

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY  
Disciplinary Review Board  
Docket No. DRB 18-066  
District Docket No. XIV-2017-0179E

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IN THE MATTER OF  
JOHN ANDREW KLAMO  
AN ATTORNEY AT LAW

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Decision

Argued: May 17, 2018

Decided: August 10, 2018

Johanna Barba Jones appeared on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics.

Respondent appeared pro se.

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.

This matter was before us on a motion for reciprocal discipline, filed by the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE) pursuant to R. 1:20-14(a). The motion was based on respondent's six-month suspension in Pennsylvania, retroactive to October 12, 2013, for violations equivalent to RPC 8.1(a) (knowingly making a false statement of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter), RPC 8.1(b) (failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities), RPC 8.4(a) (violating or attempting to violate the

Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assisting or inducing another to do so, or doing so through the acts of another), RPC 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), and RPC 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), for failure to comply with the Pennsylvania equivalent of R. 1:20-20.

For the reasons expressed below, we recommend that respondent be disbarred.

Respondent was admitted to the New Jersey bar in 1982 and the Pennsylvania bar in 1981. At the relevant time, he maintained a law office in Cherry Hill, New Jersey.

Respondent has an extensive ethics history.

In 1996, respondent was reprimanded for delegating his recordkeeping responsibilities to an employee whom he never supervised or instructed on recordkeeping practices. As a result, the employee misappropriated client funds. Respondent was guilty of gross neglect, negligent misappropriation of client trust funds, commingling fees and trust account funds, and recordkeeping violations. In re Klamo, 143 N.J. 386 (1996).

In 2013, respondent was suspended for three months for charging improper expenses in contingent fee matters (photocopying, postage, and telephone calls); failing to promptly deliver funds belonging to clients and third parties by amassing approximately

\$100,000 in his trust account and failing to disburse deductibles and co-pays, in some instances for as long as thirteen years, until the OAE began its investigation and instructed him to disburse the funds; recordkeeping violations; engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation; making material misstatements of fact to ethics authorities; and failing to maintain malpractice insurance. In re Klamo, 213 N.J. 494 (2013).

Respondent was reinstated to practice law, effective September 25, 2013, and was ordered to practice under the supervision of an OAE-approved proctor for a two-year period and to submit to the OAE, for a two-year period, on a quarterly basis, monthly reconciliations of his attorney accounts, prepared by an accountant. In re Klamo, 215 N.J. 520 (2013).

In 2016, respondent was censured, in two consolidated matters, for failure to abide by the client's decisions concerning the scope of the representation, lack of diligence, failure to communicate with the client, failure to expedite litigation, and misrepresentation by silence. Although we concluded that respondent had failed to maintain malpractice insurance, we did not impose discipline for this violation because he had been found guilty of that infraction for the same timeframe in a prior disciplinary matter. In re Klamo, 225 N.J. 331 (2016).

Earlier this year, on January 10, 2018, respondent received a three-month suspension, in a default, for misconduct that included gross neglect, lack of diligence, and failure to communicate with clients. Respondent's failure to answer interrogatories resulted in the dismissal of his clients' complaint. He also failed to obtain his client's permission before retaining an entity to prepare an appellate brief, in violation of RPC 1.2(a); violated RPC 5.5(a) by failing to submit certificates of insurance to the Clerk of the Court from 1998 to 2010, as required by R. 1:21-1A(b); and misrepresented the status of the case to his clients by telling them that their case was proceeding properly, thereby violating RPC 8.4(c). In re Klamo, 231 N.J. 395 (2018).

Respondent was disciplined again, on May 30, 2018, when he received a two-year suspension for failing to safeguard funds, lying to ethics authorities, and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, when settling a fire insurance claim. Instead of depositing settlement funds in his trust account and disbursing them to all interested parties, respondent released the funds to the contractor he had hired to make the repairs. He then lied to the OAE about the disposition of the settlement check and his involvement in retaining the contractors for the property restoration, and made misrepresentations to his client, by preparing a settlement

statement that did not accurately reflect the disposition of the settlement funds and a letter that misrepresented that he had given the check to her.

