

Supreme Court of New Jersey
 Disciplinary Review Board
 Docket Nos. DRB 20-035 and 20-067
 District Docket Nos. IV-2018-0028E and
 XIV-2019-0343E

In the Matters of
 Stephen Robert Jones
 An Attorney at Law

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Decision

Argued: July 16, 2020

Decided: January 29, 2021

Lynda L. Hinkle appeared on behalf of the District IV Ethics Committee (DRB 20-035).

Colleen Burden appeared on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics (DRB 20-067).

Mario J. Persiano, III appeared in behalf of respondent.

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.

These matters were consolidated for our review and the imposition of discipline. DRB 20-035 was before us on a recommendation for a six-month

suspension filed by the District IV Ethics Committee (DEC). The formal ethics complaint charged respondent with having violated RPC 1.1(a) (gross neglect); RPC 1.3 (lack of diligence); RPC 1.4(b) and (c) (failure to communicate); RPC 1.16(d) (failure to protect a client's interests upon termination of representation); RPC 8.1(b) (failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities); and RPC 8.4(g) (engaging, in a professional capacity, in conduct involving discrimination).

DRB 20-067 was before us on a motion for final discipline filed by the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE), pursuant to R. 1:20-13(c)(2), following respondent's conviction in the State of Florida for felony possession of cocaine, in violation of Florida Statute § 893.13(6)(a). This offense is the equivalent of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1), a third-degree crime, and, thus, constitutes a violation of RPC 8.4(b) (criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects).

For the reasons set forth below, we determine to grant the motion for final discipline and to impose a consolidated, retroactive, one-year suspension, with conditions.

Respondent earned admission to the New Jersey bar in 2006 and currently resides in Florida. During the relevant timeframe, he maintained an office for the practice of law in Pitman, New Jersey. He has no history of

discipline in New Jersey, but, on March 16, 2020, he consented to the temporary suspension of his New Jersey license due to the then-pending Florida criminal matter. In re Jones, 241 N.J. 352 (2020). He remains suspended to date.

We now turn to the facts of these matters.

PRESENTMENT (DRB 20-035 and District Docket No. IV-2018-0028E)

This matter stems from respondent's representation of the grievant, Kim Parker, and her husband, Stanley Paul, in a civil matter. Prior to the commencement of the June 17, 2019 ethics hearing, respondent executed a stipulation of facts, admitting that he violated all the RPCs charged in the complaint, except RPC 1.16(d). As discussed below, however, respondent subsequently argued that his stipulation was limited to the RPC 1.1(a), RPC 1.3, and RPC 8.1(b) violations.

On September 18, 2017, Parker and Paul retained respondent to defend a civil matter in which they were sued, in connection with a real estate transaction, for failing to disclose and remediate a mold issue. Prior to retaining respondent, they had represented themselves pro se, and had failed to comply with a discovery deadline. Parker and Paul met respondent at his apartment, from which he had been conducting his law practice.

Ten days later, on September 28, 2017, Parker met with respondent alone at his apartment, where they discussed the terms of payment, legal fees, and deadlines for representation in the civil case.

During a November 8, 2017 conversation about the pending litigation, respondent admitted to Parker that he had not properly reviewed the case to identify the documentation needed to comply with discovery, but claimed that he would conduct further research. Respondent then hand-delivered a motion and supporting documents to reinstate the clients' case, without first having obtained Parker's response to the opposing party's demand for production of documents. On November 29, 2017, Parker sent respondent an e-mail directing him to cease contact with opposing counsel. That same day, respondent delivered the case file to Parker's home. On December 4, 2017, respondent signed a substitution of attorney.

In addition to the above facts, respondent stipulated that he had failed to respond to notices to produce documents, to respond to interrogatories, and to review the motion to dismiss, in violation of RPC 1.1(a); admitted that he had lacked diligence by failing to review previous discovery motions filed against Parker, in violation of RPC 1.3; admitted that he had failed to communicate with his clients by not explaining that they were required to produce documents to reinstate the litigation, in violation of RPC 1.4(b) and (c);

admitted that he had failed to provide documents to ethics investigators and failed to comply with the deadline to submit information, in violation of RPC 8.1(b); and admitted that he had sent lewd text messages to Parker while he was intoxicated, although he claimed that he did not recall doing so, in violation of RPC 8.4(g). Again, respondent did not stipulate to having violated RPC 1.16(d).

