

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BOARD
Docket Nos. DRB 25-226 and 25-227
District Docket Nos. XIV-2024-0517E;
XIV-2025-0212E; XIV-2024-0530E;
XIV-2024-0531E; and XIV-2024-0532E

In the Matters of Frances Ann Hartman
An Attorney at Law

Decided
March 6, 2026

Certifications of the Record

CORRECTED DECISION

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Introduction

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.

These matters were before us on certifications of the record filed by the Office of Attorney Ethics (the OAE), pursuant to R. 1:20-4(f), which we consolidated for review.

In the matter docketed as DRB 25-226, the formal ethics complaint charged respondent with having violated RPC 8.1(b) (three instances – failing to cooperate with disciplinary authorities) and RPC 8.4(d) (two instances – engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).¹

In the matter docketed as DRB 25-227, the formal ethics complaint charged respondent with having violated RPC 1.1(b) (three instances – engaging in a pattern of neglect); RPC 1.3 (two instances – lacking diligence); RPC 1.4(b) (three instances – failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter); RPC 1.5(b) (failing to set forth, in writing, the basis or rate of the legal fee); RPC 1.16(d) (three instances – failing to protect the client’s interest upon termination of the representation); RPC 5.5(a) (engaging in the

¹ Due to respondent’s failure to file an answer to the formal ethics complaint, and on notice to her, the OAE amended the complaint to include the third RPC 8.1(b) charge.

unauthorized practice of law); and RPC 8.1(b) (four instances – failing to cooperate with disciplinary authorities).²

For the reasons set forth below, we determine that a three-year suspension, with a condition, is the appropriate quantum of discipline for respondent's misconduct.

Ethics History

Respondent earned admission to the New Jersey and Pennsylvania bars in 1984 and to the Kansas bar in 1987. During the relevant timeframe, she maintained a practice of law, Cordry Hartman, LLC, in Moorestown, New Jersey. She has an extensive disciplinary history in New Jersey.

Hartman I

In 2014, respondent received an admonition for violating RPC 1.3 and RPC 1.4(b) and (c) (failing to communicate with the client). In the Matter of Frances Ann Hartman, DRB 14-138 (July 22, 2014) (Hartman I).

In that matter, respondent failed to act with diligence after her client's lawsuit was dismissed and, for almost a year thereafter, failed to return the

² Due to respondent's failure to file an answer to the formal ethics complaint, and on notice to her, the OAE amended the complaint to include the additional RPC 8.1(b) charge.

client's repeated telephone calls and e-mails. Further, she failed to explain to the client aspects of the matter that respondent perceived as problematic, which the client could have considered in making an informed decision regarding whether to proceed. In imposing an admonition, we considered that she had no prior discipline in her thirty-three years at the bar.

Hartman II

On July 6, 2020, the Court censured respondent, in a default matter, for violating RPC 1.1(a) (engaging in gross neglect); RPC 1.3; RPC 1.5(b); and RPC 8.1(b). In re Hartman, 243 N.J. 76 (2020) (Hartman II).

In that matter, respondent accepted the legal representation of a client in a pension recoupment case and then failed to perform any work in furtherance of the representation. In the Matter of Frances Ann Hartman, DRB 19-239 (January 29, 2020) at 7-8. Moreover, despite never having represented the client, she failed to memorialize, in writing, the basis or rate of her legal fee. Id. at 7. Finally, she violated RPC 8.1(b) by failing to file an answer to the complaint. Id. at 8. However, she was not charged with failing to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation, given her reply to the grievance and her participation in an interview with the investigator. Id. at 5-6.

Hartman III

On May 10, 2023, the Court again censured respondent, in a default matter, for violating RPC 8.1(b) (two instances). In re Hartman, 253 N.J. 557 (2023) (Hartman III).

In that matter, in 2018, the Clerk of the Court referred respondent to the OAE after she failed to comply with the Clerk's request that she provide a valid certificate of malpractice insurance. In the Matter of Frances Ann Hartman, DRB 19-477 (November 23, 2020) at 10. Throughout its investigation, the OAE made exhaustive attempts to contact her regarding the Clerk's referral. Ibid. Although she initially interacted with the OAE and, later, with the Chair of a District Ethics Committee (DEC) hearing panel, she subsequently failed to cooperate with the ethics investigation and disciplinary proceedings, notwithstanding multiple opportunities to participate in the process. Id. at 10-11. Moreover, after filing a nonconforming answer to the complaint, she failed to file an amended, conforming answer, resulting in the certification of the matter to us as a default. Id. at 11.

Weighing the default status of the matter and respondent's demonstrated pattern of failing to cooperate in New Jersey's disciplinary process, we recommended the imposition of a three-month suspension. Id. at 12-13. The Court imposed a censure. Hartman, 253 N.J. at 557.

Hartman IV

Also on May 10, 2023, in respondent's third consecutive default matter, the Court found that she violated RPC 1.1(a); RPC 1.3; RPC 1.4(b); RPC 3.2 (failing to expedite litigation); and RPC 8.1(b) (two instances). In re Hartman, 253 N.J. 556 (2023) (Hartman IV). However, in accordance with our recommendation, the Court imposed no further discipline for these violations, in light of the timing of the misconduct relative to the misconduct at issue in Hartman II and Hartman III. In the Matter of Frances Ann Hartman, DRB 20-254 (March 2, 2021) at 25-27.

In that matter, in connection with respondent's representation of a client in a dispute relating to the estate of her client's parent, she failed to arrange for a required accounting; after assuring the court that she would complete the accounting, she failed to comply with a court order giving her thirty days to do so; and, subsequently, she failed to appear on behalf of her client on a motion to enforce the order. Id. at 4-8, 20. Consequently, the court removed her client as executrix of the estate. Id. at 8-9, 20, 24. Respondent then failed to inform her client that the court had removed her as executrix and, eventually, stopped communicating with the client. Id. at 8-9, 20-21. Subsequently, she ignored repeated requests from the investigator to submit a written reply to the client's

ethics grievance or to otherwise engage in the disciplinary process. Id. at 21. Moreover, she failed to file an answer to the formal ethics complaint. Ibid.