In our decision, we considered, as aggravating factors, respondent's serious ethics history, as well as his proclivity for dishonesty, both in respect of his misrepresentations to his clients and to ethics authorities. In addition, we considered the extreme harm suffered by the client. Specifically, the individuals to whom respondent released the funds to make the repairs appeared to have absconded with them. As of the date of the hearing before us, virtually none of the repairs had been made to the client's property, which was vacant and boarded up. In re Klamo, 233 N.J. 352 (2018); In the Matter of John Andrew Klamo, DRB 17-127 (October 24, 2017).

Finally, on February 20, 2018, we determined to impose an additional two-year suspension for respondent's misconduct based on two consolidated complaints comprising two client matters. In the first matter, respondent was guilty of improperly requesting a client to withdraw his ethics grievance in exchange for attempting to reopen the client's workers' compensation case, a violation of RPC 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

In the second matter, respondent assisted a personal injury client in obtaining money from a funding company, pre-settlement.

The funding company's contract, which respondent signed, required him to explain the terms of the contract to his client, including the fact that the company was a source of funding of last resort, and that the fees continued to accrue until full payment of the advance and fees were made.

Prior to the settlement of the client's case, the company rejected respondent's offer to compromise the amount it was owed. Once respondent received the client's settlement, he disbursed all of the funds, including a reduced amount to the funding company, to which the company had not consented, and then avoided the company's attempts to contact him. Respondent's conduct violated RPC 1.15(b) (failure to promptly notify a third person about the receipt of funds), RPC 1.15(c) (failure to segregate disputed funds), and RPC 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). In the Matter of John Andrew Klamo, Docket No. DRB 17-311 (February 20, 2018). The matter is pending with the Court.

We now address the facts of this matter. On July 22, 2015, the Pennsylvania Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) filed a petition for discipline charging respondent with violations of several Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct. After respondent filed an answer, the Hearing Committee, conducted a prehearing conference and a hearing, and filed a report on June 17, 2016, recommending a

six-month suspension. Following the parties' submission of briefs and exceptions, the Pennsylvania Disciplinary Board (Pa. Board) adjudicated the matter, on October 13, 2016.

The Pa. Board made the following findings of fact. As noted above, respondent was suspended in New Jersey for three months, effective May 27, 2013. Prior to his suspension, Whadeha Allen had retained respondent to represent her in two personal injury matters arising from motor vehicle accidents: one involving a Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) vehicle, the other involving Marcus Ford, an individual. After respondent's suspension, Mitchell Goldfield, Esq., as a favor to a mutual friend, agreed to take over respondent's files, including Allen's file. Goldfield maintained that he "managed" respondent's law practice from May 27, 2013 through August 27, 2013.

On June 28, 2013, Goldfield instituted a civil action on Allen's behalf in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County in the SEPTA matter.

By Order dated September 12, 2013, effective October 12, 2013, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania imposed reciprocal discipline on respondent, a three-month suspension, consistent with his New Jersey discipline. Pursuant to that Order, respondent was required to comply with the provisions of Pa.R.D.E. 217 and Form DB-25, Statement of Compliance, which directed respondent to file a

verified statement of compliance, within ten days of the Order, certifying that he had fulfilled the Order's terms and rules, and had notified all current clients of his suspension.

Respondent failed to file the Pennsylvania Statement of Compliance with the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Disciplinary Board and, "[a]t present, Respondent remains on suspension in Pennsylvania and continues to be ineligible to practice law in the Commonwealth."

Respondent was reinstated to practice law in New Jersey, effective September 25, 2013. Two days later, in a September 27, 2013 letter to Goldfield, Allen demanded that he return her SEPTA file; that he "cease and desist any and all representation in regard to any of [her] matters;" and that he forward all future correspondence to respondent. In an October 7, 2013 letter to Goldfield, respondent requested Allen's file in the Pennsylvania matter. By letter dated October 15, 2013, Goldfield denied respondent's request, asserting that, because respondent remained suspended in Pennsylvania, he was not permitted to take on any new clients, which included the Allen matter.

