation, the DEC noted that respondent offered no evidence to contradict the allegation that she had failed to communicate

with the DEC, prior to answering the complaint. Here, too, there is no mention of an RPC. Nevertheless, the above remark suggests that the DEC found that respondent did not cooperate with ethics authorities.

The DEC did not find persuasive the mitigating factors submitted by respondent (relocation of her office and her family's financial and health problems). The DEC's recommendation mirrored that made in the matters under DRB 06-327, specifically, a two-year suspension, completion of the NJSBA diversionary course, and a proctor upon reinstatement.

Following a de novo review of the record, we are satisfied that the conclusion of the DEC that respondent was guilty of unethical conduct is fully supported by clear and convincing evidence.

We agree with the DEC's findings in these matters in all instances, with two exceptions. In Kitchen, the complaint charged, and the DEC found, lack of diligence. The record, however, provides no information on what work respondent was supposed to perform for Kitchen. Kitchen did not testify. We, therefore, dismiss the charged violation of RPC 1.3.

Similarly, in Koch, although the DEC correctly found that respondent failed to comply with a fee arbitration determination, the remedy for such conduct is a temporary

suspension. R. 1:20-15(k). Moreover, respondent ultimately paid the client, albeit in the face of a small claims proceeding and a lesser amount than originally owed. We are, thus, unable to agree that respondent's failure to comply with the fee arbitration determination is deserving of final discipline.

In one other instance, we choose to modify the DEC's conclusions. In Wisher (failure to pay for the title insurance), the DEC properly found insufficient evidence of gross neglect. Respondent drafted the check, but simply forgot to mail it to the title company. The funds remained in her account, and the situation was remedied when it was brought to her attention. Nevertheless, respondent's conduct was not blameless. She lacked diligence in ensuring that the company received payment. Although she was not charged with violating RPC 1.3, a finding in this context does not constitute a due process violation because lack of diligence is a less serious offense than gross neglect, with which she was charged. We, thus, find that respondent's failure to ensure proper payment to the title company violated RPC 1.3.

One critical aspect of this case received surprisingly little attention during the DEC hearing. In the Wilkes matter, the funds intended for the bond were deposited into respondent's business account. Although respondent did not purchase the

bond, the funds did not remain intact in her account. The complaint charged respondent with failure to safeguard funds, a charge that the DEC found sustainable.

Whether respondent's actions were knowing or negligent, however, is not adequately addressed in the record below. In fact, the complaint never charged misappropriation, despite clear and convincing evidence that respondent was out of trust. The only reference to a misappropriation is found in the OAE's brief to us: "The audit of Respondent's trust account did not identify any misappropriations, but rather more of the careless and/or negligent conduct that characterized her law practice prior to her suspension." Presumably, the OAE attributed respondent's use of the \$1,600 for the bond to poor recordkeeping on her part and charged her merely with a recordkeeping violation, instead of negligent misappropriation caused by deficient accounting practices. We cannot agree, however, that respondent's use of Wilkes' funds amounted to only a recordkeeping violation. It may have been caused by a recordkeeping violation, but it clearly amounted to an invasion of Wilkes' funds. As such, it constituted a negligent misappropriation of client's funds, a violation of RPC 1.15(a) (a rule that was cited in this count of the complaint.)

In sum, we find respondent guilty of negligent misappropriation (Wilkes), failure to promptly turn over funds to a client (Wilkes), lack of diligence (Wisher, Koch), failure to communicate with clients (Koch, Kitchen), failure to turn over a file (Esser), recordkeeping violations, and failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities (Koch, Kitchen).

One additional point warrants mention. In September 2001, respondent was declared ineligible to practice law for failure to pay the annual assessment to the CPF. She was, therefore, ineligible to practice when she represented Wilkes and Koch. This issue was not addressed below and we decline to make a finding in this regard in light of the lack of notice to respondent.

We now turn to the measure of discipline required for respondent's ethics infractions.

Generally, a reprimand is imposed for recordkeeping deficiencies and negligent misappropriation of client funds. See, e.g., In re Winkler, 175 N.J. 438 (2003) (reprimand for attorney who commingled personal and trust funds, negligently invaded clients' funds, and did not comply with the recordkeeping rules; the attorney withdrew from his trust account \$4,100 in legal fees before the deposit of corresponding settlement funds, believing that he was withdrawing against a