In January 2021, after the record was certified to us, respondent filed a motion to vacate the default (MVD). Id. at 10. Under the two-prong test for prevailing on an MVD, although she offered a reasonable explanation for her failure to answer the ethics complaint, she failed to assert meritorious defenses to the underlying ethics charges. Id. at 15-19. Accordingly, we denied the MVD. Id. at 19.

More specifically, respondent provided information regarding mental health issues, including undiagnosed depression and anxiety, that she had experienced starting within the last several years, followed by a diagnosis of “Major Depressive Disorder and Anxiety Disorder,” which she received after she defaulted in the May 2020 matter. Id. at 11, 13. Respondent’s assertions in this regard were supported by a letter from her doctor, also explaining her disorder and affirming that her prognosis was positive. Id. at 13. We concluded that her “mental health issues, as supported by the submission from her doctor, serve to satisfy the first prong of the test and appear to explain the abrupt turn that her career seems to have taken the last several years,” which, in the past, we had “questioned, considering her previous thirty-three years of otherwise good standing at the bar.” Id. at 15-16.

However, under the second prong for succeeding on an MVD, we declined to find that her recent mental health diagnosis (or her other contentions, relating to her representation of the client) constituted a meritorious defense to the underlying ethics charges. Id. at 16-19. We determined that “the record and respondent’s own motion negate the Jacob standard³ by acknowledging that respondent was able to appreciate her actions and the need to meet deadlines” and, further, that “her failure to cooperate in this matter is in stark contrast to her contemporaneous cooperation in another disciplinary matter.”⁴ Id. at 19.

In our March 2021 decision recommending no further discipline, we concluded that additional discipline would serve no purpose, since the timing of respondent’s mishandling of the estate matter coincided with that of her misconduct underlying Hartman II and Hartman III, the latter of which was then pending before the Court on our recommendation for a three-month suspension. Id. at 27. Moreover, whereas “the prior enhancement of discipline was premised primarily on respondent’s repeated failure to participate in the disciplinary process,” we determined that, in this matter, “due to the overlapping timeframe,

³ In In re Jacob, 95 N.J. 132, 137 (1984), the Court held that, to successfully defend ethics charges based on a mental health condition, an attorney must prove a “loss of competency, comprehension or will of a magnitude that could excuse egregious misconduct that was clearly knowing, volitional, and purposeful.”

⁴ Although we did not identify the other disciplinary matter in our decision, the reference is to respondent’s submission of a reply to the grievance, and participation in an interview, in November 2018, during the investigation in Hartman II.

it cannot be said that [she] is repeatedly thumbing her nose at the disciplinary system.” Id. at 27. In addition, we noted that “[a] review of respondent’s three most recent disciplinary matters shows that, in late 2017 and early 2018, she began experiencing some sort of personal or professional difficulty. She began neglecting client matters and ignoring client communications and subsequently failed to meaningfully participate in the disciplinary process.” Id. at 26-27.

Temporary Suspension

Effective July 2, 2024, the Court temporarily suspended respondent from the practice of law for failing to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation. In re Hartman, 258 N.J. 26 (2024).

Hartman V

Effective March 27, 2025, the Court suspended respondent for three months, in connection with two consolidated default matters, for her violation of RPC 8.1(b) (four instances). In re Hartman, 260 N.J. 225 (2025) (Hartman V). In both matters comprising Hartman V, respondent failed to cooperate with disciplinary authorities and, thereafter, failed to file answers to the formal ethics complaints. In the Matters of Frances Ann Hartman, DRB 24-180 and DRB 24-245 (January 30, 2025).

In determining that a three-month suspension was the appropriate quantum of discipline, we accorded significant aggravating weight to respondent's pattern of noncooperation with the disciplinary authorities attempting to address her misconduct. Id. at 25-28. Specifically, the matters represented her fifth and sixth disciplinary matters before us and her fifth consecutive default. Id. at 26.

As a condition to her reinstatement to the practice of law, the Court imposed the condition that respondent be required to demonstrate her fitness to practice law, as attested to by a medical doctor approved by the OAE.

Temporary Suspension

Effective January 15, 2026, the Court again temporarily suspended respondent from the practice of law for her failure to comply with a fee arbitration committee determination. In re Hartman, __ N.J. __ (2025), 2025 N.J. LEXIS 1227.

To date, respondent remains subject to both disciplinary and temporary suspension from the practice of law.

Service of Process

DRB 25-226

Service of process was proper. On August 1, 2025, the OAE sent a copy of the formal ethics complaint, by certified and regular mail, to respondent's home address of record. The undated certified mail receipt was returned to the OAE signed, although the signature is illegible. The regular mail was not returned to the OAE.

On September 4, 2025, the OAE sent respondent a second letter, by regular mail, to her same home address of record. The letter informed her that, unless she filed a verified answer within five days of the date of the letter, the allegations of the complaint would be deemed admitted, the record would be certified to us for the imposition of discipline, and the complaint would be deemed amended to charge a willful violation of RPC 8.1(b). The regular mail was not returned to the OAE.

As of September 18, 2025, respondent had not filed an answer to the complaint, and the time within which she was required to do so had expired. Accordingly, the OAE certified this matter to us as a default.

DRB 25-227

On August 5, 2025, the OAE sent a copy of the formal ethics complaint, by certified and regular mail, to respondent's home address of record. According to the United States Postal Service (USPS) tracking system, the letter sent by certified mail was delivered on August 11, 2025. The regular mail was not returned to the OAE.

On September 4, 2025, the OAE sent respondent a second letter, by regular mail, to her same home address, informing her that, unless she filed a verified answer to the complaint within five days of the date of the letter, the allegations of the complaint would be deemed admitted, the record would be certified to us for the imposition of discipline, and the complaint would be deemed amended to charge a willful violation of RPC 8.1(b). The regular mail was not returned to the OAE.

As of September 18, 2025, respondent had not filed an answer to the complaint and the time within which she was required to do so had expired. Accordingly, the OAE certified this matter to us as a default.

Regarding both DRB 25-226 and DRB 25-227, on November 24, 2025, Chief Counsel to the Board sent respondent a letter, by certified and regular mail, to her home address of record, and by electronic mail, to her e-mail address of record, informing her that these matters were scheduled before us on January

15, 2026, and that any motion to vacate must be filed by December 15, 2025. On the same date, the OBC received a relayed receipt indicating that delivery to respondent's e-mail address was complete. The undated certified mail receipt was returned to the OBC signed, although the signature is illegible. The regular mail was not returned to the OBC.

