

Supreme Court of New Jersey
Disciplinary Review Board
Docket No. DRB 20-039
District Docket Nos. VII-2017-0025E and
VII-2018-0002E

In the Matter of :
Edward Harrington Heyburn :
An Attorney at Law :

Decision

Argued: July 16, 2020

Decided: March 2, 2021

Cherylee O. Melcher appeared on behalf of the District VII Ethics Committee.

Respondent appeared pro se.

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.

This matter was before us on a recommendation for a suspension of unspecified duration filed by the District VII Ethics Committee (DEC). The formal ethics complaint in District Docket No. VII-2017-0025E charged respondent with having violated RPC 1.1(a) (gross neglect); RPC 1.3 (lack of

diligence); RPC 1.4(b) and (c) (failure to communicate with the client); RPC 3.2 (failure to expedite litigation); RPC 8.1(b) (failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities); and R. 1:21-1(a)(3) and (4) (failure to be reasonably accessible and available).¹

The formal ethics complaint in District Docket No. VII-2018-0002E charged respondent with having violated RPC 1.3; RPC 1.4(b); RPC 1.4(c) (failure to explain a matter to a client); RPC 8.1(b); and R. 1:21-1(a)(3) and (4).

For the reasons set forth below, we determine to impose a six-month suspension.

Respondent earned admission to the New Jersey and Pennsylvania bars in 1997. He maintains an office for the practice of law in East Windsor, New Jersey.

Respondent has received four censures. On November 13, 2013, he was censured for his combined misconduct in two default matters. In the first matter, he violated the attorney advertising rules; in the second matter, he was found guilty of a lack of diligence; failure to communicate with the client; failure to safeguard property; failure to cooperate with ethics investigators; and misrepresentation by silence. In re Heyburn, 216 N.J. 161 (2013).

¹ Both complaints improperly cited these Court Rules as though they were RPCs. As further detailed below, due to respondent's failure to timely file an answer to the first formal ethics complaint, the DEC amended the complaint to include the RPC 8.1(b) charge.

On June 18, 2015, respondent received a second censure for gross neglect; lack of diligence; failure to communicate; and misrepresentations to the client. In re Heyburn, 221 N.J. 631 (2015).

On July 9, 2018, respondent received a third censure for negligent misappropriation of client funds and recordkeeping violations. In re Heyburn, 234 N.J. 80 (2018).

On December 9, 2020, respondent received a fourth censure for failing to promptly deliver funds to a third party, knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. In re Heyburn, ___ N.J. ___ (2020), 2020 N.J. LEXIS 1390.

The Michael Salazar Matter (Docket No. VII-2017-0025E)

On November 6, 2012, grievant Michael Salazar sustained significant personal injuries while on the premises of his condominium complex, which was owned by Runaway Beach Community Association (Runaway). Following Hurricane Sandy, Salazar had been evacuated from his residence, but was allowed to return to retrieve his belongings. Upon his return, Salazar tripped over a damaged railing, which impaled his ribs, resulting in his hospitalization for almost a month.

On November 6, 2014, precisely two years after Salazar had sustained those injuries, respondent filed a civil complaint against Runaway, in Superior Court of New Jersey, Monmouth County. On May 22, 2015, the trial court administratively dismissed Salazar's complaint for lack of prosecution because, more than six months after the filing of the complaint, respondent still had not served the complaint on Runaway. Respondent failed to locate Runaway or a successor corporation. Following the court's dismissal of Salazar's complaint, respondent failed to make any efforts to reinstate the case, despite having a year, pursuant to Court Rule, to file such a motion following an administrative dismissal.

Salazar testified that respondent had not informed him of respondent's failure to serve the defendant, or of the court's dismissal of the lawsuit. In turn, respondent claimed that, at some point after May 22, 2015, during a meeting, he told Salazar that the complaint had been administratively dismissed, but that Salazar need not be concerned, because respondent was searching for the successor company to serve. However, at some point, respondent told Salazar that he had spoken to Runaway's insurance carrier, which led Salazar to believe that litigation was ongoing and that settlement negotiations were occurring.