"cushion" of his own funds left in the trust account); In re Blazsek, 154 N.J. 137 (1998) (attorney reprimanded for the negligent misappropriation of \$31,000 in client funds and failure to comply with recordkeeping requirements); In re Goldstein, 147 N.J. 286 (1997) (reprimand for negligent misappropriation of clients' funds and failure to maintain proper trust and business account records); In re Liotta-Neff, 147 N.J. 283 (1997) (reprimand for attorney who negligently misappropriated approximately \$5,000 in client funds after commingling personal and client funds; the attorney left \$20,000 of her own funds in the account, against which she drew funds for her personal obligations; the attorney was also guilty of poor recordkeeping practices); In re Gilbert, 144 N.J. 581 (1996) (reprimand imposed on attorney who negligently misappropriated in excess of \$10,000 in client funds and violated the recordkeeping rules, including commingling personal and trust funds and depositing earned fees into the trust account; the attorney also failed to properly supervise his firm's employees with regard to the maintenance of the business and trust accounts); In re Imperiale, 140 N.J. 75 (1995) (attorney reprimanded for deficient recordkeeping and negligent misappropriation of \$9,600 in client funds); and In re Lazzaro, 127 N.J. 390 (1992) (reprimand imposed after poor recordkeeping

resulted in negative client balances and a trust account shortage of more than \$14,000).

A reprimand may still result even if the attorney's disciplinary record includes a prior recordkeeping violation or other ethics transgressions. In re Toronto, 185 N.J. 399 (2005) (attorney reprimanded for negligent misappropriation of \$59,000 in client funds and recordkeeping violations; the attorney had a prior three-month suspension for conviction of simple assault, arising out of a domestic violence incident, and a reprimand for a misrepresentation to ethics authorities about his sexual relationship with a former student; mitigating factors taken into account); In re Regojo, 185 N.J. 395 (2005) (reprimand imposed on attorney who negligently misappropriated \$13,000 in client funds as a result of his failure to properly reconcile his trust account records; the attorney also committed several recordkeeping improprieties, commingled personal and trust funds in his trust account, and failed to timely disburse funds to clients or third parties; the attorney had two prior reprimands, one of which stemmed from negligent misappropriation and recordkeeping deficiencies; mitigating factors considered); In re Rosenberg, 170 N.J. 402 (2002) (reprimand imposed on attorney who negligently misappropriated client trust funds in amounts ranging from \$400 to \$12,000 during an eighteen-month period;

the misappropriations occurred because the attorney routinely deposited large retainers in his trust account and then withdrew his fees from the account as he needed funds, without determining whether he had sufficient fees from a particular client to cover the withdrawals; prior private reprimand for unrelated violations); and In re Marcus, 140 N.J. 518 (1995) (attorney reprimanded for negligently misappropriating client funds as a result of numerous recordkeeping violations and commingling personal and clients' funds; the attorney had received a prior reprimand).

If compelling mitigating factors are present, the reprimand may be reduced to an admonition. See, e.g., In re Michals, 185 N.J. 126 (2005) (admonition for attorney who negligently misappropriated \$2,000 for one day and \$187.43 for two days, respectively, commingled personal and trust funds, and violated the recordkeeping rules; in mitigation, it was considered that the trust account shortage was limited to a few days, that the attorney fully cooperated with ethics authorities, that he had no prior encounters with the disciplinary system, that he assumed full responsibility for the problems with this practice, and that he subsequently made recordkeeping a priority); In the Matter of Michael A. Mark, DRB 01-425 (February 13, 2002) (admonition by consent for attorney who negligently

misappropriated client funds for a period of two years, as a result of failure to follow proper recordkeeping procedures; the misappropriation occurred when the attorney erroneously withdrew a legal fee of \$4,000, failed to reimburse the trust account for bank service charges in the amount of \$100, mistakenly advanced client costs in the amount of \$350 from the trust account, instead of the business account, and failed to reconcile the account on a quarterly basis; an OAE audit also disclosed several recordkeeping violations; mitigating factors were the attorney's prompt replacement of the trust funds and his hiring of a CPA to reconstruct the trust records, correct all recordkeeping deficiencies, and insure that all client funds were on deposit; prior three-month suspension for unrelated conduct); In the Matter of Cassandra Corbett, DRB 00-261 (January 12, 2001) (admonition where the attorney's deficient recordkeeping resulted in a \$7,011.02 trust account shortage; in imposing only an admonition, we considered that the attorney had reimbursed all missing funds, admitted her wrongdoing, cooperated with the OAE, and hired an accountant to reconstruct her records); In the Matter of Bette R. Grayson, DRB 97-338 (May 27, 1998) (admonition where the attorney's deficient recordkeeping resulted in the negligent misappropriation of \$6,500 in client trust funds; in mitigation, we considered that

the attorney fully cooperated with the OAE, took subsequent steps to straighten out her records, and had no prior discipline); and In the Matter of Joseph S. Caruso, DRB 96-076 (May 21, 1996) (admonition where the misrecording of a deposit led to a trust account shortage and the attorney committed a number of violations in the maintenance of his trust account; in imposing only an admonition, we considered that the attorney was newly admitted to the bar at the time, corrected all deficiencies, implemented a computerized system to avoid reoccurrences, and fully cooperated with the OAE; moreover, the attorney's conduct caused no harm to clients).