By letter dated October 23, 2013, Goldfield notified the OAE that he believed that respondent had contacted clients prior to his New Jersey reinstatement and that he had requested the transfer of many matters, including a Pennsylvania matter, for which Goldfield



was the named counsel, notwithstanding that respondent's Pennsylvania suspension was still in effect. On November 4, 2013, the OAE forwarded the letter to the Pennsylvania ethics authorities.

On February 21, 2014, the petitioner, ODC, sought respondent's statement with respect to a "complaint" involving the Allen matter, which alleged that respondent had requested her Pennsylvania file, even though he was ineligible to practice law in Pennsylvania.

Respondent's June 25, 2014 reply included a June 6, 2014 signed statement by Allen, asserting that she had asked respondent to retrieve her New Jersey file in the Marcus Ford matter and that Goldfield had represented her in the SEPTA matter. Respondent's letter added that he would file the appropriate paperwork regarding compliance with Pa.R.D.E. 217.

Respondent knew that Allen's June 6, 2014 statement was false because Goldfield never represented Allen in the Ford matter, and Allen's letter to Goldfield had specifically requested that he forward the SEPTA file to respondent. Moreover, respondent knew that Allen's June 6, 2014 witness statement was false when he forwarded it to the ODC because his office had prepared Allen's September 27, 2013 letter to Goldfield, requesting the transfer of the SEPTA matter to him.

On September 11, 2014, the ODC forwarded a supplemental request form for respondent's position, warning that, if he did not reply within thirty days, he would be in violation of Pa.R.D.E. 203(b)(7). An ODC investigator personally served respondent with another supplemental request letter at his Cherry Hill, New Jersey address. Respondent neither submitted a reply nor demonstrated good cause for his failure to do so.

Following a hearing, the Pa. Board found Goldfield's testimony credible, and Allen's testimony not credible. The hearing panel found that respondent committed the violations charged in the petition. Respondent admitted that he failed to file a compliance statement and failed to reply to the disciplinary authority's request for supplemental information. He failed to demonstrate remorse for his actions. After considering the ODC's recommendation for a suspension of one year and one day, and respondent's request for a retroactive six-month suspension, the Pa. Board recommended the imposition of a six-month retroactive suspension. The Pa. Board considered, in aggravation, respondent's prior Pennsylvania record, which consisted of an informal admonition in 2009 and the reciprocal three-month suspension; his lack of remorse; his failure to accept responsibility for his misconduct; and his lack of candor and lack of credibility. In mitigation, the Pa. Board considered respondent's admission that he failed to reply to the supplemental

request for information; his assertion that his failure to file his Statement of Compliance was a "mistake on [his] part;" and his cooperation, evidenced by entering into a joint stipulation of facts, law, and exhibits.

The Pa. Board rejected the petitioner's proposed one-year and one-day suspension on respondent, finding that respondent's conduct was distinguishable from the cases the petitioner cited because respondent's conduct did not involve misrepresentations to the ODC regarding the handling of funds belonging to clients, the breach of duty to clients to hold entrusted funds inviolate, or the failure to return unearned fees. Rather, the Pa. Board found that respondent's misconduct involved his unsuccessful attempt to obtain the file of a new client after the Court had ordered his suspension, and further found no evidence that respondent had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Thus, noting that respondent's misconduct had occurred at about the same time as the misconduct resulting in the prior three-month suspension, and, further, was based on actions respondent had taken regarding that suspension, the Pa. Board found that a retroactive six-month suspension was appropriate.

The Pa. Board noted further that respondent was still suspended, based on the reciprocal three-month suspension that he received on September 12, 2013, because he failed to certify,

through a verified statement, his compliance with all of the terms of the order of suspension. Thus, his suspension order had been in effect for more than three years. The Pa. Board noted further that, pursuant to Pa.R.D.E. 218(g)(iv), respondent cannot resume his Pennsylvania practice until he petitions for reinstatement and proves to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, by clear and convincing evidence, that he is fit to practice law.

On March 13, 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court imposed a six-month suspension, retroactive to October 12, 2013, noting the requirement that respondent must petition to be reinstated and must prove his fitness to practice law.