Additionally, the OBC published a notice dated November 25, 2025 in the New Jersey Law Journal and on the Court's website, stating that we would consider these matters on January 15, 2026. The notice informed respondent that, unless she filed a successful MVD by December 15, 2026, her prior failure to answer would remain deemed an admission of the allegations of the complaints.

Respondent did not file an MVD.

We now turn to the allegations of the complaints.

Facts

DRB 25-226

As previously detailed, effective July 2, 2024, the Court temporarily suspended respondent from the practice of law and, to date, she remains temporarily suspended.

The Court's temporary suspension Order directed respondent to comply with R. 1:20-20, which required, among other obligations, that she, "within 30 days after the date of the order of suspension . . . file with the Director the original of a detailed affidavit specifying by correlatively numbered paragraphs how the disciplined attorney has complied with each of the provisions of this rule and the Supreme Court's order." Further, R. 1:20-20(c) expressly provides that an attorney's failure to file the affidavit of compliance constitutes a violation of RPC 8.1(b) and RPC 8.4(d).

Respondent failed to file the required affidavit of compliance. Consequently, on January 13, 2025, the OAE sent her a letter, by certified and regular mail, to her office and home addresses of record, with an additional copy sent by electronic mail to her office e-mail address of record, reminding her of her obligation to file the affidavit, pursuant to R. 1:20-20, and directing that she file it by January 27, 2025. The same date, the OAE received a relayed receipt indicating that delivery to respondent's e-mail address of record was complete. The certified mail receipt for the letter sent to respondent's home address was returned to the OAE signed, indicating delivery; however, the signature is illegible. Further, the USPS tracking system confirmed that the certified mail sent to respondent's home address was delivered on January 17, 2025. The regular mail sent to respondent's home address was not returned to the OAE.

Neither the certified nor regular mail sent to respondent's office address was returned to the OAE and, further, the USPS tracking system indicated that the certified mail was "Delivered, Left with Individual" on January 29, 2025.

Respondent failed to contact the OAE or file the required affidavit.

In addition to her temporary suspension, effective March 27, 2025, respondent was suspended from the practice of law for three months in connection with Hartman V. Again, the Court's disciplinary suspension Order directed that she comply with R. 1:20-20.

Nevertheless, respondent again failed to file the required affidavit of compliance. Consequently, on April 30, 2025, the OAE sent her a letter, by certified and regular mail, to both her office and home addresses of record, with an additional copy sent by electronic mail, to her office e-mail address of record, reminding her of her obligation to file the affidavit, pursuant to R. 1:20-20, and directing that she file it by May 10, 2025. That same date, the OAE received a relayed receipt indicating that delivery to respondent's e-mail address was complete. According to the USPS tracking system, the certified mail was delivered to respondent's home address on May 5, 2025. The regular mail sent to respondent's home address was not returned to the OAE. Both the certified and regular mail sent to respondent's office address were returned to OAE as undeliverable.

According to the OAE's complaint, the website for Cordry Hartman, LLC is still active and lists respondent and Richard D. Cordry, Esq., as attorneys. The most recent blog post on the website is dated April 23, 2025. The OAE also attempted to call respondent's office telephone number of record and a second telephone number listed on the firm's website, to no avail.

As of July 9, 2025, the date of the formal ethics complaint, respondent had failed to file the required affidavit, a step required of all suspended or disbarred attorneys, following her temporary and disciplinary suspensions. Consequently, the OAE charged respondent with having violated RPC 8.1(b) (two instances) and RPC 8.4(d) (two instances) for her willful violation of the Court's suspension Orders. Further, based on her failure to file an answer to the complaint, the OAE amended the complaint to charge her with having violated RPC 8.1(b) a third time.

DRB 25-227

This complaint addresses respondent's misconduct across three client matters. Each are detailed separately below.

The Wang Client Matter

On December 4, 2023, Wang retained respondent to represent her in connection with a divorce proceeding. On February 14, 2024, respondent filed a complaint for divorce on Wang's behalf. On March 29, 2024, Wang and her spouse executed a marital settlement agreement resolving all issues in their divorce.

On June 25, 2024, respondent sent a letter to Wang, via e-mail, stating that she would have to file a request for default to obtain a court date to finalize Wang's divorce. In her letter, respondent advised Wang that she would need to sign an Affidavit of Non-Military Service to file for the default. The same date, Wang texted respondent confirming that she would stop by the office the next morning to sign the required affidavit.

On July 2, 2024, respondent was temporarily suspended from the practice of law.

On July 31 and August 1, 2024, Wang texted respondent to inquire if there were any updates in her case. Also on August 1, 2024, Wang sent respondent an e-mail seeking confirmation that the request for default had been filed and asking if a court date to finalize the divorce had been set.

On August 5, 2024, Wang sent respondent another e-mail, this time stating that she had been trying to reach respondent via text message, telephone calls, and e-mails, to no avail.

During her interview with the OAE, Wang stated that she had spoken with respondent on August 6, 2024, during which conversation respondent informed her that she had sent Wang an e-mail and that she was still working on the case. During that telephone call, respondent failed to inform Wang that she had been suspended from the practice of law. Following that telephone call, Wang sent an e-mail to respondent, stating that she had not received the e-mail that respondent mentioned during their call.

On August 7, 2024, respondent sent Wang, via text message, a photograph of an undated draft e-mail that respondent had composed to Wang, stating that respondent's legal assistant was working on scheduling the court appearance for the divorce proceeding.

On August 27, 2024, Wang sent two e-mails to respondent, inquiring whether the request for default had been filed and whether the court had scheduled a hearing date. Two days later, on August 29, 2024, Wang sent a text message to respondent asking if the default had been filed. On September 4, 2024, Wang sent another text message to respondent, seeking an update on her

case and asking respondent to let her know if there was some reason she was unable to work on the case.

Respondent failed to reply to any of Wang's communication attempts after August 7, 2024. In September 2024, Wang twice traveled to respondent's law office, finding it locked on both occasions.

Wang subsequently retained replacement counsel to represent her in the divorce matter. Thereafter, replacement counsel unsuccessfully attempted to contact respondent to obtain her cooperation in filing a substitution of counsel. Nevertheless, on or about December 16, 2024, replacement counsel finalized Wang's divorce.