Discipline for violations of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(a), and RPC 1.16(d) usually ranges from an admonition to a reprimand, depending on, among other things, the attorney's disciplinary history and the number of matters involved. See, e.g., In the Matter of Vera Carpenter, DRB 97-303 (October 27, 1997) (admonition for attorney who, in one matter, failed to act diligently, failed to communicate with a client, and failed to turn over the client's file to new counsel; the attorney had no disciplinary history); In re Weiss, 173 N.J. 323 (2002) (reprimand for attorney who, in an estate matter, failed to file a fiduciary income tax return for more than four years and failed to prepare an estate accounting, refunding bonds, and

releases for the beneficiaries of the estate); In re Baiamonte, 170 N.J. 184 (2001) (reprimand for attorney who, in two matters, was found guilty of lack of diligence, failure to communicate with a client, failure to turn over a client's file after termination of representation, and failure to expedite litigation; the attorney had no disciplinary history); and In re Magid, 167 N.J. 614 (2001) (reprimand for failure to communicate with a client and failure to take reasonable steps to protect the interests of that client on termination of representation in two matters, and for lack of diligence in one of those matters; the attorney had a prior reprimand).

Here, we must consider respondent's disciplinary record (a reprimand and two three-month suspensions) and whether her subsequent conduct reflects an inability – or unwillingness – to learn from prior mistakes. We note that much of respondent's misconduct in these matters took place before her earlier discipline had been imposed. Specifically, in Kitchen and Wisher, the misconduct took place before respondent's 2002 reprimand (the earliest discipline imposed). In Koch, the misconduct occurred after the reprimand, but before the first suspension. Finally, in Wilkes, the misconduct took place after the reprimand and, in part, after the first suspension. To some extent, thus, respondent did not learn from her former mistakes.

We also note that the DEC was so troubled by respondent's disciplinary history that it recommended a two-year suspension. Surprisingly, during the DEC hearing, the OAE presenter stated that, had it not been for "respondent's prior ethical issue, [they] might have been able to do this by way of diversion." In her brief, the OAE presenter called for the imposition of a six-month suspension, retroactive to January 13, 2005, to run consecutively to respondent's last suspension. The OAE also suggested continuation of the restriction imposed by the Court in October 2004, specifically, that, on reinstatement, respondent not practice as a sole practitioner until further order of the Court.

Our independent review of the record convinces us that the two-year suspension recommended by the DEC is grossly excessive. On the other hand, respondent not only mishandled five client matters, but she committed recordkeeping violations about which she had been previously warned. In one instance, her poor bookkeeping practices caused the negligent misappropriation of client's funds. Moreover, in two matters, respondent did not cooperate with disciplinary authorities. In the three matters that led to her reprimand and suspensions, too, respondent did not cooperate with ethics authorities. Two of those matters proceeded on a default basis. When the totality of respondent's

conduct in these five matters is considered in conjunction with her disciplinary record and her continued failure to conform to the standards of the profession after she was disciplined, we determine that respondent should receive a six-month suspension, retroactive to January 13, 2005, the expiration date of her last three-month suspension.

As to the conditions suggested by the DEC, we agree that a proctorship for two years is necessary. However, the diversionary course also suggested by the DEC is not appropriate. Much of respondent's difficulty sprang from her poor recordkeeping. We, thus, determine that, prior to reinstatement, respondent should complete a course in the proper maintenance of her trust and business accounts.

Members Boylan and Lolla did not participate.

We further determine to require respondent to reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for administrative costs and actual expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in R. 1:20-17.

Disciplinary Review Board
William J. O'Shaughnessy, Chair

By: Julianne K. DeCore
Julianne K. DeCore
Chief Counsel

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BOARD
VOTING RECORD


In the Matters of Patricia Adelle
Docket Nos. DRB 06-327 and DRB 06-328

Argued: February 15, 2007

Decided: April 5, 2007

Disposition: Six-month suspension (retroactive)

Members	Disbar	Six-month Retroactive Suspension	Reprimand	Dismiss	Disqualified	Did not participate
O'Shaughnessy		X				
Pashman		X				
Baugh		X				
Boylan						X
Frost		X				
Lolla						X
Neuwirth		X				
Stanton		X				
Wissinger		X				
Total:		7				2


Julianne K. DeCore
Chief Counsel