During the ethics hearing, Parker testified that she was uncomfortable meeting with respondent at his home, without Paul. Respondent asked her personal questions and directed her to his bedroom to conduct business. After that meeting, respondent asked Parker to buy him alcohol, and gave her money to do so. Parker took the money, went home, and asked Paul to address respondent's behavior. Thereafter, respondent sent Parker a friend request on social media, which she accepted. Respondent then sent Parker inappropriate, lewd messages via text and social media. Parker added that, during a court proceeding on November 3, 2017, respondent failed to provide a defense for her case, failed to file the appropriate papers, and urged her to settle, contrary to her wishes. She further claimed that respondent yelled at her in the hallways of the courtroom, in the vicinity of the judge. Although respondent later told Parker that he would "fix" things for her and Paul, he never did. From the end

of October through November 2017, respondent and Parker went “back and forth,” but respondent did nothing to rectify the problems in the case.

Parker further testified that she had paralegal training, and that thirty years earlier, she had worked at a defense litigation firm. She testified that, by the time she hired respondent, the case had fallen into default, because it had been moved to the Law Division from the Special Civil Part, and the complexity of the case “was way over [her] head.” Parker testified that respondent constantly threatened to withdraw from the case and that he “didn’t want to do his job.” Parker tried, and failed, to find new counsel to take over her case, testifying that, considering the stage in the litigation, finding a new attorney was “almost impossible.”

In turn, respondent testified that he has a substance abuse problem and that, when he met Parker, he was living in low-income housing, from which he ultimately was evicted, in 2018. After losing a business he had represented as a client, respondent was in an “emotional state,” and began collecting unemployment benefits and food stamps. In September 2018, his mother bought him a plane ticket and he moved to Florida. Thereafter, he was arrested for felony possession of cocaine. At the time of the ethics hearing, respondent’s criminal case in Florida was pending. Further, he claimed that he had remained sober since March 2019. Respondent admitted that some of his

conduct toward Parker was not appropriate, which he attributed to his alcohol abuse problem.

As to the alleged violation of RPC 1.16(d), Parker testified that, on December 18, 2017, two weeks after she had hired a new attorney to replace respondent, a motion for summary judgment regarding Parker's third-party complaint was filed. She speculated that, due to her transition between attorneys, the court might have mistakenly notified respondent of the hearing date, instead of her new attorney. Because of the miscommunication, Parker and her attorney failed to appear for the hearing.

After the disciplinary hearing, the presenter and respondent submitted written closing arguments. The presenter asserted that respondent had stipulated to all the charged violations except RPC 1.16(d), RPC 8.4(c),¹ and RPC 8.4(g). Contending that respondent violated all RPCs charged in the complaint, the presenter recommended a six-month suspension, and the following conditions: "substance abuse control including testing, abstinence, and support group attendance;" supervision by a proctor for an unspecified term; submission of proof of fitness to practice law, attested to by a mental

¹ The complaint did not charge respondent with having violated RPC 8.4(c).

health professional, or continued mental health counseling; and \$2,000 in restitution to Parker, the amount of the retainer.

In respondent's post-hearing brief, he denied having stipulated to violations of RPC 1.4(b) and (c) or RPC 8.4(g). In respect of RPC 1.16(d), respondent had not conceded that he had received the motion papers, and further asserted that, because a substitution of attorney had been executed, he was no longer obligated to forward the motion papers to the new attorney.

Respondent also asked the DEC to consider that Parker had paralegal training, was in default of discovery obligations prior to retaining him, and ultimately settled the underlying case by paying \$2,000 less than the amount that respondent had recommended and, thus, arguably did not suffer a negative financial impact.

Respondent's counsel advanced the following mitigating factors: respondent's lack of disciplinary history; his stipulations to his misconduct and his expression of remorse; his substance abuse issues and their direct effect on his behavior toward Parker; his acknowledgement of the Florida drug charge; and his testimony that he had remained drug-free since March 2019, as well as his success in complying with pre-trial conditions. Respondent argued that a six-month suspension would not be appropriate, because the presenter did not demonstrate a pattern of misconduct.

