

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BOARD
Docket No. DRB 25-243
District Docket No. XIV-2023-0275E

In the Matter of Thomas George Aljian
An Attorney at Law

Argued
January 15, 2026

Decided
March 25, 2026

Saleel Sabnis appeared on behalf of the
Office of Attorney Ethics.

Respondent did not appear, despite proper notice.

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Introduction

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.

This matter was before us on a motion for final discipline filed by the Office of Attorney Ethics (the OAE), pursuant to R. 1:20-13(c)(2), following respondent's guilty plea and conviction, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, for endangering the welfare of a child, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). The OAE asserted that this offense constitutes a violation of RPC 8.4(b) (committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer).

For the reasons set forth below, we determine to grant the motion for final discipline and conclude that a six-month suspension is the appropriate quantum of discipline for respondent's misconduct.

Ethics History

Respondent earned admission to the New Jersey bar in 1998 and to the New York bar in 2000. During the relevant time, he maintained a practice of law in Manahawkin, New Jersey. He has no prior discipline in New Jersey.

Facts

On June 10, 2023, at approximately 4:00 a.m., Brigantine police officers approached respondent's parked vehicle. Respondent, who was fifty-six years old at the time, was in the vehicle with a male named J.W.¹

Respondent informed the police that he had met J.W. on the dating application Grindr,² and that J.W. had represented, on that application, that he was nineteen years old. As the police were attempting to identify J.W. and confirm his age, he ran away. The police took respondent's information and permitted him to leave. Later, when the police located J.W., they learned that he was fifteen years old. During his interview with the police, J.W. stated that he had penetrative sex with respondent. When the police returned to the location where respondent's vehicle had been parked, they found a used condom.

¹ In view of the sensitive nature of this matter and the age of the victim, we use initials to protect the victim's identity. R. 1:38-3(c).

² Grindr is a location-based social media and "online hookup" application that allows LGBTQ+ users to browse the profiles of nearby users sorted by distance. See <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grindr>. The application does not verify the age of its users. See <https://www.npr.org/2021/08/03/1024108203/how-grindr-a-popular-gay-dating-app-poses-exploitation-risk-to-minors> (last visited March 16, 2026).

On June 22, 2023, the Atlantic County Prosecutor's Office notified the OAE that respondent had been charged with second-degree sexual assault and third-degree endangering the welfare of a child.

On December 7, 2023, an Atlantic County Grand Jury indicted respondent for (1) second-degree sexual assault on a victim between thirteen and fifteen years old, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(4),³ and (2) third-degree endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of a child under the age of sixteen, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1).⁴

On September 24, 2024, respondent appeared before the Honorable Donna M. Taylor, J.S.C., and pleaded guilty to having violated N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). In exchange for his guilty plea, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss count one of the indictment.

³ N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(4) provides that: "An actor is guilty of sexual assault if the actor commits an act of sexual penetration with another person under any one of the following circumstances: [t]he victim is at least 13 but less than 16 years old and the actor is at least four years older than the victim."

⁴ N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) provides that: "Any person having a legal duty for the care of a child or who has assumed responsibility for the care of a child who engages in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child is guilty of a crime of the second degree. Any other person who engages in conduct or who causes harm as described in this paragraph to a child is guilty of a crime of the third degree."

During his plea allocution, respondent admitted that, on June 10, 2023, during the late evening or early morning hours, he encountered J.W. after communicating with him on a dating application. During their encounter, he engaged in sexual activity with J.W. Respondent stated he later had learned, “well after the fact,” that J.W. was under sixteen years old.

Judge Taylor accepted respondent’s guilty plea and ordered him to complete an evaluation at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center, in Avenel, New Jersey.⁵ The evaluation, and several other details regarding respondent’s interaction with J.W., are contained in a confidential Presentence Report (PSR). Due to the confidential nature of the PSR, we do not describe those details herein. However, we carefully considered that confidential information in reaching our determination in this matter.