Recognizing that reciprocal disciplinary proceedings are governed by R. 1:20-14(a)(4), and that we impose identical discipline, unless an exception applies, the OAE maintained that, ordinarily, the facts set forth in the record would merit substantially different discipline, but for respondent's disciplinary record. The OAE argued, nevertheless, that a six-month prospective suspension, not a retroactive suspension, was warranted. The OAE argued further that discipline less than a six-month suspension "would trivialize respondent's recurring pattern of dishonesty and noncooperation."

The OAE maintained that respondent's disciplinary history was a "profound aggravating factor which militates in favor of a further enhanced disciplinary penalty."

In contrast to the OAE's position, in his April 2, 2018 submission, respondent urged us to impose the same discipline imposed in Pennsylvania, a six-month suspension, retroactive to October 12, 2013.

Following a review of the record, we determine to grant the OAE's motion for reciprocal discipline.

Reciprocal discipline proceedings in New Jersey are governed by R. 1:20-14(a)(4), which provides in pertinent part:

The Board shall recommend the imposition of the identical action or discipline unless the respondent demonstrates, or the Board finds on the face of the record on which the discipline in another jurisdiction was predicated that it clearly appears that:

(A) the disciplinary or disability order of the foreign jurisdiction was not entered;

(B) the disciplinary or disability order of the foreign jurisdiction does not apply to the respondent;

(C) the disciplinary or disability order of the foreign jurisdiction does not remain in full force and effect as the result of appellate proceedings;

(D) the procedure followed in the foreign disciplinary matter was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or

(E) the unethical conduct established warrants substantially different discipline.

"[A] final adjudication in another court, agency or tribunal, that an attorney admitted to practice in this state . . . is guilty of unethical conduct in another jurisdiction . . . shall establish conclusively the facts on which it rests for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this state." R. 1:20-14(a)(5). Thus, with respect to motions for reciprocal discipline, "[t]he sole issue to be determined . . . shall be the extent of final discipline to be imposed." R. 1:20-14(b)(3). In Pennsylvania, "evidence is sufficient to prove unprofessional conduct if a preponderance of the evidence establishes the conduct and the proof of such conduct is clear and satisfactory." Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Duffield, 537 Pa. 485 (1994). See also Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Surrick, 749 A.2d 441, 444 (2000) and Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Keller, 509 Pa. 573 (1986).

The record clearly and convincingly establishes that respondent was guilty of the violations charged in the petition. He made misrepresentations in connection with a disciplinary matter and sent fabricated records to disciplinary authorities, violations of RPC 8.1(a) and RPC 8.4(c); assisted another in violating the Rules of Professional Conduct, by helping Allen submit a false letter to the ODC, a violation of RPC 8.4(a); failed to cooperate with disciplinary authorities when he did not reply to the ODC's

supplemental request for information, a violation of RPC 8.1(b); and violated this Rule once more when he failed to verify his compliance with the terms of the Pennsylvania order of suspension, also a violation of RPC 8.4(d).

Generally, in matters involving misrepresentations to ethics authorities, the discipline ranges from a reprimand to a term of suspension, depending on the gravity of the offense, the presence of other unethical conduct, and aggravating or mitigating factors. See, e.g., In re DeSeno, 205 N.J. 91 (2011) (reprimand for attorney who misrepresented the filing date of a complaint to the district ethics committee; failed to adequately communicate with the client; and failed to cooperate with the investigation of the grievance; prior reprimand); In re Sunberg, 156 N.J. 396 (1998) (reprimand for attorney who created a phony arbitration award to mislead his partner and then lied to the OAE about it; mitigating factors included the passage of ten years since the occurrence, the attorney's unblemished disciplinary record, his numerous professional achievements, and his pro bono contributions); In re Homan, 195 N.J. 185 (2008) (censure for attorney who fabricated a promissory note reflecting a loan to him from a client, forged the signature of the client's attorney-in-fact, and gave the note to the OAE during the investigation of a grievance against him; the attorney told the OAE that the note was genuine and that it had