In her brief, the presenter addressed the stipulated facts and violations, as well as the aggravating and mitigating factors. In aggravation, she argued that respondent did not cooperate with disciplinary authorities, and that respondent admitted prior chemical dependency issues, including “past DUIs” that he “thought” had been dismissed. She argued that respondent’s stipulation to the violations should not be considered a mitigating factor. She further contended that Parker’s legal training and the default status of her case when she retained respondent failed to mitigate respondent’s misconduct.

DEC FINDINGS

The DEC determined that respondent had admitted all RPC violations alleged in the complaint, except RPC 1.16(d). In respect of that charge, the DEC considered that respondent had received a notice of motion for summary judgment implicating his former clients, which he failed to forward to their new attorney. The DEC rejected respondent’s arguments regarding his lack of responsibility following the substitution of attorney and found that he had violated RPC 1.16(d).

Turning to the proper level of discipline for respondent’s violations, the DEC noted, but did not weigh in aggravation, that respondent had been charged, in Florida, with a drug crime. In aggravation, the DEC considered

that respondent failed to cooperate with disciplinary authorities. The hearing panel report did not address the mitigating factors that respondent had asserted in his brief.

The DEC recommended that respondent be suspended for six months and that, prior to reinstatement, he be required to submit proof of a substance abuse evaluation and any participation in any recommended treatment.

MOTION FOR FINAL DISCIPLINE (DRB 20-067 and District Docket No. XIV-2019-0343E)

On October 23, 2019, in the Florida court, respondent entered the equivalent of a plea of nolo contendere to felony possession of cocaine. As part of that plea, he stipulated that, on March 22, 2019, he had been in possession of cocaine. The court sentenced him to eighteen months of probation, with conditions. In respect of the motion for final discipline, the OAE urged the imposition of a three-month suspension as the presumptive measure of discipline for possessory drug crimes. Moreover, the OAE recommended the imposition of the following conditions: prior to his reinstatement, respondent should be required to provide proof of fitness to practice law, as attested to by a mental health professional approved by the OAE; after his reinstatement, respondent should be required to provide the

OAE with quarterly reports documenting his continued psychological and substance abuse counseling, for a period of two years, and to notify the OAE of any positive drug tests.

* * *

Following a de novo review of the record in DRB 20-035, we find that respondent violated RPC 1.1(a); RPC 1.3; RPC 1.4(b) and (c); RPC 1.16(d); RPC 8.1(b); and RPC 8.4(g).

Specifically, respondent violated RPC 1.1(a) and RPC 1.3 by failing to respond to multiple discovery requests, failing to properly review the motion to dismiss, and by failing to review previous discovery motions filed against Parker. As a result of respondent's inaction, the trial court denied the motion to vacate that respondent had filed in an attempt to reinstate his clients' pleadings and, instead, entered an order of dismissal. Although respondent promised his clients that he would take action to vacate the order of dismissal, he failed to do so, forcing his clients to secure new counsel.

Respondent also violated RPC 1.4(b) and (c) by failing to explain to his clients that, in order to reinstate their pleadings, they were required to produce the documents that the opposing party previously had requested.

Furthermore, respondent failed to provide requested documents to disciplinary investigators. Although he was granted additional time to provide

those requested materials, respondent failed to comply with the deadline to submit information, in violation of RPC 8.1(b).

Moreover, respondent violated RPC 8.4(g) when he sent lewd text and Facebook messages to Parker. As detailed below, pursuant to that Rule, such sexual harassment constitutes discrimination based on sex.

Finally, we also determine that respondent's conduct constituted a failure to protect his clients' interest on termination of representation. RPC 1.16(d) requires an attorney to "take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests" upon termination of the representation. Here, respondent received a notice of motion for summary judgment against Parker after the client had terminated his representation. Yet, respondent failed to inform Parker, her new attorney, or the court of the administrative error. Therefore, respondent failed to protect Parker's interests, in violation of RPC 1.16(d).

In respect of DRB 20-067, following a review of the record, we determine to grant the OAE's motion for final discipline and find that respondent violated RPC 8.4(b).

In New Jersey, R. 1:20-13(c) governs final discipline proceedings. Under that Rule, a criminal conviction is conclusive evidence of guilt in a disciplinary proceeding. R. 1:20-13(c)(1); In re Magid, 139 N.J. 449, 451

(1995); In re Principato, 139 N.J. 456, 460 (1995). Respondent’s conviction of possession of cocaine, in violation of Florida Statute § 893.13(6)(a), the equivalent of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1), a third-degree crime, thus, establishes a violation of RPC 8.4(b). Pursuant to that Rule, it is professional misconduct for an attorney to “commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer.” Hence, the sole issue is the extent of discipline to be imposed. R. 1:20-13(c)(2); In re Magid, 139 N.J. at 451-52; and In re Principato, 139 N.J. at 460.