On January 21, 2025, respondent appeared before Judge Taylor for sentencing. Based on his guilty plea and the information contained in the PSR, Judge Taylor imposed a suspended, two-year term of incarceration. Respondent also was ordered to pay fines, comply with Megan’s Law, and placed on parole

⁵ Pursuant to the New Jersey Sex Offender Act, individuals convicted of enumerated offenses must be referred for a psychological examination which “shall include a determination of whether the offender’s conduct was characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior and, if it was, a further determination of the offender’s amenability to sex offender treatment and willingness to participate in such treatment.” N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1.

supervision for life (PSL). Further, Judge Taylor prohibited respondent from future contact with J.W.

In imposing sentence, Judge Taylor considered, in aggravation, the risk that respondent will commit another offense and the need to deter him and others from violating the law. In mitigation, Judge Taylor considered that he had no criminal history, led a law-abiding life for a substantial amount of time, and was particularly likely to “respond affirmatively to probationary treatment.” Judge Taylor concluded that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors.

The Parties’ Positions Before the Board

In support of its recommendation that respondent be disbarred, the OAE relied on In re Legato, 229 N.J. 173 (2017), discussed in detail below. Specifically, the OAE argued that matters involving sexual assault of minors turn on whether the case involved “actual touching.” The OAE emphasized that, here, respondent had physical sexual contact with a minor and that his conduct was “not negated by his purported belief that J.W. was 19 years old nor, importantly, is the harm to the 15-year-old negated by such a belief.” Indeed, the OAE noted that, in a criminal prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1), the State need not prove that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known

that the victim was under the age of sixteen. See State v. Perez, 177 N.J. 540, 555 (2003).

The OAE contended that, in matters involving sexual contact with minors, the Court consistently has determined that disbarment is the appropriate quantum of discipline. Further, the OAE argued that respondent was on notice that “engaging in this form of unlawful conduct may be grounds for disbarment,” and that his criminal conduct was “so divergent from the high standard of conduct expected of New Jersey attorneys and so erodes the integrity of the legal system that disbarment is the only discipline that is appropriate to restore public confidence in the bar.”

During oral argument, in response to our questioning about whether it made a difference to the OAE’s recommendation for discipline that respondent believed J.W. was nineteen years old based, in part, on his Grindr profile, the OAE asserted that, because respondent violated a strict liability statute, even a reasonable belief regarding J.W.’s age was not a defense to his crime. The OAE acknowledged, however, that the record was unclear whether respondent knew, prior to the sexual encounter, that J.W. was underage.

In aggravation, the OAE asserted that respondent failed to notify the OAE of his criminal charges or his conviction, as R. 1:20-13(a)(1) requires.

In mitigation, the OAE acknowledged that respondent has no disciplinary history. Additionally, the OAE maintained that respondent's guilty plea in the criminal matter demonstrated that he accepted responsibility for his conduct. Moreover, there is no evidence that respondent's conduct was repetitive. Finally, in mitigation, the OAE asserted that respondent's conduct did not harm any clients. However, the OAE argued that the presence of mitigating factors did not preclude disbarment.

As of September 23, 2025, the date of the OAE's brief to us, respondent was compliant with his PSL.

Respondent did not submit a brief for our consideration and did not appear at oral argument, despite proper notice.

Analysis and Discipline

Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct

Following a review of the record, we determine to grant the OAE's motion for final discipline. Final discipline proceedings in New Jersey are governed by R. 1:20-13(c). Under that Rule, a criminal conviction is conclusive evidence of guilt in a disciplinary proceeding. R. 1:20-13(c)(1). See also In re Magid, 139 N.J. 449, 451 (1995), and In re Principato, 139 N.J. 456, 460 (1995).

Pursuant to RPC 8.4(b), it is misconduct for an attorney to “commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness[,] or fitness as a lawyer.” Thus, respondent’s conviction for endangering the welfare of a child, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1), establishes his violation of RPC 8.4(b). Hence, the sole issue left for our determination is the proper quantum of discipline for respondent’s misconduct. R. 1:20-13(c)(2); Magid, 139 N.J. at 451-52; and Principato, 139 N.J. at 460.

Quantum of Discipline

In determining the appropriate measure of discipline, we must consider the interests of the public, the bar, and respondent. “The primary purpose of discipline is not to punish the attorney but to preserve the confidence of the public in the bar.” Principato, 139 N.J. at 460. Fashioning the appropriate penalty involves a consideration of many factors, including “the nature and severity of the crime, whether the crime is related to the practice of law, and any mitigating factors such as respondent’s reputation, [their] prior trustworthy conduct, and general good conduct.” In re Lunetta, 118 N.J. 443, 445-46 (1989).