been executed contemporaneously with its creation; ultimately, the attorney admitted his impropriety to the OAE; extremely compelling mitigating factors considered, including the attorney's impeccable forty-year professional record, the legitimacy of the loan transaction listed on the note, and the fact that the attorney's fabrication of the note was prompted by his panic at being contacted by the OAE and his embarrassment over his failure to prepare the note contemporaneously with the loan); In re Ezor, 222 N.J. 8 (2015) (three-month suspension in a default matter for attorney guilty of making misrepresentations to the OAE about judgments against him and concealing assets from judgment creditors, recordkeeping violations, failing to cooperate with the OAE's investigation, engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by misusing his trust account to defraud creditors, and practicing law while ineligible); In re Bar-Nadav, 174 N.J. 537 (2002) (three-month suspension for attorney who submitted two fictitious letters to the district ethics committee in an attempt to justify his failure to file a divorce complaint on behalf of a client; the attorney also filed a motion on behalf of another client after his representation had ended, and failed to communicate with both clients); In re Katsios, 185 N.J. 424 (2006) (two-year suspension for attorney who prematurely released a buyer's deposit, which he held in escrow for a real estate



transaction, to the buyer/client, his cousin, without the consent of all the parties to the transaction; ordinarily, that misconduct would have warranted no more than a reprimand, but the attorney panicked when contacted by the OAE, and then sought to conceal his misdeed by falsifying bank records and trust account reconciliations to mislead the ethics investigator that the funds had remained in escrow; we noted that the cover-up had been worse than the "crime"); In re Silberberg, 144 N.J. 215 (1996) (two-year suspension imposed on attorney who, in a real estate closing, allowed the buyer to sign the name of the co-borrower; the attorney then witnessed and notarized the "signature" of the co-borrower; the attorney stipulated that he knew at the time that the co-borrower was deceased; after the filing of the ethics grievance against him, the attorney falsely stated that the co-borrower had attended the closing; on another occasion, the attorney sent a false seven-page certification to the district ethics committee in order to conceal his improprieties); and In re Penn, 172 N.J. 38 (2002) (three-year suspension for attorney who failed to file an answer in a foreclosure action, thereby causing the entry of default against the client; thereafter, to placate the client, the attorney misrepresented that the case had been successfully concluded, fabricated a court order, and signed the name of a

judge; the attorney then lied to his adversary and to ethics officials; the attorney also practiced law while ineligible).

Here, respondent also was guilty of failure to file a document similar to the one required under New Jersey's R. 1:20-20(b)(15), which constitutes violations of RPC 8.1(b) and RPC 8.4(d). The threshold measure of discipline in New Jersey for an attorney's failure to file the required R. 1:20-20(b)(15) affidavit is a reprimand. In re Girdler, 179 N.J. 227 (2004); In the Matter of Richard B. Girdler, DRB 03-278 (November 20, 2003) (slip op. at 6). The actual discipline imposed may be different, however, if the record demonstrates mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Ibid. Examples of aggravating factors include the attorney's failure to answer the complaint, the extent of the disciplinary history, and the attorney's failure to follow through on his or her promise to the OAE that the affidavit would be forthcoming. Ibid.

Three-month suspensions have been imposed for this omission where aggravating factors are present, such as a pattern of non-compliance or a significant ethics history. See, e.g., In re Palfy, 221 N.J. 208 (2015) (default; attorney exhibited a pattern of failure to cooperate with disciplinary and fee arbitration officials; he was twice temporarily suspended for non-compliance with five fee arbitration matters and was temporarily suspended for failure to cooperate with an OAE investigation; we determined that

the baseline for attorneys who failed to file R. 1:20-20 affidavits, defaulted, and had only temporary suspensions on their record was a censure; enhanced discipline was required in Palfy because of the attorney's "pattern of obstinacy toward ethics and fee authorities"); In re Garcia, 205 N.J. 314 (2011) (default; attorney failed to comply with R. 1:20-20; her disciplinary history consisted of a fifteen-month suspension); and In re Berkman, 205 N.J. 313 (2011) (default; attorney had a prior nine-month suspension).