In determining the appropriate measure of discipline, we must consider the interests of the public, the bar, and the respondent. “The primary purpose of discipline is not to punish the attorney but to preserve the confidence of the public in the bar.” Ibid. (citations omitted). Fashioning the appropriate penalty involves a consideration of many factors, including the “nature and severity of the crime, whether the crime is related to the practice of law, and any mitigating factors such as respondent’s reputation, his prior trustworthy conduct, and general good conduct.” In re Lunetta, 118 N.J. 443, 445-46 (1989).

That an attorney’s conduct did not involve the practice of law or arise from a client relationship will not excuse an ethics transgression or lessen the degree of sanction. In re Musto, 152 N.J. 165, 173 (1997). Offenses that

evidence ethics shortcomings, although not committed in the attorney's professional capacity, may, nevertheless, warrant discipline. In re Hasbrouck, 140 N.J. 162, 167 (1995). The obligation of an attorney to maintain the high standard of conduct required by a member of the bar applies even to activities that may not directly involve the practice of law or affect his or her clients. In re Schaffer, 140 N.J. 148, 156 (1995).

In sum, in DRB 20-035, we find that respondent violated RPC 1.1(a); RPC 1.3; RPC 1.4(b) and (c); RPC 1.16(d); RPC 8.1(b); and RPC 8.4(g). In DRB 20-067, we find that respondent violated RPC 8.4(b). The sole issue left for us to determine is the appropriate quantum of discipline for respondent's misconduct.

Conduct involving gross neglect, lack of diligence, and failure to communicate with clients ordinarily results in either an admonition or a reprimand, depending on the number of client matters involved, the gravity of the offenses, the harm to the clients, the presence of additional violations, and the seriousness of the attorney's disciplinary history. See, e.g., In the Matter of Esther Maria Alvarez, DRB 19-190 (September 20, 2019) (admonition for attorney who was retained to obtain a divorce for her client, but for the next nine months, failed to take any steps to pursue the matter, and failed to reply to all but one of the client's requests for information about the status of her case,

violations of RPC 1.1(a) and RPC 1.4(b); in another matter, the attorney agreed to seek a default judgment, but waited more than a year-and-a-half to file the necessary papers with the court; although the attorney obtained a default judgment, the court later vacated it due to the passage of time, which precluded a determination of the timing of the damage to the property, violations of RPC 1.1(a) and RPC 1.3); In the Matter of Michael J. Pocchio, DRB 18-192 (October 1, 2018) (admonition for attorney who filed a divorce complaint and permitted it to be dismissed for failure to prosecute the action; he also failed to seek reinstatement of the complaint, and failed to communicate with the client; violations of RPC 1.1(a), RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(b), and RPC 3.2); In re Burro, 235 N.J. 413 (2018) (reprimand for attorney who grossly neglected and lacked diligence in an estate matter for ten years and failed to file New Jersey Inheritance Tax returns, resulting in the accrual of interest of \$40,000 and the imposition of a lien on property belonging to the executrix, in violation of RPC 1.1(a) and RPC 1.3; the attorney also failed to keep the client reasonably informed about events in the case (RPC 1.4(b)); to return the client file upon termination of the representation (RPC 1.16(d)); or to cooperate with the ethics investigation (RPC 8.1(b)); in aggravation, we considered the significant harm to the client and the attorney's prior private reprimand; in mitigation, the attorney suffered a stroke that forced him to

cease practicing law and expressed his remorse); and In re Abasolo, 235 N.J. 326 (2018) (reprimand for attorney who grossly neglected and lacked diligence in a slip-and-fall case for two years after filing the complaint; after successfully restoring the matter to the active trial list, the attorney failed to pay a \$300 filing fee, permitting the defendants' order of dismissal with prejudice to stand, in violation of RPC 1.1(a) and RPC 1.3; in addition, for four years, the attorney failed to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the case, in violation of RPC 1.4(b)).