Over time, respondent became nonresponsive to Salazar's requests for information and blocked all of Salazar's attempts to communicate with him by

telephone. Respondent claimed that, in January 2016, he told Salazar that he was blocking Salazar's calls because his communications had become abusive and because Salazar had been calling him late at night and early in the morning. In turn, Salazar asserted that he started calling respondent off hours because respondent had become nonresponsive, and Salazar had become increasingly frustrated. Salazar claimed that he felt desperate because his "life was riding" on this lawsuit and he was "still living in pain."

After January 2016, respondent continued to communicate with Salazar, despite having blocked his telephone calls, because Salazar sought an advance from a loan company, based on his anticipated settlement or judgment in his personal injury matter. On February 1, 2016, respondent sent Salazar his medical records in furtherance of receiving such a loan, and called a loan provider on his behalf, even though the lawsuit had been dismissed. That communication further led Salazar to believe that the lawsuit was active and, thereafter, through May 2017, he made repeated attempts to communicate with respondent. Respondent, however, failed to reply to Salazar's requests for information. Therefore, in May 2017, Salazar went to the Monmouth County courthouse to investigate the status of his lawsuit, and learned that the trial court had dismissed his lawsuit two years earlier.

During the ethics hearing, respondent acknowledged that Salazar's personal injury case had merit and that respondent should have done more to locate the defendant. Respondent further admitted that he neither explained to Salazar the deadline to move to reinstate the complaint nor took any steps to protect Salazar's interests.

By letter dated August 31, 2018, the DEC served the formal ethics complaint on respondent and informed him of the twenty-one-day deadline to file an answer. On October 23, 2018, because respondent had not filed an answer, the formal ethics complaint was deemed amended to charge respondent with a willful violation of RPC 8.1(b). On November 9, 2018, respondent filed a belated verified answer.

During the ethics hearing, respondent conceded that he had received the formal ethics complaint and the DEC's correspondence but had failed to file a timely answer. He offered as an explanation, not as an excuse, that, in September and October 2018, he had been engaged in a homicide trial.

The Andre Collier Matter (Docket No. VII-2018-0002E)

After filing an employment discrimination lawsuit, pro se, in federal court, grievant Andre Collier retained respondent to assume the representation. During the representation, respondent failed to file his notice of appearance for several months, although he represented to Collier that he had done so; failed to

appear at a scheduled hearing; failed to file an amended complaint, after the district judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, resulting in dismissal of the complaint with prejudice; and failed to inform Collier of these adverse developments in his case.

Specifically, on March 19, 2015, Collier alleged that his employer had discriminated against him based on his race, sexual orientation, and disability. On June 7, 2016, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a Right to Sue letter. On September 7, 2016, Collier filed an employment discrimination lawsuit, pro se, in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (DNJ), which was assigned to the Honorable Michael A. Shipp, U.S.D.J. In his complaint, Collier alleged that he had received the EEOC letter on June 8, 2016, ninety-one days prior to the date he filed his complaint.

On November 21, 2016, Collier executed a retainer agreement with respondent to assume the representation, on a contingent fee basis. Thereafter, starting from at least January 9, 2017, Collier made repeated requests for status updates about his matter. On January 24, 2017, respondent informed Collier there was no update, but represented that he had informed the DNJ that Collier had retained him.

On February 10, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss Collier's complaint, alleging the claims were time-barred because Collier had filed the

complaint one day after the expiration of the ninety-day statute of limitations. In February 15 and 16, 2017 text messages, Collier asked respondent for a status update and informed him about the motion and the March 6, 2017 return date. Respondent asked Collier to bring the motions to his office for review, but Collier did not do so, because he believed that respondent, as his counsel of record, should have copies. Thereafter, the court rescheduled the hearing on the defendant's motion to dismiss to March 7, 2017, and Collier informed respondent of the new date.

On the date of the hearing, Collier appeared at the DNJ courthouse, but respondent did not. On the same day, for the first time, respondent formally entered his appearance in behalf of Collier. Respondent claimed that he had filed a notice of appearance months earlier, but a technical issue had prevented the DNJ from receiving his notice. Yet, when respondent was asked whether he previously had filed a document with a federal court, he replied that he probably had filed a "thousand."