Respondent failed to inform Wang, at any point, that she had been suspended from the practice of law.

On October 21, 2024, the OAE docketed an ethics grievance filed by Wang against respondent. On December 2 and 19, 2024, the OAE sent a copy of the grievance to respondent and directed her to submit a written reply by December 12 and 30, respectively. Respondent failed to reply to either letter.

On February 27, 2025, the OAE filed a petition for the appointment of an attorney-trustee for respondent's law practice.⁵

⁵ On or about June 17, 2025, the Honorable Terence R. Cook, A.J.S.C., appointed as attorney-trustee to oversee respondent's practice.

Based on the foregoing facts, the OAE charged respondent with having violated RPC 1.1(b) by engaging in a pattern of neglect, evidenced by her failure to file a request to enter default to secure a court date to finalize Wang’s divorce, failing to communicate with Wang, and by engaging in a pattern of neglect across the Wang, Ray, and Broderick client matters, the latter two of which are detailed below. Next, the OAE alleged that respondent violated RPC 1.3 by failing to file the request to enter default, RPC 1.4(b) by failing to keep Wang reasonably apprised as to the status of her case, failing to reply to Wang’s attempts to reach her, and failing to inform Wang that she was suspended, and RPC 1.16(d) by failing to take reasonably practicable steps to protect Wang’s interests following her temporary suspension from the practice of law. Last, the OAE charged respondent with having violated RPC 8.1(b) by failing to cooperate with its investigation.⁶

The Ray Client Matter

On May 16, 2024, Ray retained respondent to represent him in connection with a pending divorce proceeding.

⁶ The OAE declined to charge respondent with having violated RPC 5.5(a) in connection with the Wang client matter. Specifically, the OAE determined that respondent’s August 7, 2024 text message to respondent, which is the only documented communication with Wang following her suspension, was non-substantive and pertained only to her legal assistant’s anticipated scheduling of a hearing to finalize the divorce, which never occurred.

On July 2, 2024, the Court temporarily suspended respondent from the practice of law. Respondent, however, failed to inform Ray that she had been suspended.

On July 8, 2024, respondent sent a text message to Nicole Donoian-Pody, Esq., counsel for Ray's wife in the divorce proceeding, canceling the mediation session scheduled that day.

Following her July 2, 2024 suspension, respondent and her legal assistant, Joanna Barley, sent the following communications regarding the Ray client matter:

A July 5, 2024 e-mail from Barley to Donoian-Pody, with the subject line "Fwd: Info for Monday" with an attached spreadsheet reflecting Ray's payments for the children's expenses;

A July 23, 2024 e-mail from respondent to the law clerk of the Honorable Linda A. Hynes, J.S.C., with a copy to Donoian-Pody, asserting her belief that Donoian-Pody had withdrawn a pending motion;

A July 25, 2024 e-mail from respondent to Donoian-Pody stating that Ray had paid \$10,000 to Donoian-Pody's office but the motion had not been withdrawn, as promised, and asking "[c]an you either withdraw the motion or push it so that [he can] file opposition next week? Judge Hynes law clerk needs to know today."

An August 15, 2024 lengthy e-mail from respondent to Donoian-Pody regarding allegations in connection with Ray's divorce proceeding;

An August 20, 2024 e-mail from respondent to Donoian-Pody's legal assistant regarding the Ray matter;

An August 20, 2024 reply e-mail from respondent to Donoian-Pody to confirm that Barley was still working for her.

Additionally, respondent sent Ray the following e-mails after her temporary suspension:

A July 12, 2024 six-page e-mail detailing her thoughts on how Ray's divorce case should be resolved;

An August 16, 2024 e-mail stating that she was almost finished his marital settlement agreement and that she would be preparing a cross-motion on his behalf, due the following week;

An August 23, 2024 e-mailing proposing a time to discuss, over the telephone, her draft of Ray's cross-motion.

On August 27, 2024, Ray requested an update on the status of the pending motion and respondent's progress on the cross-motion.

Two days later, on August 29, 2024, Ray sent an e-mail to respondent, informing her that the court had notified him of her suspension, and requesting that she provide an explanation and an update on the outstanding motion. Respondent failed to reply.

On September 9, 2024, having received no reply, Ray sent another e-mail to respondent, requesting a refund of his retainer. Ray also expressed concern

regarding respondent's representation of him in the divorce matter. Respondent never filed an opposition or a cross-motion to the pending adverse motion.

Ray retained replacement counsel who attempted to obtain Ray's client file from respondent, to no avail.

On September 11, 2024, Ray filed an ethics grievance, alleging that respondent failed to notify him that she had been suspended from the practice of law and, further, that respondent had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. On December 2 and 19, 2024, the OAE sent a copy of the grievance to respondent and directed her to submit a written reply. Respondent, however, failed to reply.

As previously mentioned, on February 27, 2025, the OAE filed a petition for the appointment of an attorney-trustee for respondent's law practice.

Based on the foregoing facts, the OAE charged respondent with having violated RPC 1.1(b) by failing to inform Ray of her suspension from the practice of law, failing to file a response to the pending motion, failing to communicate with Ray, and by engaging in a pattern of neglect across the Ray, Wang, and Broderick client matters. Next, the OAE alleged that respondent violated RPC 1.3 by failing to file an opposition or cross-motion in connection with the pending motion, RPC 1.4(b) by failing to keep Ray reasonably apprised as to the status of his case or to reply to his repeated inquiries for status updates, and

RPC 1.16(d) by failing to take reasonably practicable steps to protect Ray’s interest following her temporary suspension from the practice of law. The OAE further alleged that respondent violated RPC 5.5(a) by practicing law following her temporary suspension. Last, the OAE charged respondent with having violated RPC 8.1(b) by failing to cooperate with its investigation.

The Broderick Client Matter

On July 22, 2020, Broderick retained respondent to represent her in a divorce matter. The terms of the representation were memorialized in a written fee agreement of the same date. The attorney-client relationship continued until August 30, 2023, when respondent terminated the representation.

Pursuant to R. 5:3-5(a)(5), “bills are to be rendered . . . no less frequently than once every ninety days, provided that services have been rendered during that period.” Broderick informed the OAE that respondent failed to issue any bills to her until January 2023, approximately two-and-a-half years after the representation had commenced. Broderick also told the OAE that she had asked respondent for invoices and was told, on more than one occasion, that invoices “would be coming shortly.”