Longer suspensions have been imposed where the underlying circumstances were more egregious: In re Rosanelli, 208 N.J. 359 (2011) (default matter; attorney suspended for six months for not complying with R. 1:20-10; prior three-month and six-month suspensions); In re Sharma, 203 N.J. 428 (2010) (six-month suspension in a default matter; the attorney did not comply with the OAE's specific request that he file the affidavit of compliance with R. 1:20-20; prior censure for misconduct in two default matters and a three-month suspension); In re Wood, 193 N.J. 487 (2008) (one-year suspension; attorney failed to file the affidavit after a three-month suspension and failed to comply with the OAE's request that he do so; the attorney had an extensive disciplinary history: an admonition, a reprimand, a censure, and a three-month suspension; two of those matters proceeded as defaults); In re

McClure, 182 N.J. 312 (2005) (one-year suspension; the attorney's disciplinary history consisted of an admonition and two concurrent six-month suspensions, one of which was a default; the attorney also failed to abide by his promise to the OAE that he would file the affidavit); and In re Kozlowski, 192 N.J. 438 (2007) (default matter; two-year suspension for attorney who failed to comply with R. 1:20-20; the attorney's significant disciplinary history included a private reprimand, an admonition, three reprimands, a three-month suspension, and a one-year suspension; the attorney defaulted in six disciplinary matters).

Based on the above precedent, we discern no intrinsic fault with the discipline imposed on respondent by Pennsylvania, for his misconduct in that jurisdiction, to justify a departure under subsection (E) of R. 1:20-14(a)(4). Rather, it is respondent's long history of deceit and dishonesty that causes us concern and that gives us no confidence in his ability to conform his conduct to acceptable standards.

The primary purpose of discipline is to protect the public from unfit lawyers and to promote public confidence in the legal system. In re Gallo, 178 N.J. 115, 122 (2003). In In re Harris, 182 N.J. 594, 609 (2005), the Court detailed the factors to consider in determining the quantum of discipline to impose on an errant attorney, including: the nature and number of professional

transgressions, the harm caused by the transgressions, the attorney's ethics history, and whether the attorney is capable of meeting the standards that must guide all members of the profession.

It is clear to us that respondent has little regard for his clients or the disciplinary system. In our view, respondent has demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to conform his conduct to meet the standards required of all members of the legal profession. We have reached the sad conclusion that his character is unsalvageable; that is, no amount of redemption, counseling, or education will overcome his continued improper behavior. As such, he presents a danger to his clients, to the profession, and to the public-at-large. Thus, based on his contempt for the ethics system, his pervasive dishonesty,<sup>1</sup> the above precedent, his extensive ethics history (a 1996 reprimand; a 2013 three-month suspension; a 2016 censure; a 2018 three-month suspension, and a two-year suspension in that same year, and a pending recommendation for

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<sup>1</sup> In 2013, respondent was found guilty of violating RPC 8.4(c) and making material misstatements of fact to ethics authorities; in 2016, he was guilty of a misrepresentation by silence; in June 2017, respondent was found guilty of making misrepresentations to his client; and again in 2017, he was found guilty of dishonesty and deceit in his dealings with a creditor; in 2018, he was found guilty of both making misrepresentations to disciplinary authorities and to his client; and, also in 2018, we found him guilty of violating RPC 8.4(c) in his dealings with a funding company.

another two-year suspension), and the principles of progressive discipline, we determine to recommend respondent's disbarment.

Vice-Chair Clark and Member Boyer voted to impose a consecutive three-year suspension.

We further determine to require respondent to reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for administrative costs and actual expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in R. 1:20-17.

Disciplinary Review Board  
Bonnie C. Frost, Chair

By:   
Ellen A. Brodsky  
Chief Counsel

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY  
DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BOARD  
VOTING RECORD


In the Matter of John Andrew Klamo  
Docket No. DRB 18-066

Argued: May 17, 2018

Decided: August 10, 2018

Disposition: Disbar

<b>Members</b>	Disbar	Three-year Suspension	Recused	Did Not Participate
Frost	X			
Clark		X		
Boyer		X		
Gallipoli	X			
Hoberman	X			
Joseph	X			
Rivera	X			
Singer	X			
Zmirich	X			
<b>Total:</b>	7	2	0	0


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 Ellen A. Brodsky  
 Chief Counsel