The Court has noted that, although it does not conduct “an independent examination of the underlying facts to ascertain guilt,” it will “consider them

relevant to the nature and extent of discipline to be imposed.” Magid, 139 N.J. at 452. In motions for final discipline, it is acceptable to “examine the totality of [the] circumstances, including the details of the offense, the background of respondent, and the pre-sentence report” before reaching a decision as to the sanction to be imposed.” In re Spina, 121 N.J. 378, 389 (1990). The “appropriate decision” should provide “due consideration to the interests of the attorney involved and to the protection of the public.” Ibid.

The fact that an attorney’s conduct did not involve the practice of law or arise from a client relationship will not excuse an ethics transgression or lessen the degree of sanction. In re Musto, 152 N.J. 165, 173 (1997). “Offenses that evidence ethical shortcomings, although not committed in the attorney’s professional capacity, may, nevertheless, warrant discipline.” Ibid. (citing In re Hasbrouck, 140 N.J. 162, 167 (1995)). The obligation of an attorney to maintain the high standard of conduct required by a member of the bar applies even to activities that may not directly involve the practice of law or affect the attorney’s clients. In re Schaffer, 140 N.J. 148, 156 (1995).

Before 2014, cases involving sexual misconduct against children resulted in discipline ranging from a reprimand to disbarment. See, e.g., In re Gilligan, 147 N.J. 268 (1997) (reprimand for an attorney convicted of lewdness for

exposing and fondling his genitals, for his sexual gratification, in front of three individuals, two of whom were under the age of thirteen); In re Ferraiolo, 170 N.J. 600 (2002) (one-year suspension for an attorney convicted of third-degree attempting to endanger the welfare of a child; the attorney, who had communicated in an internet chat room with someone whom he believed to be a fourteen-year-old boy, was arrested after he arranged to meet the “boy” for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts; the “boy” was a law enforcement officer); In re Ruddy, 130 N.J. 85 (1992) (two-year suspension for an attorney convicted of endangering the welfare of a child; the attorney fondled several young boys); In re Herman, 108 N.J. 66 (1987) (three-year suspension for an attorney who pleaded guilty to second-degree sexual assault after he purposely touched the buttocks of a ten-year-old boy); In re Frye, 217 N.J. 438 (2014) (disbarment for an attorney convicted of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child; the attorney inappropriately touched a minor on her rectal area while the minor was entrusted to his care; the attorney also repeatedly violated the terms of his probation by failing to attend mandatory therapy sessions and failed, for fifteen years, to report his conviction to disciplinary authorities).

However, in In re Cohen, 220 N.J. 7 (2014), the Court imposed an indeterminate suspension where the attorney – a state assembly member at the

time of his arrest – pleaded guilty to second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, following an investigation that led to the discovery of pornographic images of children on his state-issued computer and on his private law office computer. Cohen received a five-year prison sentence for his offense. Id. at 9.

In Cohen’s disciplinary matter, the Court weighed, in aggravation, that he had downloaded child pornography using a state-owned computer at his office and, further, exposed “an innocent third party to the risk of criminal liability” by using a receptionist’s computer for the same purpose. Id. at 17. In mitigation, the Court weighed that he had been sexually abused as a child. Id. at 18.

In imposing an indeterminate suspension, the Court observed that society had become more acutely aware of the pernicious effects of sexual crimes against children and, further, noted recent changes in the law increasing the severity of those crimes. Id. at 17-18. Additionally, the Court emphasized that:

[c]rimes involving the sexual exploitation of children have a devastating impact and create serious consequences for the victims Thus, the moral reprehensibility of this type of behavior warrants serious disciplinary penalties, up to and including disbarment, albeit mitigating circumstances might call for lesser discipline in particular cases.

[Id. at 12.]

The Court cautioned the bar that, although it had not adopted a “bright-line rule requiring disbarment in all cases involving sexual offenses against children, in the future, convictions in egregious cases involving child pornography may result in disbarment of attorneys who commit these offenses, in light of society’s increasing recognition of the harm done to the victims of those offenses.” Id. at 9.