In an April 5, 2017 text message, Collier complained to respondent that he had not heard from respondent since February 16, 2017. Respondent replied that he would call him in two days.

On June 29, 2017, respondent filed a brief opposing the defendants' motion to dismiss and left a message informing Collier that he had filed his pro

se complaint outside the ninety-day statute of limitations. In a text message sent on July 5, 2017, Collier acknowledged having received respondent's June 29, 2017 message, stated that he had returned his call and left messages, and asked respondent to return his call.

On July 14, 2017, respondent sent an e-mail to defendants' counsel, claiming that he was "working on the amended complaint," even though the DNJ's ruling was pending. At a July 20, 2017 meeting, Collier brought additional documents for respondent's review for the amendment to the complaint. Collier and respondent intended to meet again by the end of July, or the beginning of August, but they did not.

On August 7, 2017, Judge Shipp issued an order dismissing Collier's complaint, without prejudice, due to the time bar; however, he allowed Collier leave to file an amended complaint to cure this defect. The order required Collier's response by September 8, 2017 and cautioned that, if an amended complaint were not filed, Judge Shipp would dismiss the complaint with prejudice. Respondent failed to inform Collier about this order, failed to send Collier the order, and failed to file an amended complaint.

On September 14, 2017, six days after the deadline to file the amended complaint, Collier sent a text message to respondent stating that he still was waiting for respondent to schedule a meeting to discuss Collier's case. On the

same date, respondent replied that he was out of the state, and that upon his return, he would call Collier, but he never did.

On September 22, 2017, Judge Shipp entered an order dismissing Collier's complaint with prejudice. Respondent neither informed Collier of the dismissal nor sent him a copy of the order. Instead, on October 3, 2017, Collier called the DNJ and learned that Judge Shipp had dismissed his complaint. Collier was aware of the likelihood that his claims would be dismissed as time-barred, and of the difficulty of winning his case; however, respondent had failed to inform Collier of the dismissal of his case.

By letter dated October 3, 2017, Collier informed Judge Shipp that he had just learned of his case's dismissal, begged that his case not be closed, and asserted that respondent appeared not to be acting in Collier's best interest. On October 4, 2017, Collier sent respondent a text message asking for an update on the case. The next day, Collier filed a pro se notice of appeal of Judge Shipp's order to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. On October 13, 2017, Judge Shipp issued an order directing respondent to reply, by October 20, 2017, to Collier's October 3, 2017 letter to Judge Shipp. Respondent failed to submit a reply.

In an October 16, 2017 letter, Collier asked Judge Shipp to order respondent relieved as counsel, because respondent failed to file the amended complaint or to contact Collier regarding his case. On October 24, 2017, Judge

Shipp scheduled a November 6, 2017 conference call with respondent and Collier. On November 5, 2017, respondent sent Collier an e-mail with a substitution of counsel form, which Collier refused to sign before meeting with respondent. Although Collier requested to meet with respondent before the conference call, respondent was not in his office that day.

During the November 6, 2017 telephone conference, Judge Shipp informed respondent and Collier that the case was dismissed, barring the filing of a motion to reconsider; that even if such a motion were filed, the DNJ likely no longer had jurisdiction to hear the matter, because Collier had filed the notice of appeal with the Third Circuit; and, that, if respondent no longer represented Collier, he was obligated to file the proper notification with the court.

Following this telephone conference, Collier and respondent had no further communication. Respondent failed to file a notification with the DNJ regarding the status of his representation of Collier.

In respondent's verified answer, he admitted having violated RPC 1.4(b) and RPC 1.4(c). Further, he testified that, notwithstanding his views of the merits of the case, or its status as statutorily barred, he remained obligated to inform Collier that his case had been dismissed.

DEC FINDINGS

In the Salazar matter, the hearing panel found that respondent violated RPC 1.1(a), RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(b), and RPC 3.2. The panel determined that, by allowing Salazar's personal injury case to be dismissed for lack of prosecution and, thereafter, failing to seek its reinstatement, respondent violated RPC 1.1(a) and RPC 1.3. Further, the panel found that, by failing to keep Salazar reasonably informed about the status of the case and failing to respond to his reasonable requests for information, respondent violated RPC 1.4(b). In reaching this conclusion, the panel found respondent's claim that he verbally informed Salazar about the dismissal not credible. Finally, the panel found that respondent violated RPC 3.2 because he allowed Salazar's case to be dismissed and took no steps to reinstate the complaint.