The first invoice that respondent sent to Broderick was dated January 17, 2023 and contained the following five billing entries, which pre-dated the execution of the parties' July 22, 2020 retainer agreement:

March 11, 2020	–	.8 hours totaling \$260
April 15, 2020	–	.6 hours totaling \$195
April 16, 2020	–	.2 hours totaling \$65
April 19, 2020	–	.2 hours totaling \$65
July 21, 2020	–	.5 hours totaling \$162.50

On March 1, 2023, a Judgment of Divorce was entered, incorporating the terms of a negotiated settlement. Thereafter, respondent continued to represent Broderick in connection with post-judgment matters. Specifically, Broderick's former spouse was noncompliant with the terms of the divorce and, consequently, respondent filed a motion that resulted in a May 16, 2023 order in which the spouse was found to have acted in bad faith and was ordered to pay counsel fees in the amount of \$2,177.50. In support of that motion, respondent submitted an affidavit of services, as R. 4:42-9(b) requires, addressing the factors enumerated by RPC 1.5(b).

Thereafter, Broderick's former spouse's noncompliance continued and, consequently, respondent filed another post-judgment motion on Broderick's behalf, resulting in an August 11, 2023 order awarding Broderick \$2,000 in

economic damages to remediate certain costs related to the former spouse's lack of compliance. Respondent, however, failed to submit the required affidavit of services and, thus, the court denied counsel fees, noting in its order "[b]ecause no such affidavit or certification was included with the motion, the Court is constrained to deny [Broderick's fee application]." The court also entered judgment against Broderick's former spouse, in the amount of \$141,604.58.

On August 14, 2023, Barley sent a copy of the court's August 11, 2023 order, via e-mail, to Broderick. The same date, Broderick replied, requesting to speak with respondent for an explanation for the denial of counsel fees. Barley replied that respondent would address Broderick's questions when she was able. Respondent, however, failed to reply.

On August 22, 2023, Broderick again sent an e-mail to Barley, with a copy to respondent, asking to discuss the August 11 order and requesting an explanation regarding why an affidavit of services was not included with the previously filed motion. Respondent failed to reply to Broderick's e-mail. However, on August 30, respondent notified Broderick, in writing, that the representation was complete and enclosed an invoice.

Thereafter, respondent issued invoices to Broderick for the work she had performed in connection with the motion resulting in the August 11, 2023 order.

On October 2, 2024, Broderick filed an ethics grievance against respondent. On December 2 and 20, 2024, the OAE sent copies of the grievance to respondent and directed her to submit a written reply by December 12, 2024. Respondent failed to reply to either of the OAE's letters.

Based on the foregoing facts, the OAE charged respondent with having violated RPC 1.1(b) by failing to submit the required affidavit of services in support of the motion filed on behalf of Broderick and, thus, engaging in a pattern of neglect in connection with the Wang, Ray, and Broderick client matters. Next, the OAE alleged that respondent violated RPC 1.4(b) by failing to (1) issue a billing invoice to Broderick until January 17, 2023, two-and-a-half years after having been retained, and (2) reply to Broderick's requests to discuss the August 11, 2023 order. The OAE asserted that respondent violated RPC 1.5(b) by representing Broderick in connection with the divorce matter, beginning March 11, 2020, as evidenced in billing records, three months prior to executing the July 22, 2020 written retainer agreement. The OAE alleged that respondent violated RPC 1.16(d) by failing to protect Broderick's interests before unilaterally terminating the representation on August 30, 2023, and RPC 8.1(b) by failing to cooperate the OAE's efforts to investigate Broderick's grievance.

Finally, based on respondent's failure to answer the formal ethics complaint, the OAE amended the complaint to charge her with having committed a fourth violation of RPC 8.1(b).

Analysis and Discipline

Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct

Following a review of the records in these consolidated matters, we determine that the facts set forth in the formal ethics complaints support most, but not all, of the charges of unethical conduct. Respondent's failure to file answers to the complaints is deemed an admission that the allegations are true and that they provide a sufficient basis for the imposition of discipline. R. 1:20-4(f)(1).

Notwithstanding that Rule, each charge in an ethics complaint must be supported by sufficient facts for us to determine that unethical conduct has occurred. See In re Pena, 164 N.J. 222 (2000) (the Court's "obligation in an attorney disciplinary proceeding is to conduct an independent review of the record, R. 1:20-16(c), and determine whether the [ethics] violations found by the [Board] have been established by clear and convincing evidence"); see also R. 1:20-4(b) (entitled "Contents of Complaint" and requiring, among other

notice pleading requirements, that a complaint “shall set forth sufficient facts to constitute fair notice of the nature of the alleged unethical conduct.”).

Here, we find that the record supports a finding that respondent violated RPC 1.1(b); RPC 1.3 (two instances); RPC 1.4(b) (three instances); RPC 1.16(d) (three instances); RPC 5.5(a)(1); RPC 8.1(b) (seven instances); and RPC 8.4(d) (two instances). We determine to dismiss, however, the additional charged violations of RPC 1.1(b) (two instances) and RPC 1.5(b).

DRB 25-226

R. 1:20-20(b)(15) requires a suspended attorney, within thirty days of the Court’s Order of suspension, to “file with the Director [of the OAE] the original of a detailed affidavit specifying by correlatively numbered paragraphs how the disciplined attorney has complied with each of the provisions of this rule and the Supreme Court’s order.”

As the Appellate Division has observed, “the provisions of R. 1:20-20(b)(1) to (14) are designed to protect clients of the [suspended or] disbarred attorney, as well as any other individuals who might unknowingly seek to retain that attorney during the period of his suspension.” Eichen, Levinson & Crutchlow, LLP v. Weiner, 397 N.J. Super. 588, 596 (App. Div. 2008). Non-compliance with R. 1:20-20, therefore, obstructs one of the primary purposes of

the disciplinary system, “to protect the public from an untrustworthy lawyer.” See In re Rigolosi, 107 N.J. 192, 206 (1987) (“The purpose of a disciplinary proceeding, as distinguished from a criminal prosecution, is not so much to punish a wrongdoer as it is to protect the public from an untrustworthy lawyer.”) (citing In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401, 418-19 (1962)). Non-compliance with R. 1:20-20 may also cause “confusion among . . . clients and an administrative burden for the courts.” In re Kramer, 172 N.J. 609, 626 (2002).