Since Cohen, the most recent line of pertinent cases has created a more consistent rule applicable to attorneys who commit crimes of a sexual nature involving minors. Most significantly, in Legato, 229 N.J. 173, the Court addressed three consolidated matters, each involving an attorney who had pleaded guilty to committing a sexual offense against a child.⁶

The attorney in Legato engaged in explicit online conversations with an individual whom he believed to be a twelve-year-old girl. Id. at 179. The interactions included asking the girl to touch herself in her genital area and telling her that he would like to engage in oral sex and intercourse with her. Ibid. Unbeknownst to Legato, however, he was interacting with an undercover police officer. Ibid. Eventually, Legato engaged in a video chat with the undercover

⁶ The three consolidated matters that the Court addressed in Legato were In the Matter of Mark Gerard Legato, DRB 15-219 (April 4, 2016), In the Matter of Regan Clair Kenyon, Jr., DRB 15-351 (April 4, 2016), and In the Matter of Alexander D. Walter, DRB 15-362 (April 4, 2016).

officer, during which he unzipped his pants and exposed his erect penis. Ibid. Although Legato scheduled two in-person meetings with his putative victim, he did not appear on either occasion. Ibid. The Court determined that an indeterminate suspension was appropriate for Legato because “he admitted to targeting an underage child online but never took the additional step of meeting with the minor. Instead, the communication with the purported minor was limited to online interaction.” Id. at 186.

In Kenyon, during the course of a four-month period, the attorney engaged in multiple internet chats with a person he believed to be a fourteen-year-old girl, but who was, unbeknownst to him, an undercover officer. Id. at 180. Kenyon admitted that, in addition to his illicit chats, he sent his intended victim images of, and links to, hardcore adult pornography. Ibid. Like Legato, Kenyon also arranged to meet with his intended victim but did not appear for that meeting. Ibid. The Court determined that Kenyon’s conduct merited an indeterminate suspension, noting that – like Legato – he engaged in illicit online conversations with an individual whom he believed to be a minor, but he never met the “child” in person. Ibid.

In imposing indeterminate suspensions on Legato and Kenyon, the Court noted “that the public is protected while [they] are suspended and under parole

supervision for at least fifteen years.” Id. at 187. Thus, “[w]ith the protections of Megan’s Law and PSL in place,” the Court “stop[ped] short of eliminating all hope of future reinstatement,” further observing that “[w]e cannot anticipate what therapies, pharmaceuticals, or treatments may become available to help control or rehabilitate Legato or Kenyon.” Ibid. Simultaneously, however, the Court emphasized that each attorney would “be subject to ‘vigorous review’ before his license may be restored.” Id. at 187.

In contrast to the online misconduct undertaken by the attorneys in Legato and Kenyon, the attorney in Walter masturbated, on multiple occasions, in the physical presence of a nine-year-old child. Id. at 181. He engaged in this misconduct at times when the two were alone in a swimming pool at his home, where the child and her mother resided. Ibid. The Court found that “the nature and severity of his conduct, the physical presence of the child, and his position of power over and responsibility for the child” warranted disbarment. Id. at 189. Moreover, the Court explained that Walter had “demonstrated that he [was] willing to take advantage of his power for his own benefit, encapsulating the precise object that [the Court is] tasked with maintaining – public confidence in the bar.” Ibid. The Court also noted that he apparently lacked remorse, failed to

accept responsibility, and engaged in repeated acts of misconduct toward the child. Ibid.

Addressing all three cases and contrasting Legato and Kenyon with Walter, the Court found “a significant distinction between online and personal physical contact” and noted that, in the first two cases, there had been “no actual harm or contact to an actual minor, which would require disbarment.” Id. at 188.⁷ The Court, thus, declined to adopt a bright-line rule requiring disbarment in all cases involving sexual offenses against children. Id. at 182, 187. Rather, the Court stated that the imposition of discipline in these matters “requires a fact-sensitive inquiry on a case-by-case basis,” where the “appropriate level of discipline may depend on different factors, such as whether the case ‘involved touching, physical violence, or actual dissemination [of child pornography] to others, the number of pictures or videos, or whether the perpetrator suffered from mental illness or sexual abuse himself or herself.’” Id. at 182-83 (alteration in original) (quoting Cohen, 220 N.J. at 18).