The panel did not find that respondent had violated R. 1:21-1(a)(3) and (4) by failing to be reasonably accessible and available, determining that the record lacked clear and convincing evidence of those infractions. The panel did not address the RPC 8.1(b) charge. Further, although the complaint alleged, and the hearing panel found, that respondent misled Salazar into believing that his complaint remained pending, after it had been dismissed, the complaint did not charge respondent with having violated RPC 8.4(c).

In mitigation, the panel determined that some of Salazar's e-mails were sent at "odd hours" and, thus, respondent was not required to reply during those times. However, it also noted that respondent could have replied at a more reasonable time.

In the Collier matter, the hearing panel found that respondent violated RPC 1.3 and RPC 1.4(b). The panel found that respondent violated RPC 1.3 by failing to file a timely notice of appearance and failing to appear for a court date of which he would have been aware had he filed a timely notice of appearance. The panel found that respondent violated RPC 1.4(b) by failing to inform Collier about the status of the matter, including the dismissal of the complaint, after receiving multiple reasonable requests for information during the representation.

The panel determined that respondent was not guilty of violating R. 1:21-1(a)(3) and (4) due to a lack of clear and convincing evidence. The panel did not make a determination regarding the RPC 1.4(c) charge. Finally, although the panel found that respondent misrepresented to Collier that he had filed a notice of appearance, the complaint did not charge respondent with a violation of RPC 8.4(c) for this misconduct.

The panel did not address any mitigating factors. In aggravation, for both matters, the panel considered respondent's three prior censures, and observed

that some of the violations were similar to his prior infractions.

Based on the principle of progressive discipline, the panel recommended that respondent receive a suspension of unspecified duration.

Following a de novo review of the record, we are satisfied that the DEC's finding that respondent's conduct was unethical is fully support by clear and convincing evidence.

In the Salazar matter, we determine that the record supports the finding that respondent violated RPC 1.1(a); RPC 1.3; RPC 1.4(b) and (c); RPC 3.2; and RPC 8.1(b). We determine to dismiss the R. 1:21-1(a)(3) and (a)(4) allegations, because those Rules are non-disciplinary provisions.

Specifically, respondent violated RPC 1.1(a) and RPC 1.3 by failing to locate and serve the defendant in Salazar's personal injury action. Consequently, the lawsuit was dismissed for lack of prosecution, and respondent failed to make any efforts to remedy the dismissal. Respondent also violated RPC 3.2 by failing to serve the defendant with the filed complaint, and by failing to seek reinstatement of the complaint after the court had administratively dismissed it.

Making matters worse, respondent violated RPC 1.4(b) and (c) by wholly failing to keep Salazar informed about the status of his case. Most egregiously, he failed to inform Salazar, for years, that his lawsuit had been dismissed.

Although the panel did not address the RPC 8.1(b) charge, by respondent's own admission during the ethics hearing, he violated this Rule. He failed to file an answer within twenty-one days of his receipt of the formal ethics complaint, despite the DEC's warning that the formal ethics complaint would be amended to include an RPC 8.1(b) charge. Although respondent offered an excuse for his delay – that he was engaged in a homicide trial during September and October – his failure to answer the complaint violated RPC 8.1(b).

We determine to dismiss the R. 1:21-1(a)(3) and (a)(4) allegations. These Rules are neither RPCs nor Rules that contemplate discipline. Rather, they set forth the requirements for all New Jersey attorneys to have a system of prompt and reliable communication with clients, and state that attorneys must be reasonably available for in-person consultations requested by clients at mutually convenient times and places. Respondent's misconduct does not arise from his failure to have such a system in place, or the ability to be reasonably available for in-person consultations; rather, it stems from his failure to abide by his other obligations under the RPCs. In any event, this misconduct is sufficiently captured by our findings concerning respondent's violations of RPC 1.4(c).