For those reasons, and by operation of Rule, in the absence of an extension granted by the Director of the OAE, failure to file an affidavit of compliance pursuant to R. 1:20-20(b)(15) within the time prescribed “constitute[s] a violation of RPC 8.1(b) . . . and RPC 8.4(d).” R. 1:20-20(c).

Here, respondent willfully violated the Court’s temporary and disciplinary suspension Orders, filed on filed July 2, 2024 and March 27, 2025, respectively, by failing to file the required affidavits, a step required of all suspended attorneys. She, thus, violated R. 1:20-20 and, consequently, RPC 8.1(b) (two instances) and RPC 8.4(d) (two instances). Moreover, she violated RPC 8.1(b) a third time by failing to file an answer to the formal ethics complaint, thus, allowing this matter to proceed as a default.

DRB 25-227

RPC 1.1(b) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in at least three instances of neglect in three district client matters. See In the Matter of Donald M. Rohan, DRB 05-062 (June 8, 2005) at 16 (recognizing that, although RPC 1.1(a) is clearly limited to gross neglect, subparagraph (b) is intended to address repeated acts of simple neglect), so ordered, 184 N.J. 287 (2005). Here, the record clearly and convincingly supports a finding that respondent acted with neglect in the Wang, Ray, and Broderick client matters. Specifically, in the Wang matter, respondent failed to file the request to enter default, a step required to finalize Wang's divorce and, thereafter, failed to reply to Wang's repeated attempts to communicate with her to ascertain the status of her case.

In the Ray matter, respondent failed to file a response or cross-motion to the pending adverse motion, failed to advise Ray that she had been suspended from the practice of law, and ceased communicating with Ray when he confronted her about her suspension.

Finally, in the Broderick matter, respondent failed to file the required affidavit of services in support of Broderick's post-judgment motion, thereby resulting in the denial of counsel fees to which Broderick otherwise would have been entitled and for which respondent later billed her. Thereafter, respondent failed to reply to Brodericks' repeated inquiries concerning same. Thus,

respondent violated RPC 1.1(b) by neglecting three distinct client matters. We determine to dismiss, however, the second and third charged instances of RPC 1.1(b) as cumulative.

Next, respondent violated RPC 1.3, which requires an attorney to act with diligence in the representation of a client, in both the Wang and Ray matters. Specifically, in the Wang matter, respondent failed to file the request to enter default, a step required to finalize Wang's divorce and further failed to reply to Wang's repeated attempts to communicate with her to ascertain the status of her case. In the Ray matter, respondent failed to file a response or cross-motion to the pending motion, failed to notify Ray that she had been suspended from the practice of law, and ceased communicating with Ray when he confronted her about her suspension. Thus, respondent violated RPC 1.3 (two instances).

Respondent violated RPC 1.4(b) by failing to reply to reasonable requests for information from Wang, Ray, and Broderick regarding the status of their cases and, with respect to Wang and Ray, failing to inform them of her July 2, 2024 suspension from the practice of law.

Next, respondent violated RPC 1.16(d) by failing to withdraw as counsel, in the Wang and Ray matters, following her July 2, 2024 temporary suspension from the practice of law in New Jersey and, thereafter, by failing to facilitate the transfer of those cases to substitute counsel. She separately violated this Rule in

the Broderick matter by failing to take any steps, following her August 30, 2023 termination of the representation, to seek an award of counsel fees from Broderick's former spouse and, instead, billed Broderick for those very charges.

Respondent violated RPC 5.5(a)(1) by practicing law following her July 2, 2024 temporary suspension. Specifically, the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondent, for approximately one month following her suspension, continued to represent Ray in connection with his divorce matter. Not only did her continued communications with Ray include detailed litigation strategies, evidenced by a July 12, 2024 e-mail explaining her views on how the divorce matter should be resolved and an August 16, 2024 e-mail in which she informed Ray she was almost done drafting a settlement agreement. Moreover, she continued to communicate with her adversary and the Superior Court concerning the status of case. At no point did respondent disclose to Ray, her adversary, or the Superior Court that the Court had suspended her from the practice of law. Thus, respondent violated RPC 5.5(a)(1).

RPC 8.1(b) requires an attorney to "respond to a lawful demand for information from . . . [a] disciplinary authority." Here, respondent violated this Rule in multiple respects. First, she failed to comply timely and fully with the OAE's investigation of the grievances in connection with the Wang, Ray, and Broderick matters. Respondent violated RPC 8.1(b) a fourth time by failing to

file a verified answer to the formal ethics complaint, despite proper notice, allowing this matter to proceed as a default.

We decline to find, however, that respondent violated RPC 1.5(b), which requires a lawyer to communicate, in writing, the basis or rate of the fee. Here, the OAE alleged that respondent violated this Rule by representing Broderick for a period of four months – evidenced solely by five billing entries totaling less than two-and-a-half hours of work – prior to the execution of the parties’ July 22, 2020 written fee agreement. However, RPC 1.5(b) expressly provides that the written agreement must be communicated “before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.” (emphasis added). Here, the billing records indicate that respondent communicated with Broderick, via one telephone call on March 11, 2020, and via text messages on April 15, April 16, April 19, and July 21, 2020, prior to the execution of the July 22, 2020 fee agreement. The record lacks any evidence, however, to support a finding that the fee agreement was not memorialized within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, particularly considering the April 16 entry described that text message as “re reconciling.”

In sum, in connection with DRB 25-226, we find that respondent violated RPC 8.1(b) (three instances) and RPC 8.4(d) (two instances). In connection with DRB 25-227, we find that respondent violated RPC 1.1(b); RPC 1.3 (two

instances); RPC 1.4(b) (three instances); RPC 1.16(d) (three instances); RPC 5.5(a)(1); and RPC 8.1(b) (four instances). We determine to dismiss the additional charged violations of RPC 1.1(b) (two instances) and RPC 1.5(b). The sole issue left for our determination is the appropriate quantum of discipline for respondent's misconduct.