⁷ In a dissenting opinion, Justice Barry T. Albin expressed his view that he would have disbarred both Kenyon and Legato. He concluded that “[t]he sexual exploitation or abuse of children – whether completed or, as in the Legato and Kenyon matters, attempted – is such an egregious violation of societal norms that no discipline short of disbarment will ensure public confidence in the bar or the judiciary’s governance of the bar.” Legato, 229 N.J. at 189.

Since the Court's decision in Legato, three more attorneys have been disbarred for sexual crimes against minors. See In re Nilsen, 229 N.J. 333 (2017) (the attorney engaged in online chats with an individual purporting to be the thirty-two-year-old mother of a nine-year-old girl; unbeknownst to him, however, he was communicating with an undercover law enforcement officer; he discussed engaging in sex with both the mother and daughter, sent photos of himself, explained how the mother could access child pornography to "acclimate" her daughter, and purchased a plane ticket to meet them; prior to his departure, however, the attorney was arrested for soliciting a different putative mother/daughter pair, a presumptive six-year-old girl and her mother; the attorney was arrested when he appeared for a scheduled meeting with them); In re Gillen, 230 N.J. 382 (2017) (the attorney engaged in explicit online conversations with a girl whom he believed to be fourteen years old but who, unbeknownst to him, was an undercover officer; he also sent the "girl" files of explicit pictures and links to pornographic websites; the attorney was arrested after setting a date to meet the girl and appearing for that meeting, with wine coolers and drugs used to treat erectile dysfunction); In re Toman, 237 N.J. 429 (2019) (the attorney engaged in sexual activity, through text messages, with the fourteen-year-old daughter of a client whom he was representing in a child

custody dispute against the child's father; the attorney requested that the girl provide photos of herself wearing little clothing, discussed topics of a sexual nature, and sent her pictures of his genitalia; in recommending the attorney's disbarment, we noted that the fourteen-year-old child already was vulnerable, given the pending custody dispute, and that neither she nor her mother may ever feel safe from an attorney, should they need counsel again).

More recently, in In re Rave, 258 N.J. 453 (2024), the Court imposed an indeterminate suspension on an attorney who pleaded guilty to third-degree endangering the welfare of a child by possessing less than one thousand items depicting the sexual exploitation or abuse of a child, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(iii), and fourth-degree criminal sexual contact with a minor, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b).

In that matter, Rave admitted that, while using a website – which provided a live video feed from the user to other individuals on the site – he masturbated in view of a fourteen-year-old child. In the Matter of Michael T. Rave, DRB 23-218 (March 20, 2024) at 4. Moreover, he saved, on his personal laptop, eighty-three images depicting sexual exploitation or abuse of a minor. Id. at 3-4.

Prior to sentencing, Rave took part in a psychosexual evaluation, which revealed that he had started using the website, sporadically, in the months before

his arrest. Id. at 4. Although Rave acknowledged that he had accessed the website to find women who would watch him masturbate, he claimed that he never intended to seek out minors and believed that, because the site advertised as an adult site, it never occurred to him that minors might be using it. Id. at 4-5. Regarding the child pornography on his computer, Rave stated that he had begun visiting “teen pornography” websites a few times a month, with the intent to view images of women aged eighteen or older. Id. at 5. The Superior Court sentenced Rave to a two-year period of probation, required his compliance with Megan’s law, and directed that he continue in sex offender therapy. Id. at 6-7. However, the Superior Court did not sentence Rave to PSL because his offenses were not among the crimes to which PSL applies. Id. at 7.

We were equally divided on whether Rave’s misconduct warranted disbarment. Id. at 32.

Specifically, four Members recommended an indeterminate suspension, finding that, although deplorable, Rave’s conduct was most similar to the precedent in which the Court had imposed discipline short of disbarment. Id. at 32-22. In support of their recommendation, those Members noted that, like the misconduct in Legato and Kenyon, Rave never took the additional step of attempting to meet with the minor whom he masturbated in view of, via a live

video feed from his computer. Id. at 33. Those Members also emphasized that, in contrast to the disbarred attorney in Walter, Rave demonstrated remorse and was not in a position of power over his victims. Id. at 33-34. Further, Rave's possession of child pornography did not meet the enhanced elements to require a prison sentence or PSL. Id. at 33.