The record contains facts that support a finding that respondent violated RPC 8.4(c). Specifically, respondent misled Salazar into believing that his complaint remained pending, after it had been dismissed. This violation,

however, was not charged in the complaint. Therefore, we make no finding in that regard. See R. 1:20-4(b) (requiring the complaint to set forth sufficient facts to constitute fair notice of the nature of the alleged unethical conduct and to specify the ethics rules alleged to have been violated).

In the Collier matter, we determine that the record supports the finding that respondent violated RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(b), and RPC 1.4(c). For the same reasons set forth above, we determine to dismiss the R. 1:21-1(a)(3) and (a)(4) allegations.

Specifically, respondent violated RPC 1.3 by failing to timely file an appearance with the federal court, and by failing to appear for a hearing after Collier had notified him of both the original and the rescheduled hearing dates. Further, respondent violated RPC 1.4(b) by failing to inform Collier that the court had dismissed his complaint, with leave to amend, and by failing to inform Collier that the trial court had dismissed his case with prejudice.

Respondent violated RPC 1.4(c) by failing to inform Collier that the order had authorized him to file an amended complaint, and further, by failing to inform Collier that the court had dismissed his complaint with prejudice, thereby depriving Collier the opportunity to make informed decisions about taking any further action.

Finally, although the facts support a finding that respondent violated RPC 8.4(c) by misrepresenting to Collier that he had filed a notice of appearance, when he had not, the complaint failed to charge respondent with having violated this Rule. Therefore, we make no finding in that regard. See R. 1:20-4(b).

In sum, in the Salazar matter, the evidence supports a violation of RPC 1.1(a) and RPC 8.1(b). In both matters, the evidence further supports violations of RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(b), and RPC 1.4(c); and RPC 3.2. For the reasons set forth above, we dismiss the R. 1:21-1(a)(3) and (a)(4) allegations. The sole issue left for us to determine is the appropriate quantum of discipline for respondent's misconduct.

Conduct involving gross neglect, lack of diligence, and failure to communicate with clients ordinarily results in an admonition or a reprimand, depending on the number of client matters involved, the gravity of the offenses, the harm to the clients, the presence of additional violations, and the attorney's disciplinary history. See, e.g., In the Matter of Esther Maria Alvarez, DRB 19-190 (September 20, 2019) (admonition for attorney who was retained to obtain a divorce for her client but, for the next nine months, failed to take any steps to pursue the matter, and failed to reply to all but one of the client's requests for information about the status of her case, violations of RPC 1.1(a) and RPC 1.4(b); in another matter, the attorney agreed to seek a default judgment, but

waited more than eighteen months to file the necessary papers with the court; although the attorney obtained a default judgment, the court later vacated it due to the passage of time, which precluded a determination on the merits; violations of RPC 1.1(a) and RPC 1.3); In the Matter of Michael J. Pocchio, DRB 18-192 (October 1, 2018) (admonition for attorney who filed a divorce complaint and permitted it to be dismissed for failure to prosecute the action; he also failed to seek reinstatement of the complaint, and failed to communicate with the client; violations of RPC 1.1(a); RPC 1.3; RPC 1.4(b); and RPC 3.2); In re Burro, 235 N.J. 413 (2018) (reprimand for attorney who grossly neglected and lacked diligence in an estate matter for ten years and failed to file New Jersey Inheritance Tax returns, resulting in the accrual of \$40,000 in interest and the imposition of a lien on property belonging to the executrix, in violation of RPC 1.1(a) and RPC 1.3; the attorney also failed to keep the client reasonably informed about events in the case (RPC 1.4(b)); to return the client file upon termination of the representation (RPC 1.16(d)); and to cooperate with the ethics investigation (RPC 8.1(b)); in aggravation, we considered the significant harm to the client and the attorney's prior private reprimand; in mitigation, the attorney expressed remorse and had suffered a stroke that forced him to cease practicing law); and In re Abasolo, 235 N.J. 326 (2018) (reprimand for attorney who grossly neglected and lacked diligence in a personal injury case for two

years after filing the complaint; after successfully restoring the matter to the active trial list, the attorney failed to pay a \$300 filing fee, permitting the defendants' order of dismissal with prejudice to stand, in violation of RPC 1.1(a) and RPC 1.3; in addition, for four years, the attorney failed to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the case, in violation of RPC 1.4(b)).