Admonitions typically are imposed for failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities, if the attorney does not have an ethics history. See, e.g., In the Matter of Leticia Zuniga, DRB 19-432 (March 20, 2020) (attorney failed to reply to repeated requests for information from the district ethics committee investigator concerning the attorney's failure to appear at a motion hearing to suppress her client's answer and defenses for failure to provide discovery; the motion judge referred the attorney to the OAE; violations of RPC 1.3, RPC 3.2, RPC 3.4(c), RPC 8.1(b), and RPC 8.1(d) found; in mitigation, the attorney had no ethics history in sixteen years at the bar; there was no harm to the client; the attorney showed contrition and remorse; and the attorney had entered treatment for depression; as a condition, the attorney was required to submit proof of continued treatment to the OAE, on a quarterly

basis, for two years); In the Matter of Michael C. Dawson, DRB 15-242 (October 20, 2015) (attorney failed to reply to repeated requests for information from the district ethics committee investigator regarding his representation of a client in three criminal defense matters, a violation of RPC 8.1(b)); and In re Gleason, 220 N.J. 350 (2015) (attorney did not file an answer to the formal ethics complaint and ignored the district ethics committee investigator's multiple attempts to obtain a copy of his client's file, a violation of RPC 8.1(b); the attorney also failed to inform his client that a planning board had dismissed his land use application, a violation of RPC 1.4(b)).

Few disciplinary cases have addressed discrimination based on sexual harassment. In 1994, New Jersey RPC 8.4 was amended to include section (g), prohibiting discrimination "because of race, color, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, language, marital status, socioeconomic status, or handicap, where the conduct is intended or likely to cause harm." Since that time, several attorneys have been charged with a violation of RPC 8.4(g) for conduct involving sexual harassment, but only two attorneys have been found guilty of violating this rule as a result of sexual harassment.

In In re Pinto, 168 N.J. 111 (2001), the attorney received a reprimand after being found guilty of having sexually harassed a vulnerable,

unsophisticated female client, in violation of RPC 8.4(g). During a conference with the client in his office, Pinto questioned her about her physical appearance, and engaged in “extremely crude,” explicit conversations about what he could do sexually with her; on one occasion, the attorney massaged the client’s shoulders, kissed her on the neck, and told her that she should show herself off, “show whatever you have.” In the Matter of Harry J. Pinto, Jr., DRB 00-049 (October 19, 2000) (slip op. at 3). On another occasion, Pinto was called upon to help the client jump start her car. Upon completing that task, he exclaimed, “This is what a real man can do,” and then slapped the victim on the buttocks in the presence of her son and daughter. Id. at 5-6. Regardless of Pinto’s subjective intent, the Board and the Court determined that his behavior was “demeaning, crude and vulgar,” and, thus, “likely to cause harm” to his client, in violation of RPC 8.4(g). Id. at 13.

In a more recent matter, In re Witherspoon, 203 N.J. 343 (2010), the attorney received a one-year suspension after being found guilty of sexually harassing four female bankruptcy clients. In all four matters, the attorney repeatedly made sexual propositions that they interpreted as offers of his legal services in exchange for sex. In two of them, he discriminated on the basis of sexual preference.

Based on the foregoing, a censure is the minimum level of discipline for the totality of respondent's misconduct in DRB 20-035. We must, however, consider respondent's additional misconduct in DRB 20-067.

A three-month suspension is generally the appropriate measure of discipline for an attorney's possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS). See, e.g., In re Musto, 152 N.J. at 174 (possession of cocaine and heroin); In re Holland, 194 N.J. 165 (2008) (possession of cocaine); In re Sarmiento, 194 N.J. 164 (possession of ecstasy); and In re McKeon, 185 N.J. 247 (2005) (possession of cocaine).