Two of those Members also underscored that Rave did not actively target underage females with whom to interact, given that the website was promoted as being for persons more than eighteen years old. Id. at 35-36. Those Members also noted that Rave, who had no prior criminal or disciplinary history, appeared to have been a good candidate for rehabilitation. Id. at 36.

The four Members who voted to recommend Rave's disbarment emphasized that he had masturbated in view of an actual minor, as occurred in Walter. Id. at 37-38. In the view of those Members, given the ever-evolving state of technology, the fact that Rave satisfied his sexual urges by masturbating in view of minors using a live, online video feed, as opposed to doing so within a child's physical line of sight, did not make disbarment any less appropriate. Id. at 39. The Members also stressed that Rave could have taken steps to ensure that he limited his activities to consenting adults. Ibid. Rather, he took advantage of the anonymity provided by random pairing with other users of a website that a

reasonable user could easily identify as accessible to adolescents. Id. at 39-40. Those Members concluded that Rave's two distinct modes of child sexual exploitation required nothing less than disbarment. Id. at 42.

Following its review, the Court imposed an indeterminate suspension on the attorney. Rave, 258 N.J. 453.

In our view, Rave is most instructive to our analysis. However, whereas Rave knew he was communicating with minors using an internet-based platform, respondent's intent was to use Grindr to meet with a nineteen-year-old individual. Therefore, we must balance the strict liability of respondent's criminal conduct with attorney disciplinary matters involving overt acts to finalize planned and knowing illegal sexual conduct with minors.

In that context, we conclude that respondent's criminal conduct was unquestionably serious – it violated laws and public policy intended to protect minors against sexual abuse. However, it falls short of the sexual misconduct cases where attorneys have been disbarred for their criminal conduct for taking an overt step toward engaging in sexual misconduct with minors because the record reflects that, here, respondent unintentionally engaged in sexual contact with a minor. Although respondent's mens rea did not constitute a defense to his crime, it can be considered in this forum.

Accordingly, considering the exceptionally unique facts of this matter, we determine that the record does not establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent was seeking to engage in sexual relations with a minor. To the contrary, he used an adult dating application and agreed to meet up with someone he believed to be nineteen years old. Furthermore, J.W. was not forthcoming regarding his age, indicating on his Grindr profile that he was nineteen years old. The record also reflects that it was dark at the time respondent met with J.W.

In aggravation, respondent failed to report his criminal charges to the OAE, as R. 1:20-13(a)(1) requires.

In mitigation, respondent has no prior discipline in his twenty-eight-year career. In re Convery, 166 N.J. 298, 308 (2001). In further mitigation, respondent entered into a plea agreement in the underlying criminal matter, thereby accepting responsibility for his criminal conduct.

Conclusion

On balance, based on the foregoing disciplinary precedent and emphasizing the unique facts presented in this matter, we determine that a six-month suspension is the appropriate quantum of discipline necessary to protect the public and preserve confidence in the bar.

Chair Cuff and Vice-Chair Boyer voted to impose a two-year suspension.

Members Hoberman and Modu were absent.

We further determine to require respondent to reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for administrative costs and actual expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in R. 1:20-17.

Disciplinary Review Board
Hon. Mary Catherine Cuff, P.J.A.D. (Ret.),
Chair

By: /s/ Timothy M. Ellis
Timothy M. Ellis
Chief Counsel

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BOARD
VOTING RECORD

In the Matter of Thomas George Aljian
Docket No. DRB 25-243

Argued: January 15, 2026

Decided: March 25, 2026

Disposition: Six-Month Suspension

<i>Members</i>	Six-Month Suspension	Two-Year Suspension	Absent
Cuff		X	
Boyer		X	
Campelo	X		
Hoberman			X
Menaker	X		
Modu			X
Petrou	X		
Rodriguez	X		
Spencer	X		
Total:	5	2	2

/s/ Timothy M. Ellis

Timothy M. Ellis
Chief Counsel