Admonitions have been imposed for failure to expedite litigation, even when accompanied by another ethics violation. See In the Matter of Leonard B. Zucker, DRB 12-039 (April 23, 2012) (after the attorney had filed a foreclosure complaint against a California resident, the defendant retained a New Jersey attorney, who provided proof that the defendant was not the proper party and requested the filing of a stipulation of dismissal; the attorney ignored the request, as well as all telephone calls and letters from the other attorney; only after the other attorney had filed an answer, a motion for summary judgment, and a grievance against him did he forward a stipulation of dismissal; violations of RPC 3.2 and RPC 5.3(a); in mitigation, we considered the attorney's otherwise unblemished record of fifty-two years, his semi-retired status at the time of the events, his firm's apology to the grievant and reimbursement of his legal fees, and the firm's institution of new procedures to avoid the recurrence of similar problems).

When an attorney fails to cooperate with disciplinary authorities, and the attorney's ethics record is not serious, reprimands have been imposed. See, e.g., In re Larkins, 217 N.J. 20 (2014) (default; attorney did not reply to the ethics investigator's attempts to obtain information about the grievance and failed to file an answer to the formal ethics complaint; although we noted that a single violation of RPC 8.1(b), in a default matter, does not necessitate enhancement of the discipline from an admonition to a reprimand, a reprimand was imposed based on a prior admonition and, more significantly, a 2013 censure, also in a default matter, in which the attorney had failed to cooperate with an ethics investigation); In re Wood, 175 N.J. 586 (2003) (attorney failed to cooperate with disciplinary authorities; prior admonition for similar conduct); In re DeBosh, 174 N.J. 336 (2002) (failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities; prior three-month suspension); and In re Williamson, 152 N.J. 489 (1998) (attorney failed to cooperate with disciplinary authorities; prior private reprimand for failure to carry out a contract of employment with a client in a matrimonial matter and failure to surrender the client's file to a new attorney).

The totality of respondent's misconduct warrants a censure. However, to craft the appropriate discipline in this case, we must consider both mitigating and aggravating factors.

In aggravation, respondent has two prior censures for misconduct similar to his behavior in both the Salazar and Collier matters. In both of those matters, he failed to perform the work he was hired to perform and failed to reply to clients' reasonable requests for information.

The Court has signaled an inclination toward progressive discipline and stern treatment of repeat offenders. In such situations, enhanced discipline is appropriate. See In re Kantor, 180 N.J. 226 (2004) (disbarment for abandonment of clients and repeated failure to cooperate with the disciplinary system). Respondent's two prior censures, for similar misconduct, clearly beckons such an enhancement.


Additionally, the harm to both Salazar and Collier was significant. Their complaints were dismissed, with prejudice, as a direct result of respondent's misconduct. By respondent's own assessment, Salazar had a meritorious personal injury case that the court dismissed with prejudice due to respondent's lack of diligence in properly serving the defendant, one of the most basic tasks a litigator is bound to complete. There is no mitigation to consider.

Considering respondent's failure to learn from his past mistakes, his significant disciplinary history, and the unabated danger that he poses to clients, we conclude that a six-month suspension is the quantum of discipline necessary to protect the public and preserve confidence in the bar.

Member Rivera voted for a one-year suspension. Vice-Chair Gallipoli and Members Joseph and Zmirich voted for a two-year suspension.

We further determine to require respondent to reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for administrative costs and actual expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in R. 1:20-17.

Disciplinary Review Board
Bruce W. Clark, Chair

By: 

Johanna Barba Jones
Chief Counsel

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BOARD
VOTING RECORD


In the Matter of Edward Harrington Heyburn
Docket No. DRB 20-039

Argued: July 16, 2020

Decided: March 2, 2021

Disposition: Six-Month Suspension

<i>Members</i>	Six-Month Suspension	One-Year Suspension	Two-Year Suspension	Recused	Did Not Participate
Clark	X				
Gallipoli			X		
Boyer	X				
Hoberman	X				
Joseph			X		
Petrou	X				
Rivera		X			
Singer	X				
Zmirich			X		
Total:	5	1	3	0	0



Johanna Barba Jones
Chief Counsel