In some cases, however, the Court has refrained from imposing a suspension. See, e.g., In re Ten Broeck, 242 N.J. 152 (2020) (censure, with conditions, for attorney's unlawful possession and use of cocaine; the attorney successfully completed all conditions of the PTI program; participated in the New Jersey Lawyers Assistance Program; attended counseling; and submitted negative urinalysis results; the attorney also established significant rehabilitation and remorse, including regularly donating blood, regularly attending meetings for current and former law enforcement officers and lawyers, and traveling to self-help recovery meetings to speak about his experience and recovery); In re Caratzola, 241 N.J. 490 (2020) (censure, with conditions, for attorney's unlawful possession and use of oxycodone;

mitigation included the attorney's extreme youth and rehabilitative efforts); In re De Sevo, 228 N.J. 461 (2017) (censure imposed on attorney against whom an accusation and an indictment had issued for two separate incidents involving his possession of CDS (cocaine); the attorney was admitted into the PTI program for a twelve-month period, which he successfully completed; the attorney had participated in four inpatient drug treatment programs and an intensive out-patient program, followed by a period of time living in a half-way house, and then a sober living house where he served as an active member for almost two years; in addition to attendance at more than 1,000 recovery meetings, the attorney had a sponsor and, in turn, sponsored two men, and had been clean and sober for forty-one months; professionally, after he had been away from the practice of law for two years, a law firm hired the attorney as the director of litigation where he handled a number of cases that were resolved successfully; because the attorney had made great strides to achieve rehabilitation, had successfully and diligently returned to practice, and had moved on with his personal life, we found that a suspension would be demoralizing and could derail his rehabilitation efforts; prior admonition); In re Simone, 201 N.J. 10 (2009) (censure for attorney charged in Florida with possession of crack cocaine; the attorney was admitted to the Florida Drug Court Program, which was equivalent to New Jersey's PTI program; we

considered that the attorney had successfully completed inpatient treatment; attended twice weekly counseling sessions after his release from inpatient treatment, and then weekly sessions; attended ten to twelve Alcoholics Anonymous meetings per week; successfully completed PTI, resulting in the dismissal of all criminal charges against him; and submitted clean drug screens to the OAE and to us; in addition, the drug court judge believed that the attorney was doing so well with his recovery, he could inspire others, and, thus, invited him to address a drug court graduation, which the attorney accepted); and In re Filomeno, 190 N.J. 579 (2007) (censure for attorney arrested for possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia; numerous mitigating circumstances considered, including the attorney's quick action to achieve rehabilitation; his attendance at 415 meetings in that process; his instrumental role in re-establishing the New Jersey Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers Program meetings in Bergen County, the fact that he acted as a "very distinctive and helpful role model," from which other participants in that program profited; his conclusion of the PTI program three months early because of his commitment and diligence in exceeding its terms; and his expression of deep regret for his conduct).

In our view, this case warrants a term of suspension. Nothing in the record suggests that respondent is doing anything above and beyond the

requirements imposed on him, as did the attorneys in Ten Broeck, De Sevo, Simone, and Filomeno. However, to craft the appropriate discipline in this case, we consider both mitigating and aggravating factors. In mitigation, respondent has no prior discipline in New Jersey. There is no aggravation to consider.

On balance, we determine that a one-year suspension is the quantum of discipline necessary to protect the public and preserve confidence in the bar. We further determine that the one-year suspension should apply retroactively to March 16, 2020, the effective date of respondent's temporary suspension.

Additionally, because respondent has been convicted of possession of CDS and admits that he has a substance abuse problem, we determine to impose the conditions that the OAE suggested. Specifically, prior to his reinstatement, respondent must provide proof of fitness to practice law, as attested to by a mental health professional approved by the OAE. After his reinstatement, respondent must provide to the OAE quarterly reports documenting his continued psychological and substance abuse counseling, for a period of two years. Finally, respondent must notify the OAE of any positive drug tests.

Chair Clark and Members Boyer, Hoberman, and Singer voted for a six-month suspension, with the same conditions.

We further determine to require respondent to reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for administrative costs and actual expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in R. 1:20-17.

Disciplinary Review Board
Bruce W. Clark, Chair

By: /s/ Timothy M. Ellis
Timothy M. Ellis
Acting Chief Counsel

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BOARD
VOTING RECORD

In the Matters of Stephen Robert Jones
Docket Nos. DRB 20-035 and 20-067

Argued: July 16, 2020

Decided: January 29, 2021

Disposition: One-Year Suspension, Retroactive

<i>Members</i>	One-Year Suspension, Retroactive	Six-Month Suspension, Retroactive	Recused	Did Not Participate
Clark		X		
Gallipoli	X			
Boyer		X		
Hoberman		X		
Joseph	X			
Petrou	X			
Rivera	X			
Singer		X		
Zmirich	X			
Total:	5	4	0	0

/s/ Timothy M. Ellis

Timothy M. Ellis
Acting Chief Counsel