Quantum of Discipline

Respondent's most serious misconduct was her continued representation of Ray following her July 2, 2024 temporary suspension from the practice of law. Attorneys who practice law while suspended have received discipline ranging from a lengthy term of suspension to disbarment, depending on the presence of other misconduct, the attorney's disciplinary history, and aggravating or mitigating factors. See, e.g., In re Gonzalez, __ N.J. __ (2022), 2022 N.J. LEXIS 996 (one-year suspension for an attorney who, during a three-month term of suspension, called the Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC) on behalf of a friend whose driver's license had been suspended, identified himself as an attorney, and requested information on how to adjourn the friend's MVC hearing; thereafter, the attorney accompanied his friend, in a representative capacity, to the MVC hearing, where the attorney presented an MVC employee with the business card of another lawyer with an active law license; following

the MVC's demand that he produce his own driver's license or social security number to confirm his identity, the attorney left the MVC; violations of RPC 3.3(a)(1) (making a false statement of material fact to a tribunal), RPC 3.3(a)(5) failing to disclose a material fact to a tribunal, knowing the omission is reasonably certain to mislead the tribunal), RPC 3.4(c) (knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), RPC 5.5(a)(1), and RPC 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation); we weighed the fact that the attorney's misconduct was confined to a singular matter against his prior discipline, which included a 1995 reprimand, a 2012 admonition, and a 2017 three-month suspension); In re Stack, 255 N.J. 325 (2023) (in a consolidated default matter, two-year suspension for an attorney who practiced law while temporarily suspended in two matters spanning more than a year apart; in the first matter, the attorney wrote to a bankruptcy court to seek an adjournment, even though his client's case had already been dismissed; in the second matter, the attorney twice appeared, in person, at the Clerk's Office in an attempt to file documents; in addition to his practicing while suspended, the attorney also grossly mishandled, on behalf of a single client, three distinct matters causing the issuance of judgments against his client totaling \$128,192; the attorney also negligently misappropriated client funds, committed recordkeeping violations, and failed to cooperate with the OAE; violations of

RPC 1.1(a) (engaging in gross neglect), RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(b), RPC 1.4(c) (failing to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation), RPC 1.15(a) (negligent misappropriation), RPC 1.15(d) (failing to comply with the recordkeeping requirements of R. 1:21-6), RPC 5.5(a)(1), and RPC 8.1(b); the attorney previously had received an admonition for a conflict of interest and a reprimand for failing to file an R. 1:20-20 affidavit); In re Choi, 249 N.J. 18 (2021) (two-year suspension for an attorney who, following his indefinite suspension, in New York, for federal criminal convictions for money laundering and submitting false statements to federal authorities, represented a client, in New York state court, where he falsely certified that he was admitted to practice in New York; the attorney also maintained a law firm website that improperly claimed that he was admitted to practice in New York; finally, the attorney failed to comply with New York's affidavit of compliance rule for suspended or disbarred attorneys); In re Pinnock, 257 N.J. 604 (2024) (three-year suspension for an attorney who, following her suspension from the practice of law, mishandled numerous immigration client matters; violations of RPC 1.1(a), RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(b), RPC 1.5(b), and RPC 5.5(a)(1); in mitigation, the attorney stipulated to her misconduct; in aggravation, the attorney had prior discipline for similar misconduct, her actions impacted vulnerable clients, and she failed

to file the required R. 1:20-20 affidavit following her suspension); In re Kim, ___ N.J. ___ (2022), 2022 N.J. LEXIS 1068 (attorney disbarred, in a default matter, for practicing while suspended for almost three-and-a-half years following his temporary suspension, in connection with sixteen small business loan closings before the United States Small Business Administration (the SBA); during each loan closing, the attorney falsely certified that he maintained an active New Jersey law license; the SBA discovered the attorney's suspension and determined that it would no longer guarantee the client's loans until it had completed an internal review of the attorney's illicit behavior; the attorney also ignored the OAE's communications, spanning several months, which required him to reply to the SBA's ethics grievance; in recommending the attorney's disbarment, we weighed, in aggravation, the fact that the attorney's conduct jeopardized his client's standing before the SBA and imperiled the closing of two pending small business loans; we also weighed, in aggravation, the attorney's prior three-year suspension, in 2020, also for practicing law while suspended, and his contempt for the attorney disciplinary system by refusing to answer the allegations made against him and by continuing, for years, to practice law while suspended).

Here, respondent's unauthorized practice of law is similar to that of the attorney in Gonzalez, whose practice of law while suspended was confined to

one client matter. Thus, standing alone, respondent's violation of RPC 5.5(a) could be met with a one-year term of suspension. However, respondent's practice of law while suspended affected two client matters, and she engaged in other serious misconduct by mishandling all three client matters under scrutiny. In this respect, respondent's misconduct closely resembles that of the attorney in Stack, who received a two-year suspension, and Pinnock, who received a three-year suspension. However, respondent's disciplinary history, detailed below, is far more egregious than that of the attorney in Stack.

Respondent also failed to file her required R. 1:20-20 affidavit of compliance following both her temporary and disciplinary suspensions. Attorneys with disciplinary histories or other aggravating factors, in default matters, have received censures for their failure to file the required R. 1:20-20 affidavit. See, e.g., In re Coleman, 260 N.J. 99 (2025) (censure for an attorney who failed to file a R. 1:20-20 affidavit of compliance following a three-month disciplinary suspension stemming from his failure to maintain required professional liability insurance; in aggravation, the attorney's disciplinary history consisted of two censures and a three-month suspension; the matter marked his fifth encounter with the disciplinary system and his fourth default); In re Smith, 258 N.J. 27 (2024) (censure for an attorney who failed to file R. 1:20-20 affidavits of compliance following two suspensions – a one-year

suspension, in a reciprocal discipline matter, based on misconduct in two client matters, and a consecutive six-month suspension, in a default matter, based on his gross mishandling of one client matter; in each disciplinary matter, the attorney ignored the Court's Order of suspension, directing that he file the affidavit, and also failed to reply to the OAE's communications attempting to ensure his compliance); In re Ludwig, 252 N.J. 67 (2022) (censure for an attorney who, following his 2021 three-month suspension, failed to file the R. 1:20-20 affidavit of compliance, despite the OAE's specific requests that he do so; in aggravation, the attorney's failure to file the affidavit constituted his third disciplinary matter in five years; prior reprimand, in addition to the 2021 disciplinary suspension, in a default matter, that gave rise to his obligation to file the affidavit).

Based on the foregoing disciplinary precedent, Stack and Pinnock in particular, the totality of respondent's misconduct could be met with a two- or three-year term of suspension. To craft the appropriate discipline in this case, however, we also consider mitigating and aggravating factors.

There is no mitigation to consider.

In aggravation, respondent allowed these matters to proceed as defaults. "[A] respondent's default or failure to cooperate with the investigative authorities operates as an aggravating factor, which is sufficient to permit a

penalty that would otherwise be appropriate to be further enhanced.” In re Kivler, 193 N.J. 332, 342 (2008).

In further aggravation, we accord significant weight to respondent’s disciplinary history. Specifically, this matter represents respondent’s sixth disciplinary matter before us and her seventh consecutive default. The Court has signaled an inclination toward progressive discipline and the stern treatment of repeat offenders. In such situations, enhanced discipline is appropriate. See In re Kantor, 180 N.J. 226 (2004) (disbarment for abandonment of clients and repeated failure to cooperate with the disciplinary system).

To that end, and in view of the proximity of respondent’s instant conduct to the misconduct we addressed in Hartman V, a review of her disciplinary history is appropriate.

In 2014, in Hartman I, respondent received an admonition. Although her misconduct in that matter differed from the misconduct at issue here, that matter put her on notice that her conduct as a New Jersey attorney was under scrutiny.

In 2020 and again, in 2023, the Court censured respondent: first, in Hartman II, a matter in which she committed misconduct in connection with the representation of a client and later failed to cooperate with disciplinary authorities, and, second, in Hartman III in connection with her failure to

cooperate with a disciplinary investigation and to file a conforming answer to the formal ethics complaint.

Also in 2023, in Hartman IV, the Court entered an order imposing no additional discipline but accepting our determination that, among other misconduct, she again violated RPC 8.1(b) in two respects: first, by failing to comply with a disciplinary investigation and, second, by failing to answer a formal ethics complaint.

In our March 2021 decision in Hartman IV, we acknowledged that “in late 2017 and early 2018, [respondent] began experiencing some sort of personal or professional difficulty” and subsequently “failed to meaningfully participate in the disciplinary process,” and further noted that the overlapping timeframe of her three (then recent) matters precluded a conclusion that she was “repeatedly thumbing her nose at the disciplinary system.” Here, however, the misconduct at issue did not begin until years after her earlier difficulty.⁷ Moreover, given the passage of time since her failure to take part meaningfully in earlier

⁷ The events underlying these matters began in or around August 2023 (when respondent failed to reply to Broderick’s messages) and continued through December 2024 (when respondent failed to reply to the OAE’s efforts to investigate her misconduct) resulting in the filing of the July 23, 2025 formal ethics complaint. In Hartman II, she engaged in her underlying misconduct between late 2017 and April 2018, and defaulted in May 2019. In Hartman III, she engaged in her underlying misconduct between March or April 2018 and February 2019, and defaulted in December 2019. In Hartman IV, she engaged in her underlying misconduct between January and September 2018, and defaulted in May 2020. In Hartman V, she engaged in her underlying misconduct in late May or early June 2023 until October 2024, when she defaulted.

disciplinary proceedings, the current matter clearly establishes that she repeatedly has thumbed her nose at the disciplinary system.

Finally, in Hartman V, in consolidated defaults, the Court suspended respondent for three months for her violations of RPC 8.1(b) (two instances). In the first matter comprising Hartman V, between May 2023 and October 2023, respondent failed to cooperate with the DEC's investigation. Although she eventually submitted a written reply to the grievance on October 26, 2023, she thereafter failed to reply to the investigator's attempts to schedule an interview. She subsequently failed to file a verified answer to the formal ethics complaint, which was served upon her on June 4 and July 2024. In the second matter comprising Hartman V, the misconduct spanned from December 2023 through October 2024, during which she again failed to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation.

In determining to recommend a three-month suspension, we weighed respondent's failure to learn from her multiple prior encounters with the disciplinary system and her longstanding disregard for her obligations pursuant to the Rules of Professional Conduct. We also considered respondent's previous personal and professional difficulties, which had specifically been addressed in Hartman IV, but determined that the misconduct at issue had begun years after her earlier difficulty. Instead, we concluded that respondent had failed to learn

from her prior interactions with the disciplinary system and, thus, a term of suspension was warranted. Further, based on her prior mental health struggles, which she brought to our attention in connection with Hartman IV, we recommended the condition that, as a condition precedent to her reinstatement, she submit proof to the OAE of her fitness to practice law, as attested to by a medical doctor approved by the OAE.

Although there is some overlap in the timing of her misconduct in the instant matter and the misconduct that we addressed in Hartman V, the nature of the misconduct is different. Thus, we determine that, had the instant matter been consolidated with Hartman V for our review, we would have recommended significantly greater discipline than the three-month suspension imposed in Hartman V, particularly in view of respondent's practice of law while suspended.

In our view, respondent has failed to learn from her multiple prior encounters with the disciplinary system. To the contrary, she has demonstrated a longstanding disregard for her obligations pursuant to the Rules of Professional Conduct. As previously mentioned, these consolidated matters represent respondent's sixth and seventh defaults.

Conclusion

On balance, in view of the serious aggravating factors, we determine that a three-year suspension is the quantum of discipline necessary to protect the public and preserve confidence in the bar.

Additionally, we reiterate our previous recommendation that, as a condition to her discipline, respondent be required to submit proof of her fitness to practice law, as attested to by a medical doctor approved by the OAE.

Members Hoberman and Modu were absent.

We further determine to require respondent to reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for administrative costs and actual expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in R. 1:20-17.

Disciplinary Review Board
Hon. Mary Catherine Cuff, P.J.A.D. (Ret.),
Chair

By: /s/ Timothy M. Ellis

Timothy M. Ellis
Chief Counsel

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BOARD
VOTING RECORD

In the Matters of Frances Ann Hartman
Docket Nos. DRB 25-226 and 25-227

Decided: March 6, 2026

Disposition: Three-Year Suspension

<i>Members</i>	Three-Year Suspension	Absent
Cuff	X	
Boyer	X	
Campelo	X	
Hoberman		X
Menaker	x	
Modu		X
Petrou	X	
Rodriguez	X	
Spencer	X	
Total:	6	2

/s/ Timothy M. Ellis

Timothy M. Ellis
Chief Counsel